Social Differentiation and Inequalities
Methodological and Cross-cutting Approaches to Questions of Gender and Ethnicity

The Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Nantes University, the École française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO) and the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) have decided to support the social sciences summer university called “Tam Đảo Summer School Week” as part of a partnership agreement for the period 2010-2013. The objectives of this partnership are to develop multidisciplinary training of an excellent standard, to create a policy discussion platform and to attract a large academic and non-academic audience from the entire Southeast Asian region.

This book is a verbatim transcription of the presentations and debates during the plenary sessions and workshops held from July 15 to 23, 2011 in Hà Nội and in the hill station of Tam Đảo on the issue of differentiation and social inequalities, with a particular focus on questions of gender and ethnicity. Four main axes of reflection were highlighted in thematic workshops:

i) ethnic and gender discrimination: measurement and methods of breaking down data;
ii) biographies: from quantitative survey to analysis;
iii) construction and management of ethnicities in Southeast Asia;
iv) field study methods in socio-economics and in anthropology.

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# Table of Contents

## Foreword
- Võ Khánh Vinh, Director of the Training Institute, Vice-President of the VASS  
- Alain Henry, Director, AFD Việt Nam  
- Franciscus Verellen, Director, the EFEO  
- Jean-Pascal Torreton, Representative of the IRD in Việt Nam  
- Yves Perraudneau, University Professor, Head of the mission of the University of Nantes in Việt Nam and Southeast Asia  
- Olivier Garro, Director, Asia-Pacific, the AUF

## Part 1 - Plenary Sessions

1. **Social Differentiations and Inequalities in Southeast Asia, The State of Play, from a Multi-disciplinary and Diachronic Perspective**, Jean-Luc Maurer  
2. **State of Play of the Living Conditions of Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam: Economic and Socio-anthropological Approaches**, Christian Culas, Benoît Massuyeau, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud  
3. **Biography and Differences between Generations**, Philippe Antoine, Andonirina Rakotonarivo  
4. **Gender, Sexuality and Reproduction in Việt Nam**, Catherine Scornet

## Part 2 - Workshops

1. **Ethnic and Gender Discriminations: Methods of Measurement and Breaking Down Data**, Jean-Pierre Cling, Axel Demenet, Christophe Norman, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud  
2. **Biographies: From the Quantitative Survey to Analysis**, Philippe Antoine, Mody Diop, Andonirina Rakotonarivo  
3. **Construction and Management of Ethnicities in Southeast Asia: Cultures, Policies and Development**, Christian Culas, Trần Hồng Hạnh, Grégoire Schlemmer  
4. **Training in Field Surveys in Socio-economics and Anthropology. Differentiation and Inequalities: Realities Perceived, Realities Experienced in the Commune of Tam Quan, Tam Đảo district**, Christophe Gironde, Pierre-Yves Le Meur, Olivier Tessier with the participation of Annuska Derks and Mireille Razafindrakoto

## Biographies of Teachers

## Acronyms and Abbreviations
Foreword

Regional “Tam Đảo Summer School Week”: A Valuable Training Platform

The first Social Sciences Summer School was held in 2007 as part of the “Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire en Sciences Sociales” (FSP2S) project “Support for Research on Economic and Social Transition Issues in Việt Nam”, implemented by the “École française d’Extrême-Orient” in partnership with the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences. It was established because the Joint Franco-Vietnamese Scientific Council within the FSP2S organization had observed the need for capacity-building for Vietnamese researchers, teaching researchers and Ph.D. students, covering methodology, survey tools and data treatment. Held again in 2008 and 2009, the “Journées de Tam Đảo” (“Tam Đảo Summer School Week”) – also known as JTD – maintained its objective of introducing future Vietnamese social scientists to the intellectual tools and know-how necessary to gain a rigorous knowledge of social reality and to provide them with the theoretical and methodological basis to draft a scientifically pertinent research project. The sessions were held in Hà Nội and in Tam Đảo, a hill station near the capital, and resulted in the publication of three works published in both French and Vietnamese.

2010-2013: An Agreement for Partnership, Change on a Regional Scale

Given the success of the first three years, and in order to support the development of the Summer School, the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), the University of Nantes, the École française d’Extrême-Orient (ÉFEO) and the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) decided to confirm their combined commitment in a partnership agreement signed April 15th, 2010 at the AFD headquarters in Paris for the four years 2010-2013.

[1] Project finished May 7th, 2009
Lagrée (scientific Ed.) (2008), Les Journées de Tam Đảo. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement (2), Summer School in social sciences, Éditions Thế Giới, Hà Nội, September, 401 p. (French version), 398 p. (Vietnamese version);
This partnership aims to maintain the continuity of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week with previous training sessions, with the general objectives of:

- Supporting multi-disciplinary training of an excellent standard: improving knowledge, methods and survey tools in the social sciences; reinforcing capacity for the analysis of economic and social changes; consolidating skills in methods for evaluating the impact of development projects;
- Constituting a policy discussion platform, as well as developing a pool of researchers open to the Southeast Asian region: the JTD was designed as a forum for the study of strategies, methods and working practices in development, but also for training and exchanges between researchers and decision-makers;
- Developing the profile and appeal of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week: the JTD aims to attract a wide academic and non-academic audience throughout Southeast Asia.

Building on the evaluations of the first three years, the regional project 2010-2013 also has new ambitions:

- A specific theme of a regional or international nature is set each year, then elaborated and debated according to different methodological and cross-cutting, transverse approaches;
- At the VASS, the first two days of training and discussions conclude with a synthesis session which kicks off multi-disciplinary consideration by discussing proposed methodological tools; this part of the programme is designed to be an introduction to the thematic workshops;
- The four workshops, each attended by around twenty participants for five days, are followed by a one-day plenary session, for synthesis; in this way, participants and trainers meet at the end of the week to share and present the output of each workshop;
- In order to increase its appeal to a wider geographic area, the Summer School Week welcomes researchers and participants from Southeast Asia. This regional expansion greatly reinforces visibility in the region and allows a wider network for exchange and scientific collaboration. The audience is composed of approximately fifty Vietnamese participants and around thirty from the region (Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and other neighbouring countries).

An Annual Trilingual Scientific Production

The proceedings will be published in three languages – Vietnamese, French and English – in the year following each training session in the AFD series, Conférences et Séminaires, co-edited by the EFEO and the Tri Thức publishing house. Each work is available on CD-ROM and as a free download on the site www.tamdaoconf.com as well as on the sites of the partner organizations. To complement this, www.tamdaoconf.com also offers further reading to expand and deepen understanding of the themes and fields touched upon, an in-depth biography of each trainer and a triple evaluation provided by the trainers, participants and reporters.
Social Differentiation and Inequalities

The guiding principle of the 2011 JTD was to examine the issue of differentiation and social inequalities, with a particular focus on questions of gender and ethnicity; in accordance with the logical framework, this fifth meeting was organized around two complementary axes:

- Training in plenary sessions for two days at the VASS, 15th and 16th July 2011. Following on from the documentary film “8”, four interventions introduced and developed, from a methodological and multi-disciplinary angle, questions of social differentiation and inequalities. The sessions were concluded by a synthesis report of the two days;
- Four thematic workshops at the hill station Tam Đảo, lasting five days from Monday 18th to Friday 23rd July. Issues examined were ethnic and gender discrimination (workshop 1), biographical surveys (workshop 2), construction and management of ethnicities in Southeast Asia (workshop 3), social differentiation and inequalities in the context of training in field surveys in socio-economics and anthropology (workshop 4).

The fictional film “8” was shown at the start of the plenary sessions. Premiered in May 2009 at the Cannes Film Festival, the film is made up of eight short sections which form a feature film about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) fixed at the Millennium Summit of September 2000. Its aim is to raise awareness, as widely as possible, of the potential gains from international solidarity. Two extracts were chosen for their link with our 2011 theme, with subtitles in Vietnamese: “Tiya’s dream” by Abderrahmane Sissako on extreme poverty; “Person to person” by Wim Wenders on North-South partnership.

After the screening, an introductory lecture was given by Jean-Luc Maurer, a political scientist and professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID, Geneva). The lecture firstly aimed to highlight the historical and cultural heritage – within Southeast Asia – of the areas mainly influenced by China (mainly Việt Nam) and India (all the other countries in the region, except the Philippines). The speaker set out to show that although there were marked differences throughout the region between the majority ethnic groups in power and minority populations far removed from power, the differences were often initially more subtle and changeable than they have since become. Colonialism, by its principle of “divide and rule”, often solidified the relationships between ethnic groups and rendered them more antagonistic, whereas they had been traditionally notable for their complementarity and cooperation. Following this, the lecture focused on the post-colonial period and the effects of economic development – or its absence – on differentiation and social inequalities. The conclusion underlined that the acceleration of the processes of economic development since the start of the wave of neo-liberal “globalization” has significantly reinforced social differences almost everywhere in the region, but also with marked variations between countries as a result of their pre-colonial heritage, colonial influences and the political and economic choices made since then.

At the start of the afternoon, attention shifted to the living conditions of the ethnic minority groups in Việt Nam. This reflection was carried out through the lens of two complementary
disciplines: economics (Benoît Massuyeau, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud) and anthropology (Christian Culas). This presentation allowed us to assess the socio-economic conditions of ethnic minorities in Việt Nam via the policies implemented to help them. Taking recent research results and quantitative surveys: Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey, employment surveys, Baseline Survey – specifically conducted among ethnic minorities – as its starting point, the analysis focused on trends in the levels of income and poverty, but also on access to various essential social services. Other dimensions of wellbeing and the factors which contribute to them, were also touched upon – such as the populations’ participation in different development projects implemented in their areas and the way in which these had affected (or not) their daily life.

The second day started with a presentation on biographical surveys by Philippe Antoine and Andonirira Rakotonarivo, both demographers. This illustrated some of the numerous possibilities offered by the collection and analysis of biographies. Biographical survey is really a longitudinal approach where each event experienced by the individual is placed in the context of that moment (in individual or collective time), not in the context of the moment of the survey. The accumulated experience of the last few years shows that it is possible for national research teams to apply techniques hitherto thought only suitable for use in developed countries. These surveys can be adapted to the reality of different terrains, and remain relatively cheap: from an optimum sample of about 2,000-2,500 people at the level of a town, region or country, it is possible to obtain credible results on complex interrelations between economic, demographic and social variables. In countries where continuous and reliable observations are rare, biographical surveys retrace over a relatively long period the main socio-economic changes at the household level. The methods, as descriptive as they are in-depth, provide indicators in various dimensions of time, by age, generation or date period. This kind of survey provides us with a better view of the links between the order of events, the migratory paths and family histories which populations follow.

The morning finished with an intervention from Catherine Scornet, a social demographer at the University of Provence, on issues of gender, sexuality and reproduction in Việt Nam. The reduction of fertility, which was very rapid in Việt Nam, has been accompanied by new attitudes towards love and intimacy. It is the condition for, and the result of, a change in gender relationships and sexuality. Although in Việt Nam the fertility transition has been accompanied by non-mandatory public policy, the arrival of birth control nonetheless signalled the emergence of an element of calculation in the relationships of individuals with reproduction and life, as well as in the relationships between men and women, and contributed to disassociate sexuality and gender from fatality and from nature. The general availability of contraception marked a turning point, because it implies a transition from "male" methods of contraception, dependent on the discipline and will of men, towards methods directly controlled by women, which are more reliable medical methods of contraception. In a traditional society where it is normal to continue to do today what one did yesterday, where entire areas of one’s existence are regulated by habits and pre-existing models, individuals cannot search for and choose to adopt a lifestyle which suits their own tastes. In other words, the choice of way of life can only exist in a society
where the “reflexive narrative of self” is possible, namely modern societies. Sexual initiation is an important stage in the social construction of femininity and masculinity: men and women do not enter into it in the same way. In Việt Nam, the preoccupation with an individual’s conformity with an absolute moral ideal is now coming up against a wider range of intimate experiences – sexual, affective and conjugal. We can see a transition from a model of control of sexuality by the family/spouse, towards a more individualist representation.

Finally, at the start of the afternoon, Jean-Pierre Cling, a professor of economics at the University of Paris 13, brought the first two days to a close by way of a critical conclusion.

The training was continued from Monday 18th to Friday 22nd April in thematic workshops held concurrently at the hill station of Tam Đảo, 80 km from Hà Nội.

The objective of the workshop “Ethnic and gender discrimination: measurement and methods of breaking down data” was to present and to implement the methodological tools developed notably by economists to address these questions. By looking at a series of surveys of mainly Vietnamese households, the participants were introduced to the standard methods of measurement of discrimination – theoretical foundations, limits – and to applied pedagogic exercises in implementation, by being made familiar with the software Stata.

Workshop 2 followed up the lecture at the VASS on biographical surveys, in greater length and depth using real data so as to provide elements for the analysis of biographical data – the training was also delivered via Stata software. The training focused on understanding what a biographical survey is, the different kinds of survey form and how data is treated, on the definition of an event and on the main techniques of univariate and multivariate analysis used in this approach.

At the heart of workshop 3 were the construction and the management of ethnic groups in Southeast Asia from a cultural, political and development angle. One of the principal objectives was to show that the naming of these groups, at a specific point in their history, gives us precise indications of how States – the central power – think of them and attempt to manage them. The methodological approach used a diachronic comparative analysis of countries in the Southeast Asian region and the comparison of data – law, national constitutions – using anthropological tools.

The workshop “Differentiation and Inequalities: Realities Perceived, Realities Experienced. Training in Field Level Surveys in Socio-economics and Anthropology” had a double objective: to introduce participants to the tools and methods of surveys in socio-economics and anthropology, and their application in real time in a commune in the foothills of Tam Đảo. On the first day, participants and trainers discussed the issue of inequalities in Việt Nam since the policy of Renovation, by paying particular attention to gender and inter-ethnic inequalities. The training then continued over three days of fieldwork, via village-level surveys, on the following themes: i) dynamics of differentiation in systems of productive activity, ii) differentiation in culture and education, inequalities of access to land as a product of regional and social history.
Results from the field were explored by bringing the different groups together to interact, so as to familiarize participants with the cumulative approach.

**Principal Characteristics of the Themed Workshops Held during the JTD 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workshop</th>
<th>Scale / Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>Tools / Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1- Ethnic and gender discrimination</td>
<td>Macro, meso and micro scales. Unit of analysis: households</td>
<td>Economics, statistics</td>
<td>Employment surveys, techniques for breaking down, Stata, quantitative and comparative approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2- Biographies: from quantitative survey to analysis</td>
<td>Macro and micro approaches. Unit of analysis: households and individuals</td>
<td>Demography, statistics</td>
<td>Biographies, Stata, case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3- Construction and management of ethnicities in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>National and regional scale</td>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>Diachronic comparative analysis, case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4- Training in field surveys in socio-economics and anthropology.</td>
<td>Local scale: communes and villages. Unit of analysis: surveys of households and individuals</td>
<td>Socio-anthropology, socio-economics</td>
<td>Qualitative interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four workshops were constructed so as to be able to be followed by participants from different disciplines, the priority being to allow everyone to use the most open approaches and tools possible. This desire to bring viewpoints together in a multi-disciplinary way was evident on the last day of reporting-back, Saturday 23rd July. As usual at the JTD, a certificate of participation and engagement signed by the VASS, the AFD, the IRD, the EFEO and the University of Nantes was presented to each participant at the end of the session.

The evening of Thursday 21st July was reserved for the screening of the documentary film: “Water Money” by Christian Lallier – 52 minutes, 2006; presented and narrated by Alain Henry – subtitles in Vietnamese. This topical documentary deals with the installation of networks to provide drinking water in communes in Mali. It focuses on the debates which were sparked off in a developing country by the organization and management of a basic service on a chargeable basis; it examines the concrete logic and the uncertainties which underlie a development project like this. The screening gave all the participants a chance to discuss the complexity of introducing a new activity into the local context, which has its own constraints and history often little known to the project.
Profile of 2011 Participants

Choosing the participants was particularly difficult in 2011. In fact, almost 300 applications were received – that is a rise of almost 50% compared to 2010 – and only 84 candidates were chosen. This selection was deemed necessary so as to preserve a strong group dynamic and to maintain a relevant pedagogical approach during the workshops at Tam Đảo.

In total, almost 100 people were present at the plenary sessions at the VASS. The attendance sign-up sheets allow us to derive the following profile:

- A high proportion of women: 76% of the participants;
- A young audience: 25% between 20 and 25 years of age, 32% between 26 and 30, 23% between 31 and 35 and 20% over 36 years old;
- A range of degrees and levels of education: Master’s degrees (35), Master’s and teaching degrees (4), Ph.D. / Ph.D. students (13), Ph.D. / Ph.D. student and lecturer (5), researcher (16), lecturer (7), researcher and lecturer (2), development practitioner (2);
- Multi-disciplinarity: sociology, anthropology, socio-anthropology, economics, statistics, demography, geography, history, law;
- Within Việt Nam, most participants coming from Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (35 and 22 respectively) with participants also coming from the provinces of Lào Cai, Thái Nguyên, Nha Trang, Bình Dương and Cần Thơ;
- An openness towards Southeast Asia and beyond the region: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and free auditors from Cambodia and Việt Nam;
- Institutional pluralism:

  • Việt Nam: Institute of Economics of Việt Nam (VASS); Southern Institute of Sustainable Development (VASS); Institute of Anthropology (VASS); Institute of the Family (VASS); Centre for Population of Phu Giao district (province of Bình Dương); Institute for Research on Africa and the Middle East (VASS); Institute of Sociology (VASS); General Department of Population and Family Planning; University of Đồng Nai; Institute of the Family and of Gender (VASS); Institute of Vietnamology and Development Sciences, University of Thủ Đầu Một (Bình Dương); Institute of Research on Religions (VASS); Institute of Research on Cultures (VASS); Centre for Urban and Development Studies (CEFURD); NGO Enda; Institute of Research on Mankind (VASS); Political centre of Củ Chi; Institute of Research on China (VASS); University of Social and Human Sciences of Hồ Chí Minh City; Culture, Sports and Tourism Service of Lào Cai; Ecole Supérieure de Culture, Arts and Tourism of Nha Trang; University of Thái Nguyên; Institute of World Economics and Politics (VASS); Ecole Supérieure of Hà Nội; Institute of Research on Development, Hồ Chí Minh City; Institute of Research on Southeast Asia (VASS); Centre for Research, Consultancy and Community Development, Hồ Chí Minh City; Institute of Policy and Administration, Cần Thơ;
  • Cambodia: Institute of Technology; Royal University of Law and Economics; NGO Nyemo; NGO Development and Partnership in Action;
  • Laos: National University of Laos; University of Savannakhet;
• Thailand: Mahidol University;
• Malaysia: National University of Malaysia;
• Outside Asia: University of Provence Aix-Marseille.

Finally, we could not conclude these few lines of introduction without announcing the dates of the next Tam Đảo Summer School, 13th-21st July 2012; this sixth meeting will have an equally fascinating theme: “Water in all its States, Methods and Multi-disciplinary Analysis”.

Stéphane Lagrée
Acknowledgements

The institutional synergy sealed by a four-year partnership agreement gives the Tam Đào Summer School Week a regional reach on the scale of Southeast Asia and beyond, and for this we would like to thank: Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) – Research Department, École française d’Extrême-Orient (ÉFEO), l’Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) – Direction for the Program for Research and Training in the South, University of Nantes as well as the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie.

This publication is indebted to Philippe Cabin for his recommendations and it is important for us to thank Support for Knowledge Management at AFD for the quality of our exchanges with them.

We extend all of our gratitude to the entire team of trainers for their scientific and pedagogical contributions during the organization, execution and improvement of this year’s Tam Đào Summer School Week: Philippe Antoine, Jean-Pierre Cling, Christian Culas, Mody Diop, Christophe Gironde, Alain Henry, Pierre-Yves Le Meur, Benoît Massuyeau, Jean-Luc Maurer, Christophe Jalil Nordman, Andonirina Rakotonarivo, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud, Grégoire Schlemmer, Catherine Scornet, Olivier Tessier and Trần Hồng Hạnh.

The work involved in transcribing the sessions and workshops is a particularly long and arduous task, and our thanks go to those who made the effort to provide such quality texts: Jean Verly, plenary sessions (ESC Rouen and diploma in modern literature at Paris-Sorbonne); Amandine Lepoutre, workshop 1 (Ph.D. in History, École pratique des hautes études); Youssef Ouali Laalami, workshop 2 (M.A. in Organizational Management); Lena Kéravec, workshop 3 (diploma from Rennes University II and from the Institut Régional du Patrimoine- IRPA); Alain Fiorucci, workshop 4 (Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Provence).

Finally, we would like to congratulate the interpreters and translators who have accompanied this 2011 JTD: Trần Thị Phương Thảo, Hà Nội University; Phạm Thị Kim Yến, Lê Kim Quy and Lê Thanh Mai Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ngô Thị Hồng Lan, National Economics University; Nguyễn Việt Tiến, National University of Hà Nội; Elizabeth Burgess and David Smith, freelance translators.
Opening Remarks

Võ Khánh Vinh
*Director of the Training Institute and Vice-President of the VASS*

Alain Henry
*Director, AFD Việt Nam*

Franciscus Verellen
*Director, the EFEO*

Jean-Pascal Torreton
*Representative of the IRD in Việt Nam*

Yves Perraudeau
*University Professor, Head of the mission of the University of Nantes in Việt Nam and Southeast Asia*

Olivier Garro
*Director, Asia-Pacific, the AUF*
Opening Remarks by
Võ Khánh Vinh

Director of the Training Institute,
Vice-President of the VASS

Distinguished guests, lecturers and representatives of French and Vietnamese research and teaching establishments, Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences and its training Institute, I should like to welcome you to the regional summer school in social sciences or "Tam Dao Days" 2011.

The summer school was organized for the first time in 2007; it is now a scientific event and annual meeting place and training venue recognized both in Việt Nam and in neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Each year this summer school brings together about 100 participants from research and training establishments throughout Việt Nam but also from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and even Malaysia. An international network of researchers, trainers and scientists has thus been created and developed. The "Tam Dao Days", known as the JTD, have become a brand, an original label, due partly to their format, but also to the multi-disciplinary nature of the exchange of knowledge which takes place and the methodological approaches used. I am convinced that this training model will soon be adopted by other research institutions in Việt Nam and beyond. With this in mind, we can congratulate ourselves on the signing of a partnership agreement for the period 2010-2013 between the VASS, the AFD, the IRD, the University of Nantes and the EFEO, and also on a three-year commitment by the AUF via an "Innovative Action" funding mechanism.

The 2011 theme “Social Differentiation and Inequality; Methodological and Cross-disciplinary Approaches to Questions of Gender and Ethnicity” seems especially relevant to the structure and functioning of Vietnamese society and to the study of situations elsewhere in this region.

Our Institute is going through a development phase, particularly in its training syllabus for a short-term Master’s program; the modules forming part of this JTD will be studied and adapted to form part of that program. Both the VASS and its Training Institute are fully aware of the importance of this scientific event and will do their utmost to meet expectations and insure that this summer school will be of the highest quality. The expertise, academic rigor and enthusiasm seen from trainers and
participants in previous years certainly allow us to hope that this 2011 event will be a great success.

All my best wishes for your success.

Thank you.
Opening Remarks by Alain Henry
Director, AFD Việt Nam

Dear Mr Võ Khánh Vinh, Vice-President of the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, teaching staff and colleagues,

The Tam Đảo summer schools are an intellectual and educational adventure which is both useful and original. The Agence Française de Développement is proud to support the excellent work achieved here. Our intellectual and financial support is for the long term, which is clear proof of our conviction of the high quality of this project. The JTD are part of a university tradition of which I’d like to underline some characteristics, linked to the AFD’s motives in providing support. I see at least three exceptional qualities in the JTD:

- Each year they allow the presentation and debate of scientific work on development processes which, in itself, is very important, particularly for donors and the various actors involved in development;
- They also offer an opportunity for intensive training, providing young researchers and students a practical and theoretical apprenticeship with experienced teachers. This is done in a fairly private setting, which further enriches the dialogue;
- Finally, the JTD adopt an inclusive approach, both multi-disciplinary and regional. So it is a process of decompartmentalization, which also produces documentary results in several languages.

To my mind these qualities are fundamental.

That’s why the AFD is providing financial support to this approach. Carrying out research is not the AFD’s principal mission, even though it does carry out a little. However, the AFD’s goal is to gain from the JTD a better understanding of the context, the social fabric and the economic factors which are at play in the processes of development. Understanding the context, its forces for change, its strengths and its weaknesses, is a high priority for us. The better we understand specific local factors, the more we can challenge “ready-made” development solutions and policies. Your research interests are linked to a critical examination of our projects.

I’d like to illustrate this idea with a few points relative to this year’s theme.

Let’s take the question of gender. For sure, there are many theories about the missing link in development. Among them, I recall the theory of Emmanuel Todd according to which female literacy is the trigger for development in human history. Without completely espousing this theory, we must all be aware of the principle that there is a strong correlation between the female literacy rate, the general level of education of individuals and the triggering of growth. Understanding this point is fundamental. Deriving development policies from it is another step, and one...
which is difficult to take. Take for example France, which refuses to enact policies which discriminate in favour of women. At the same time, one can see evidence every day of how prejudiced attitudes are. I must admit that the AFD in Việt Nam does not have a project targeting gender, apart from initiatives in the sphere of microfinance which tend to favour women. So we at the AFD must ask ourselves: should we do more, should we proceed differently, and if so, on what conceptual basis?

Another example is the question of ethnicity. The idea of “ethnic minorities” is often used in development policies, but it is not well defined. The Scandinavian donors and the World Bank often make this a sole criterion for their projects. The French position is more ambiguous. A certain amount of guilt surrounds this subject in the French intellectual sphere, mainly due to the use we made of it in the colonial era. We have developed a strong and comprehensive analysis of the notion of “ethnic identity”. At the same time, the AFD today finances rural projects which are officially focused on helping ethnic minorities. I must admit that the theoretical and practical bases for these projects are pretty thin, and sometimes imprecise. In these circumstances, I fear that our financial support for these minorities is neither as rational nor as effective as it could be. It’s true that the category of ethnic minorities was conceived in the context of colonial domination. Then it was adopted by the Vietnamese administration. Today, it’s used constantly by certain donors. The AFD, among others, feels that this notion is intellectually vulnerable. It groups together communities which are often changeable, without precise boundaries, and whose historical, political and cultural trajectories are very different. Some of these communities have experienced very different levels of development from that of the Kinh community – some are even more developed. Assimilating them into one purportedly homogenous and isotropic implies trying to merge social objects which are completely distinct. What would people say if, in one particular country, the same public policies were applied to schoolchildren and the elderly? Nevertheless, that’s what we do with ethnic minorities: the same public policies are applied to very different groups.

The concept has been repeatedly challenged, but the administration and the donors continue to use it. There’s hardly a donor meeting where this notion of “ethnic minorities” is not mentioned, without identifying the specific social group; it’s a term seen as so obvious that no one actually tries to redefine it. It’s not a question of rehashing criticism of discrimination policies. I want to mention here a point from management theory, which I think explains the persistence of a concept ill-suited to public policy; “neither management nor administration is possible without categorizations”. Linked to this theory is the idea that even if a category is inexact, it’s better to have it than not. Without categories, there’s no capacity for administration, no development policy. If research has as its aim to deconstruct imprecise concepts, like ethnicity, it must also be able to build concepts to replace them. It must open the door to new categories which, of course, will one day themselves be criticized, overturned and replaced in their turn. This process is endless and inevitable. I suggest that you remember this rule from management theory: it’s essential to
I would like to finish my speech by thanking all the partners and organizers of the JTD. I must modestly point out that the origin of this initiative does not lie with the AFD. It first arose from collaboration between the various university partners; the VASS, the EFEO, the University of Nantes, the IRD and the AUF. The choice of this year’s theme and the hard work that has gone into preparing it reconfirm the quality of this initiative, and I hope that we will go on supporting it in the years to come. I wish you great success in your work.
Opening Remarks by Franciscus Verellen  
Director, EFEO

The vocation of the École française d’Extrême-Orient is to contribute to high-level research, and training for research, in human and social sciences on the Indian subcontinent and in East and Southeast Asia.

The West has long been interested in Asian languages and civilizations, but now Asia's growing economic and cultural impact in an increasingly interdependent world underlines the critical need for the understanding of this continent’s societies, and the historical forces and specific cultural factors which underpin their development. So it’s not surprising that many institutions around the world are mobilizing significant resources and expertise to stay in the vanguard of university research and teaching about Asia.

What sets the EFEO apart from the rest is its emphasis on research and training in the field. The network of eighteen EFEO offices covers twelve countries, from India to Japan, and constitutes the core of the research system operated by the 46 member institutions of the European Consortium for Asian Field Study (ECAF), established in 2007 and coordinated ever since by the EFEO.

At a time when digitization is revolutionizing the humanities and social sciences, and is the focus of massive investments by Asian research institutions, the EFEO is investing to put its documentary resources, its research results, its archives and a huge collection of manuscripts at the disposal of the scientific community in digital form. The EFEO’s participation in the groupement d’intérêt public Bibliothèque universitaire des langues et civilisations – BULAC – allows the documentary centre of the EFEO, made up of the library of the Maison de l’Asie in Paris and six libraries in Asia – including the one in Chiang Mai opened in 2011 – to concentrate on their main purpose: housing an international-level collection for Southeast Asian scientific studies, extending – as regards the cross-disciplinary subjects like archaeology, epigraphy, ethnology, the history of art and religious studies – to East and Central Asia.

The EFEO participates in the transfer of knowledge via a number of teaching courses in France and in Asia. This mission as well as the supervision of Master’s and Doctoral studies are supposed to develop in the years to come, not only in France but in Europe and Asia. I must also emphasize the considerable training for research done by the EFEO Centres which host trainees, particularly on archaeological sites, and the scholarships awarded by the EFEO, with the assistance of the Fondation de France. Every year the EFEO hosts about thirty scholarship students and trainees from France and elsewhere, and contributes in this way to a new generation of researchers specializing in Asia studies.
The reputation of the EFEO also depends on the quality of its publications. The EFEO publishes six international reviews and several collections of works of scholarship. All the reviews are published in two languages (with the exception of Faguo hanxue, published by the Beijing EFEO Centre which is entirely in Chinese) and several collections appear in Asian languages: Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesian, Malay.

Owing to its long-term involvement in Asia, the EFEO is naturally interested in contemporary questions and in the links between the history of societies and their transformation in the 21st century. The EFEO’s main mission remains to continue to deepen its knowledge and understanding in the academic and university world, but its conferences and publications also target a wider audience, whose interest has been sparked by Asia’s place in the world today.

This led the EFEO to organize a reflection on strengthening links between research and policy decision-making, within the framework of the project Integrating and Developing European Asian Studies (IDEAS), supported and financed by the European Commission, which brings together six members of the ECAF consortium for 30 months (2010-2012).

We have supported this human and social sciences summer school since its establishment in 2007; as a platform for training and exchanges with regional scope, it fits in very well with the various missions assigned to the EFEO. The JTD model, which is now recognized in Việt Nam and the neighbouring countries, offers a unique meeting place between the world of research and field-level training, and that of development; in this way it forms part of the move towards the diversification of the EFEO’s scientific activities in Việt Nam.
Dear Mr Võ Khánh Vinh, Vice-President of the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, Ladies and Gentlemen, colleagues, organizers and participants,

The IRD has been involved in this summer school since its establishment in 2007, and is happy to contribute again to this important annual scientific event which is essential for researchers and students specializing in this domain.

This high-quality training aims to transfer an intellectual approach and methodologies for a rigorous understanding of social reality to the future generation of scientists whose analyses will help to shape public policies to respond to the challenges of development. This transfer of competences and knowledge fits well with the IRD’s mission.

This summer school was extended across the region last year, and by promoting exchanges between the different scientific communities of the region it encourages the growth of regional-level research. This also corresponds to one of the IRD’s priorities.

This partnership between French institutes and organizations and the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, initiated and maintained thanks to a strong and continuous local demand from the President of the VASS, also fits with the stated willingness of the IRD and the AIRD to involve local partners even more in the definition of common objectives in the spirit of partnership.

The multi-disciplinary approaches proposed here also meet our expectations. In general, scientific progress benefits greatly from exchanges and debates not only between specialists in a given domain, but also between specialists in different disciplines and approaches, and between questioning and perceptions stemming from different cultures.

Finally, this year’s theme, social differentiation and inequality particularly as regards gender and ethnicity, corresponds to one of the three priorities set out in the IRD’s statement of objectives for 2011-2015 in the human and social sciences: “Vulnerability, Inequality and Growth”.

In summary, the approach and spirit of this summer school in social sciences are closely linked to the IRD’s mission.

I hope you will be stimulating debates and many fruitful exchanges, to make this 5th meeting of the JTD yet another success.
Presidents, Directors, respected students, dear colleagues,

I am again very honoured to participate in the opening session of this new meeting of the JTD: “Social Differentiation and Inequality”. I sincerely thank you for this. As head of the mission representing the President of the University of Nantes in our cooperation with Việt Nam and Southeast Asia, I am touched by this both personally and professionally. My satisfaction at being here among you is based on several factors.

Firstly, on behalf of the University of Nantes, its president Yves Lecointe, and its Vice-president for international relations, Françoise Le Jeune, we are very happy to be here for this 5<sup>th</sup> meeting. Our presence signifies our enthusiasm for this cooperation, for which a document was signed just over a year ago. Given the experience of past years, we think this event will be beneficial for the doctoral students, trainers, professors and researchers. In April 2011, the University of Nantes helped to lead the last doctoral seminars, working with a colloquium organised by the Hà Nội University of Social Sciences, the International School and the University of Nantes (Nantes-Angers-Le Mans regional hub). For two days, our workshops focused on “the contributions of the human and social sciences to socio-economic development”, mainly as applied to the case of Việt Nam. During this meeting, a significant delegation from Nantes, including our Vice-presidents Françoise Le Jeune and Jacques Girardeau, was present to witness the involvement of our university and to participate in the launch of an international doctoral centre in Literature, Languages and Human and Social Sciences at the National University of Việt Nam.

Within the framework of its international cooperation policy, our university regularly participates in partnerships and projects. We also promote the decentralization of some of our Master’s courses. Several courses from the University of Nantes are based in Việt Nam, thanks to the work of our former President François Resche who signed many agreements with Vietnamese universities, such as those in the fields of health (Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City), odontology (Hà Nội), science and technical studies (Đà Nẵng and Cần Thơ), and economic and management sciences (Hà Nội).
As Director of the Institute of Economics and Management at Nantes, I'd like to underline our presence through three Master’s programmes in economics and management – soon to be four, I hope. Moreover, projects in Cambodia and Thailand are advancing, reinforcing the opening up towards the region which this summer school has encouraged. So it’s also with my researcher/teacher hat on that I participate willingly in this cooperation.

The theme of this year’s JTD is fascinating. For an economist, the question of inequality is crucial, because when researching the maximum satisfaction of the population, we must pose the question of society as the sum of individuals or society as a global entity in its own right: does the sum of individual interests thus equal the interests of society as a whole?

Furthermore, for some observers, questions of gender and ethnicity are at the origin of certain differences between individuals. These studies sometimes use an empirical approach, sometimes a quasi-doctrinal one. The explanation for development itself can be influenced by factual considerations – geographical, sociological, cultural and so on – or considerations tainted with subjective, partisan or even racist elements. By looking only at the most traditional, theoretical approaches like that of productivity, for example, authors like Carré Dubois Malinvaud in France and Denison in the USA have shown the impact of the “sexual” dimension in macro-economic outcomes. Studies at micro-economic level into the physical productivity of men and women, or into that of “Japanese” or “Europeans”, also bring out interesting elements of this debate about the inequalities of gender and ethnicity. The economist, or the sociologist, can also look into the “sexual” division of work in civilizations and its consequences in terms of the evolution of the structure of the family, or of the organisation of work in societies. One can imagine some interesting discussions.

The presence of the University of Nantes was made possible in 2010 by the favourable reception extended by the founders of the JTD. I would like to thank them all again for this. And in particular Stéphane Lagrée who, as a former student at the University of Nantes, was able to make a personal approach to initiate this cooperation and, through his own close involvement, to ensure that it succeeded.

Finally, I am very happy with this cooperation on a personal level; after 33 years in higher education, this cooperation brings me fresh inspiration to learn more. Moreover, I never tire of spending time in this beautiful country, in this beautiful region of Southeast Asia.

I thank you. I am happy and honoured to be amongst you and with you in this common project. I wish health and success to all the researchers present at this summer school 2011.
Opening Remarks by Olivier Garro

Director, Asia-Pacific, AUF

The Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie is happy to be associated with this summer school in social sciences, which brings together numerous partners and each year allows about 80 people to work for ten days both in plenary sessions and in workshops.

The main aim of our participation in the JTD and the financial support which we bring is to help to open up the international aspect, and I am really impressed to see that the participants this year come from many Asian countries. Opportunities for Cambodians, Laotians, Thais and Malaysians to come together in Việt Nam to learn and exchange ideas by drawing on mainly French-speaking expertise are rare.

As it does for the doctoral seminars, such as the one which took place yesterday – and I think that many of you participated in it – this summer school contributes to the creation of a real network of Ph.D. students, young researchers and academics in the social sciences.

The format chosen for this summer school seems to me to be particularly interesting, because its duration and above all its organisation in field-level workshops during the week at Tam Đảo allow a different kind of exchange than in the more formal meetings (seminars, conferences, etc.) which students usually attend. The interactions are also different. Unfortunately I haven’t yet been able to see the JTD in action because I’ve only been in Hà Nội since last September, but I believe that organising workshops in this way encourages discussion, the exchange of views and a real interaction in an interesting system of multilingualism which is close to speaking in tongues. The teaching expertise is overall French in this summer school but participants speak in various languages and communication nevertheless succeeds.

It therefore seems to me very important that the summer school challenges certain practices – “top-down” teaching, absence of dialogue – because it is training the academics and researchers who already today, and even more so in the future, will be those in charge of the research and the teaching of social sciences in the region. I hope that when lecturing their students, these young teachers will remember their conferences and workshops here and base their pedagogical approach on that experience.

For the future, the AUF has suggested to several partners the idea of forming a regional college for Ph.D. students in the social sciences, which could, over several years, support groups of students as they progress towards their final thesis. In our opinion, which is still to be confirmed by our partners, there should be a support system for Ph.D. students while they are in Asia. We
must try to avoid students finding themselves completely alone, cut off from active research teams and from other students. The summer school would be a valuable opportunity to bring these cohorts of Ph.D. students together and offer them extra scientific and methodological instruction.

We therefore hope, if the other entities supporting this summer school are interested, and if this doctoral college can be launched, that there could be a synergy between the two initiatives and that for many more years, the great success of this summer school in social sciences could make an important contribution to the training of young researchers and teachers in this field in Asia.

Thank you for your attention.
Localization Map

Source: Tomorrow Media.
Part 1
Plenary Sessions
1.1. Social Differentiations and Inequalities in Southeast Asia
The State of Play, from a Multi-disciplinary and Diachronic Perspective

Jean-Luc Maurer, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID, Geneva)

(Retranscription)

I’d like to thank the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences and its French partners – IRD, AUF, EFEO, the University of Nantes – and in particular Stéphane Lagrée, who has been the real lynchpin of the Tam Đảo Summer School since its creation, for having invited me to this fifth session. Stéphane has been asking me to lecture at the JTD for several years now, as I’ve been coming to Việt Nam to teach for two or three weeks each summer for almost a decade now. Our Institute itself offers a decentralised Master’s programme in development studies, which takes place partly in Hà Nội.

The theme chosen for this year’s Summer School lends itself particularly well to my area of expertise because I’m a specialist in the development policies of Asian countries and I’ve done most of my research work in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia but also in Việt Nam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia.[1] So I know the region well, perhaps better than I know my two countries of origin, France and Switzerland! Moreover, with other colleagues from the Institute of Development Studies in Geneva I’ve lectured regularly for several years on issues of social inequality. I hope that the reflections I’m going to share will give you new insights into this fundamental issue.

I’m perhaps being a bit over-ambitious by wanting to give you such a vast introductory tableau, but I hope that this will be useful not only for the discussion of my own presentation, but also for the week-long workshops at Tam Đảo. In fact, I want to cover the ten countries of the region, comparing their dynamics from a diachronic perspective because beyond the contemporary context, the processes of differentiation are based in History, Culture and what Denys Lombard – one of my tutors – called “long-term time”. This presentation will

[1] The term Malaysia used here designates the country established on both sides of the South China Sea.
obviously and inevitably be accompanied by a certain number of statistics. It’s the role of the researcher to measure and quantify, but not only that; the main thing is to understand, perhaps by using figures, but also by turning to qualitative analysis. As a political scientist, I am open to this double approach.

After an introduction in which I will justify the point of analysing the issue of inequalities and differentiation in the world, and particularly in Southeast Asia, my presentation can be divided into three broad sections. In the first, I will set out elements of unity and diversity across the region, which in most cases stem from its long and complex history. In the second part, I will briefly trace the development paths of the countries of the region, emphasizing the link between economic growth, poverty reduction and problems of inequality. Finally, in the third part I will compare the social inequalities of two countries which seem to me to best represent the two standard models which are symbolic of the region: Indonesia and Việt Nam. I will close my presentation by analysing the deadlock in the development model and the possibilities for breaking this deadlock through the invention of a new paradigm.

The Importance of Prioritising the Study of Inequalities and the Importance of Choosing Southeast Asia as a Symbolic Region for such an Analysis

Why is it legitimate for a specialist in the problems of development to touch on the issues of differentiation and social inequality, and to prioritize them? Doubtless because, given the already proven problem of the ecological “unsustainability” of our model of economic development, the question of increasing differentiation and social inequality is certainly the issue with the greatest influence on social justice, political stability, peace and the future of humanity. In fact, differentiation and social inequalities have increased starkly in almost all countries in the world since the start of the wave of neo-liberally inspired globalization which has become widespread on the planet since the early 1980s, with the conservative “revolution” of Reagan and Thatcher.

In fact, for thirty years we’ve been living a real-life repeat of the era of inequality which characterised the unbridled capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This period resulted in the First World War, followed by the great financial and economic crisis of 1929 then by a second and even more devastating conflict of global scale. All these elements were clearly linked, and had terrible consequences. A century later, History seems to be repeating itself, and the triumphant phase of financial capitalism which we’re experiencing now could have equally tragic consequences. For these reasons, it’s crucial that development studies accord a certain priority to the analysis of the phenomena of differentiation and social inequalities, to understand them better in order to be able to curb them and try to reduce them.
Table 1 sets out the results of a study led by WIDER – the Institute of economic research of the University of the UN in Helsinki – which did a great deal of work on the issue of social inequality. This study looked at 73 countries over the period 1960-1990. There are increasing inequalities of income in 48 of these 73 countries. Moreover, in 29 of these countries the inequalities take the form of an inverted “U”, which runs counter to the dominant neo-classical theory set out by Simon Kuznets. I’ll come back to this in a moment. Of course, these figures are a little out-of-date, but if today WIDER were to run a comparable study covering the years 1980-2010, I am convinced that there would be almost no countries left in the category of those with decreasing inequalities.
Table 2 differentiates three categories of country: developed countries, developing countries and economies in transition. One notices that out of 22 economies in transition, 21 have increasing inequalities of income. The only country not in this situation is also the only one not open to market forces: Belarus! You’ll also see that most of the large Anglo-Saxon industrial economies, which were the first to get on the hobby-horse of neo-liberally inspired globalization, are experiencing growing inequalities. Only a few counties, such as France and Norway, were still at that time in the category of countries with falling inequalities, but today both are also facing worsening inequalities.
Data borrowed from the World Bank are very revealing on this point and demonstrate an alarming situation. In terms of global consumption in 2005, the poorest quintile – the least privileged 20% on the planet – only account for 1.5% of consumption. What we could call the “middle class”, that is the three middle quintiles, share only about 22% of overall consumption. As for the richest quintile, it accounts for three-quarters of total consumption.

This graph goes even further and shows the scale of consumption inequalities by decile in 2005. The richest decile takes for itself almost 60% of global consumption, i.e. 120 times more than the poorest decile, which accounts for only 0.5% of consumption. If we look at the second decile, which accounts for 1% of consumption, the ratio is still 1:60. We could continue to line up figures which would all show that we’re facing a widening gap between the rich and the poor in the world. If we looked at centiles and then at thousandths, the figures would be even more stark because riches are essentially concentrated at the summit of the pyramid. In our opinion, all this amply justifies a focus on the issues of inequalities as the most devastating overall social phenomenon on a global scale for the last thirty years.

East Asia, and notably Southeast Asia, is a region of the world which is of particular interest for the analysis of issues like this. For historical, cultural and religious reasons, social inequalities have always been considered relatively moderate compared to other regions of the world, like South America – Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia – or Southern Africa – Botswana, Namibia, South Africa. This was confirmed by the famous World Bank report of 1993 on the so-called “East Asian miracle”, which has been much analysed and criticised. Seven countries are covered in the report: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which are all four part of Southeast Asia, and the three other “little Dragons” of East Asia, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The main conclusion of this study was that the region was characterized by a phenomenon of equitable growth – “Growth with Equity”.

At another level of analysis, despite their major differences, the countries of Southeast Asia share an ancient “common cultural base” – to return to the concept set out by the great orientalist Paul Mus in his famous work *The Angle of Asia* – which in general emphasises the values of equality, sharing and simplicity. Could this be linked to the fact that, according to recent work on the genome by Professor Edison Liu, a Chinese-American researcher based in Singapore, all the peoples of Southeast Asia share a common ancestor, including populations described as minority or aboriginal? Of course, Paul Mus was not thinking of this when he described the “common cultural base”, a key concept in the analysis of inequalities. Moreover, East Asia is larger than Southeast Asia, and social inequalities have remained moderate especially in the two beacon countries of the “Asian miracle”: South Korea and Taiwan. In the ten countries of Southeast Asia itself, inequalities are variable depending on historical, cultural and political factors which we will look at. The only point in common is that, no matter what the starting point, inequalities have grown over the last twenty or thirty years in almost all these countries, and that they continue to grow.
This table shows the rise in inequalities of income and consumption in the countries of the “East Asian Miracle” at various time intervals between the start of the 1970s and the mid-1990s. However, I’ve added China and Việt Nam, which joined this trajectory mid-way through, and the Philippines which in some ways never has. The issue of inequalities is complex and comparisons are difficult. For a start, countries do not use the same indicators: some measure income, others consumption; some measure individual consumption, others consumption by household. Moreover, the reference years are never the same, which renders comparative analysis even more difficult. In this table, for each country, there is a start and finish year, which are often different, and the corresponding Gini coefficient, which is the main indicator used to analyse inequality. We can see that inequalities increased in eight out of the ten countries in the period 1970-1995, with marked differences:

- In Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines, the level of inequality, which was already high, increased further. Just to take one symbolic example, Singapore is one of the most inequitable countries in the world: the Gini coefficient was already very high in 1973 (41) and saw further strong growth until 1989 (49). In terms of social inequalities, this puts this small Southeast Asian city-state almost at the level of Brazil, which has always been one of the world champions on this issue, although it seems that Brazil’s inequalities have been falling slightly since President Lula adopted redistributive policies.

- Starting from a moderate or even low level, inequalities have literally exploded in Thailand, China and Việt Nam. The People’s Republic of China, very egalitarian during
the first thirty years of its history, started from a level probably below 30 in 1985, but reached almost 40 in 1995. Today, China is at 50, which makes it one of the least equitable countries in the world. Việt Nam, which followed the same historical process, is already in the range of 40;

- Inequalities have also risen in Taiwan and in South Korea, but they started from a low level and remain relatively moderate today;

- Inequalities have diminished in only two countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. In the second, the level was and remains relatively low. In contrast, in Malaysia the level of inequality was very high at independence, then dropped due to the policies of positive discrimination adopted by Prime Minister Mahathir to favour the Malay majority. However, inequalities have remained relatively high.

Beyond these limited comments, inequalities have generally tended to diminish from when these countries gained independence until the 1980s, whatever the strength of economic growth. It was not until the wave of neoliberal globalization of the 1980s affected these countries, and submerged them, that inequalities began to rise again. This thus contradicts the neo-classical theory set out by Simon Kuznets in the 1950s, which postulates that inequalities have a natural tendency to grow initially with economic growth and that they will then diminish, when the benefits of economic growth are shared more widely among the population.

Furthermore, much of the explanation for this stems not only from historical and cultural causes but also from the development policies adopted. It’s not by chance that inequalities rise or fall. They are also linked to the public policies which are implemented. South Korea didn’t achieve its results by miracle. Inequalities are not inevitable, they depend in part on public policies on fiscal matters and social redistribution. It will become clear during this summer school that I adopt the “pessimism of reason” and the “optimism of will” advocated by Antonio Gramsci. My analysis of the situation is in fact rather gloomy, but I believe that it is always possible to improve things if the right policies are adopted.
This table sets out a number of more recent indicators of the differences in income inequalities among the ten countries of Southeast Asia. The survey years and the indicators are different. We also use here the other principal indicator we make use of to measure inequalities: the comparison between the share of the poorest quintile (Q1) and that of the richest quintile (Q5). Major differences appear. So, for Malaysia, the ratio Q1/Q5 is greater than 12, which means the richest quintile is twelve times richer than the poorest. If we take the least inequitable countries in Southeast Asia, like Indonesia and Việt Nam, the share of the richest quintile is only five times greater than that of the poorest quintile. This is also reflected in the Gini coefficients.

<table>
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<th>Share Q1</th>
<th>Share Q5</th>
<th>Ratio Q5/Q1</th>
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1.1.1. Unity and Diversity in Southeast Asia: the Fruits of a Long and Complex History

How can we explain this situation and these differences? It seems to me that we cannot do so without returning to ancient History. From the first centuries of the Christian Era, two major waves of exogenous cultural influence spread over Southeast Asia – this “angle of Asia” for Paul Mus, “from between India and China” for Michel Bruneau. The more important of these phenomena was Indian influence, the second was Chinese influence. The former touched more or less all the countries of the region leaving a durable imprint behind, especially in Cambodia and Indonesia while Việt Nam was the only country to be more influenced by Chinese culture and the Philippines remained broadly apart from these two very ancient processes of cultural assimilation. It is important
to emphasize that the Philippines are geographically and politically an integral part of Southeast Asia, but numerous elements pull this country historically and culturally closer to Latin America. This results from the fact that the country was untouched by these two great external cultural influences of pre-colonial times, and from the fact that it was the only country to be oriented more towards the other side of the Pacific due to its colonization by Spain and then the United States. Apart from this exception, the many common values shared by religions and philosophies of Indian origin, Hinduism and above all Buddhism, and of Chinese origin, mainly Confucianism, left their mark on all the societies of Southeast Asia and left a heritage which forms part of the origin of the “common cultural base” described by Paul Mus. Among these common values we find many elements derived from a relatively egalitarian vision of society: notions of sharing, the virtues of simplicity and frugality, as can be seen in Buddhism.

If we look at more recent history, Islam, which arrived far later in the region – from the 12th century onwards – and mainly affected the Malay world, also brought with it a doctrine advocating values like humility, solidarity and charity. Thereafter, Western colonization reinforced these existing differences. On the one hand, some regions were affected very early on, from the late 16th century, like the Malaysian peninsula, Java or Luzon, while others were only affected form the mid- or late 19th century, like Bali, Northern Sumatra, Cambodia or Việt Nam. Other regions were not really affected formally, like Thailand and the border regions, the interior of the larger islands or in the mountains. It is important to understand that there is about three centuries’ difference between the moment when Western colonization touched the Malaysian peninsula and the island of Java, and the period when the other regions of Southeast Asia entered the colonial orbit, only in the 19th and 20th centuries.

On the other hand, all the major colonial powers participated in the sharing out of the region. Portugal and Spain were the first in the 16th and 17th centuries, followed by the Netherlands – it is often forgotten that this small country dominated a large part of the world in the 17th century, with colonies on all the continents – Britain and France, then the United States in the 19th century and briefly Japan in the 20th. The varying plans, styles, methods and levels of colonial processes naturally reinforced the existing diversity between the countries of the region. Christianity, which had accompanied colonization, mainly touched only the regions which had not been subject to Indian, Chinese or Islamic influence, i.e. mainly the Philippines – where Catholicism was brought by the Spanish – and border areas. This religion also brought its contribution to the “common cultural base” by advocating, at least from a theoretical point of view often sadly the opposite of its practices, the same values of humility, solidarity and charity.

Striding forwards through this long and complex history, the nationalism which emerged from the early 20th century led to processes of colonial emancipation which are relatively comparable, but to widely differing declarations of independence. After the Second World War and the trauma of Japanese occupation from which the whole region suffered, some countries’ independence was attained through struggle and violence, as in Indonesia and
Việt Nam, while others attained it more “peacefully”, such as Malaysia or Cambodia. All the Southeast Asian countries which attained their independence between 1945 – Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma – and the late 1950s / early 1960s – Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore – enshrined the same values in their constitutions. We find, in fact, similar principles of equitable development, social justice and democracy, in the range of variations from the social rationalism of Sukarno in Indonesia to the autarchic socialism of Burma for example. These elements can equally be seen as aspects of unity or of diversity.

Since the post-colonial period, all the countries of Southeast Asia have experienced complex and sometimes chaotic changes, and have been deeply affected by the Cold War; this region was the main “hot spot” of that tense period. Some joined the Western camp straight away – Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore – and adopted capitalist strategies for modernisation and development. Only one country immediately joined the socialist camp and followed an opposing model: Việt Nam. The others initially tried the (sadly illusory) third path of non-alignment – Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and Laos – before switching to the Western – Indonesia in 1965 – or the socialist bloc – Cambodia and Laos in 1975. Only one remained apart from the two blocs, for better or (mainly) for worse: Burma. Whatever their political ideology, only four of them have embarked relatively late on processes of democratization which have been partial, eventful and of variable depth: Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.

Moreover, all these countries have each in their turn become members of ASEAN – created in 1967 –, then all gradually, with the exception of Burma, joined the dynamic of capitalist globalization, whatever political ideology they continue to claim. This is particularly clear in the case of Việt Nam, where market socialism fits perfectly with neoliberal globalization. This integration into the maelstrom of globalization has stimulated strong economic growth which has itself brought about very deep social change, notably characterized not only by poverty reduction, but also by an increase in inequalities between the winners and the losers of this process. In the final analysis, this complex history has produced a mosaic of ethnic, demographic, cultural, religious and political diversity, which nonetheless maintains strong elements of unity in economic, social and political terms.
This table offers a summary of the historical trajectories of Southeast Asia. Major differences can be seen. There is widespread heterogeneity in economic terms among the countries of the region. Singapore, for example, has a rate of economic openness greater than 400%, that is to say its external trade is worth four times its GDP, while its GDP is only half that of Indonesia’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cultural/religious pre-colonial influence</th>
<th>Dominant colonial power</th>
<th>Year independence declared</th>
<th>Entry into ASEAN</th>
<th>Rate of economic openness 2004-06</th>
<th>Index of political liberty 2008 (0 to 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>407.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>184.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>139.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Islam (south)</td>
<td>Spain+ USA</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Islam (sync.)</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1945 (49)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>Confucianism</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1945 (75)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>170.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s personal data, WTO, UNDP
Demographic indicators also bring out major differences between the countries of Southeast Asia. It’s very difficult, perhaps impossible, to compare a country like Singapore – 640 km², 5 million inhabitants – with its neighbour Indonesia – 2 million km², 240 million inhabitants; they obviously do not have the same development issues. Here, factors of diversity prevail over those of unity, even though the indicators of demographic growth for the period 1990-1995 and 2010-2015 show that all these countries have already made their demographic transition, albeit at different moments.

1.1.2. Trajectories of Development in Southeast Asia: Focus on the Links between Growth, Poverty and Inequalities

A close look at the different series of indicators of economic and human development reveals the nature, within the process of development, of the existing relationship between three key dimensions: economic growth, poverty reduction and the dynamic of social inequalities. All the countries which participated in the “East Asian Miracle” started their processes of economic and social development at different moments: Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia at the start of the Cold War – during which they were from the start allied to the capitalist bloc – whereas Indonesia started twenty years later in 1967. This therefore took place well before the start of the wave of globalization of a neoliberal character which established itself in the region and in the world from the early 1980s with the liberal “revolution” of Reagan and Thatcher.

The public development policies that these countries had been able to adopt and follow without interference for several decades by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface area (km²)</th>
<th>Pop. 2010 (millions)</th>
<th>Demographic growth 1990-95 (%)</th>
<th>Demographic growth 2010-15 (%)</th>
<th>Rural/urban split (%)</th>
<th>Medi- an age 2010</th>
<th>Dep. Ratio 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0/100</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>5,765</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>243/75.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>329,758</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>27.8/72.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>513,115</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>66.0/34.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>51.1/48.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,904,842</td>
<td>232.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>55.7/44.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>331,041</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>69.6/30.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>236,800</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>66.8/33.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>181,285</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>79.9/20.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>676,572</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>66.3/33.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: De Koninck 2005, WDR 2010/UNDP
practising a subtle protectionism, allowed them to establish a sustained economic growth and to reduce poverty spectacularly by relying on proactive social policies, notably in education and health. Most countries with a significant agricultural sector also prioritized agricultural and rural development – not heavy industry or high technology –, which had had a major impact on the population’s standard of living. Taking into account the fact that these countries had inherited historically very different starting points, social inequalities tended to increase in the countries which had immediately adopted a capitalist development model – Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia –, and to remain relatively stable in Indonesia which waited twenty years to do the same.

I’d like to add something here which could be useful for the reflections of the workshops in Tam Đảo, and is drawn from the doctoral thesis which Trần Thu Quynh prepared under my supervision and submitted in 2010 to IHEID Geneva: “The Dynamics of Inequality in Vietnam (1986 – 2008)”. The author makes an interesting distinction between structural inequalities, a historical legacy and the result of a “reproduction”, according to the concepts of Pierre Bourdieu, and contemporary inequalities, which are created by the present-day situation and current economic development, such as globalization. Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia are countries where structural inequalities were unaffected by independence processes. New contemporary inequalities were constructed over the former structural inequalities – as in Singapore where this cumulative process has resulted in a Gini coefficient of nearly 0.5. Thus, inequalities have grown in countries which from the start adopted a capitalist model of development, but remained relatively stable in the only country which waited twenty years to join this process. This gap partly explains the stability of inequalities in Indonesia, as does also the fact that the country avoided a revolutionary process in which structural inequalities were largely eliminated, as was the case in Việt Nam. Owing to its specific social and political historical legacy, the Philippines, which did opt for a capitalist development model, remained on the fringe of the dynamic of the “East Asian Miracle”.

From the start of the neoliberal globalization of the 1980s, economic growth was sustained but often dipped in the countries of the “Asian Miracle”. The reduction of poverty remained a goal, with various setbacks in the countries which were most affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia. As for inequalities, they increased everywhere under the economic liberalization policies and the reduction in social support. The countries which had been part of the socialist bloc and had then joined neoliberal globalization by adopting the famous “market socialism” – Việt Nam, Laos, Cambodia – saw their economic growth accelerate sharply, their poverty fall in an often spectacular manner – especially in Việt Nam – and their social inequalities grow rapidly, even though these inequalities had been at a very low level before growth. Two Southeast Asian countries stayed at the fringe of all these processes due to their specific circumstances – monarchy and oil in Brunei – or their political choices – military dictatorship in Burma.
Now let’s elaborate on the issue of growth, poverty and inequalities. This table shows the variations in economic growth from 1965 to 1995. GDP per capita sharply increased over this thirty-year period in most countries in the region. It grew by a factor of eight in Korea and Singapore, a factor of six in Taiwan, five in Hong Kong, four in Indonesia and Malaysia and threefold in China. Only the Philippines stagnated: GDP multiplied by 1.4. However, if we divide this thirty-year increase into three broad periods 1965-1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-95, we can see that economic growth was stronger at the start and tended to slow down over time. It seems, therefore, that the globalization of the 1980s did not really stimulate the growth of the Asian “dragons”, notably Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Several authors have worked on this issue such as the American economist Dani Rodrik who demonstrated that globalization did not lead to a spectacular acceleration in growth, or Mark Weisbrot in a famous article with an especially apposite title: “The Emperor Has No Growth”.

### Table 7 Countries of the “East Asian Mirage”: Variations in Economic Growth, 1965-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>13,269</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>15,191</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>4,843</td>
<td>26,334</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2,648</td>
<td>23,350</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>6,723</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peninsular Malaysia</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>9,458</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table appears to show a spectacular reduction in poverty in the region. Having said that, it is legitimate to ask what USD 1.25 PPP per person per day actually means? This classic indicator evidently does not reflect the reality of poverty which is far more complex and multi-dimensional, but for now it is still used in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This poverty has been halved in the space of twenty years (1975-1995). If you take East Asia as a whole, there’s been a shift from over 700 million poor people to 345 million. In some countries like Thailand or Malaysia, the more acute poverty (people living on under USD 1.25 PPP) had almost disappeared until the financial crisis of 1998. Indonesia, for its part, reduced its poverty by three-quarters in terms of number of people affected, and by five-sixths in percentage terms! This extraordinary reduction in poverty constitutes an exceptional phenomenon, probably without equivalent in human history.

I won’t come back at this stage to the issue of the rise in inequalities in the region which was presented and commented upon earlier in the table “Countries of the “East Asian Mirage”: Sharp Increase in Inequalities, 1970-95” to which I refer the reader. However, I must emphasise here that the problem of inequality is often reduced to inequality of income or of consumption, which are easier to measure and more regularly measured. But social inequalities have a wider dimension. They are also caused by the distribution of other factors of production like land, capital, labour and access to the main universal common goods: healthcare, education, habitat, security, citizenship, etc. To go a step further, I’d like to propose that the analysis of social inequalities can be structured around five major divides; rural/urban (sectional); centre/periphery (regional), majority/minorities (ethnic), formal/informal (labour) and man/woman (gender). Furthermore, so as to be more precise, I will from now on
concentrate my analysis on the cases of the two countries in the region which seem to me to lend themselves most readily to an analysis of this type; Indonesia and Việt Nam.

1.1.3. Comparative Analysis of the Processes of Differentiation and Social Inequality in Indonesia and in Việt Nam

Why these two countries? Firstly, these are the two “heavyweights” of Southeast Asia in terms of population, Indonesia with almost 240 million inhabitants (the fourth largest population in the world after China, India and the USA) and Việt Nam with almost 90 million inhabitants (second largest in the region, almost tied with the Philippines). Furthermore, from the historical, cultural and religious points of view, Indonesia and Việt Nam represent the two “standard models” whose comparative analysis is the most interesting:

- Indonesia, which was first subject to Indian influence, is the largest Muslim country in the world, but has also been the largest Muslim democracy for the last 15 years; it was colonized very early on by the Netherlands which used an indirect colonial model of administration there;
- Việt Nam, which was deeply affected by Chinese culture, under whose influence it spent a millennium, was then colonized at a late stage by France which, as it did elsewhere, practised a direct style of administration.

Post-colonization, these two countries attained their freedom through wars of national liberation and revolutionary processes, proclaimed their independence in the same year (1945), but only really attained it after further very difficult periods, Indonesia in 1949 and Việt Nam in 1954 (the North) and then in 1975 (reunification).

At the start, these countries experienced very difficult initial periods of independence, both in political and economic terms, and delayed development processes:

- Indonesia, which emerged tattered and bled white in 1949 from the war of national liberation from the Dutch, sank into an increasing political instability and an economic morass from 1950 onwards, culminating in the terrible massacres of 1965-1966 which wiped out the Indonesian Communist Party, caused the fall of President Sukarno (the father of Independence), and brought to power the pro-Western military regime directed by General Suharto. Its development process only really started in 1967;
- Việt Nam, which also emerged very much weakened from world war in 1945, launched its wars of liberation, first against France until victory in 1954, which endorsed the division of the country in two, then against the USA, until victory in 1975, which resulted in the reunification of the country under the Presidency of the Father of the nation, Hồ Chí Minh. It was only with the adoption of the Đổi Mới policy in 1986 that the process of development finally began.

These two processes of accelerated development were delayed in time – as opposed to what happened in Singapore and Malaysia, which experienced no traumatic period and started their development processes immediately – and started after a delay of respectively 20 years, in 1967 for Indonesia,
and forty years, in 1986 for Việt Nam. However, they share several features in common:

- Indonesia, under the yoke of the authoritarian dictatorship the “New Order”, first experienced its “Glorious Thirty Years”, with sustained economic growth and remarkable poverty reduction. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 called a halt to economic growth until 2005, causing a “lost decade” of recession, instability and violence, which all but caused the implosion of the country. The “total crisis”, however, resulted in a democracy, which today is probably the most advanced − or rather the least imperfect − in Southeast Asia;

- For 25 years, Việt Nam has seen sustained economic growth which was little affected by the crisis of 1997-1998, and has become the model country in terms of poverty reduction. However, there are no real changes on the political level.

Let’s look more closely at the similarities and differences between these two countries in terms of social inequalities.[2] At first sight, similarities outweigh differences. Let’s start with the basic statistics: the two countries have not only very similar Gini coefficients as regards consumption, but also have the lowest in Southeast Asia, their averages for the period 2000-2010 being 37.6 for Indonesia and 37.8 for Việt Nam. The most likely theory to explain this situation is based on the fact that both countries attained independence via nationalist revolutionary processes, where the traditional elites, who had in general collaborated with the colonial powers, lost their powers and privileges. This was not the case in any other country in Southeast Asia, except, much later − and, sadly, radically − in 1975 in Laos and particularly in Cambodia. We should also emphasize that these two national revolutions broadly ushered in values of equality and solidarity reminiscent of the ancient “common cultural base” of Paul Mus.

To return to the statistics, we can see that although they remain relatively moderate, the inequalities have a tendency to grow sharply and quickly; in 2002 the Gini coefficient was only 34.3 in Indonesia and 34.8 in Việt Nam. The gap between the rich and the poor is thus widening in both countries. In Indonesia, the Q5/Q1 ratio has jumped from 5.2 in 2002 (Q5/43.3 and Q1/8.4) to 5.9 in 2009 (Q5/44.9 and Q1/7.6) while in Việt Nam, it has shifted over the same time period from 5.6 in 2002 (Q5/43 and Q1/7.7) to 6.2 in 2009 (Q5/45.4 and Q1/7.3). This shows that the new elites who are close to political power are greatly profiting from the liberalization of the economy and that we’re seeing a contemporary increase in inequality, as mentioned above. The level of inequality is slightly higher in Việt Nam than in Indonesia, which is surprising because the former started from a very egalitarian point of departure before Đổi Mới (a Gini coefficient below 25 formerly?). In 25 years, it has caught up and overtaken the latter, where the situation has deteriorated less. Explanations for this situation could be the more brutal style of liberalization in Việt Nam, where the economy is more open than in Indonesia − a percentage of exports against GDP of 68%, compared with 24% in 2009 −, acute, long-

[2] All the statistical data used until the end of the paragraph comparing Vietnam and Indonesia come essentially from the World bank statistics base or from the UNDP Human Development Report 2010 and appear in the six chosen indicator tables in the annex which concern all ten Southeast Asian countries.
frustrated consumer demand, and the fact that Việt Nam remained relatively detached from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. We should also note that the crisis had a few beneficial effects: it allowed Indonesian democracy to emerge, and it contributed to a certain temporary diminishing of inequalities – it was primarily the upper classes and the well-off, living in urban areas and employed in the tertiary sector, who suffered in the crisis.

Having said that, as regards the structural tendencies of differentiation and social inequalities, the similarities are significant:

- In both cases, the rural-urban divide has been exacerbated: while the national poverty rate in 2010 was 13.3% in Indonesia and 14.5% in Việt Nam, it jumps to 16.7% and 18.7% respectively for rural poverty, as compared to only 9.9% and 3.3% for urban poverty;
- In both cases, the town-country differentiation is coupled with a growing gulf between the centres of development and the peripheral regions. In Indonesia, this is the case between Java-Bali or certain enclaves of the extractive industries in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua and the most isolated and marginal provinces like Bengkulu or the Moluccas. In Việt Nam the opposition is between the two deltas of the Mekong and the Red River or the region of Đà Nẵng and the Central Highlands or the mountainous regions of the North. Thus, even if the number of people living beneath the poverty line is higher in the most populated areas like the island of Java or the two deltas of Việt Nam, the percentage of poor people is much higher in the marginal areas. A complementary paradox: income inequalities are in general less accentuated in the poorest rural areas than in the richest urban ones.
- In both cases, this double process of differentiation is further reinforced by the growing divide between the majority of the population and the minority groups. The phenomenon is clearly more marked in Việt Nam, between the Kinh majority and the ethnic minorities of the Mekong Delta (Khmer), of the Central plateau (Jarai and others) and the mountains of the North (Hmong, Dao, etc.). In fact, it is in the regions with biggest ethnic minority presence that poverty rates are highest and human development indicators are lowest. In Indonesia, although the Javanese and the Sundanese of Java continue to hold the core of political and economic power – with the Chinese minority –, they are sharing it slightly more with the elites of certain of the larger ethnic minorities from other peripheral islands like the Minangkabau and the Batak of Sumatra or the Bugis of Sulawesi. Furthermore, the rather rushed administrative decentralization put in place after the fall of Suharto has been a real “revenge for the local elites” who have captured a large proportion of the political and economic power, along with the possibility of “sharing the fruits of corruption” and getting rich quick.

In both cases, differentiation and social inequalities are largely determined by access to formal employment, since poverty is concentrated in the informal sector which represented, in 2000-2008, on average 63.1% of all jobs in Indonesia and 73.9% in Việt Nam. As everyone knows, the informal sector’s dominance within an economy is one of the explanatory factors of poverty and one of the most significant determinants of inequality.
Well-known differences in the processes of differentiation and of social inequality in the two countries are, however, worth underlining. This is notably the case for the last of our great structural divides, that of gender. Thus we find that inequalities of gender are clearly less marked in Việt Nam than in Indonesia, with an inequality coefficient in 2010 of 0.530 and 0.680 respectively. This is also found in the other indicators used by the United National Development Program (UNDP): percentage of women in parliament – 25.8% in Việt Nam as opposed to 11.6% in Indonesia –, and above all a maternal mortality rate of 150 in Việt Nam as opposed to 420 in Indonesia, i.e. three times higher. This difference can surely be explained by Việt Nam’s socialist past and the successive wars that the country has endured, during which women played a very important role, as against the weight of the Islamic religion in Indonesia, which has accentuated since the fall of Suharto.

More generally, human development indicators are slightly more favourable in Việt Nam than in Indonesia, essentially due to higher investment of public resources in the social sectors, education and, above all, health care:

- Certainly, the human development index (HDI) is slightly better in Indonesia with 0.600 in 2010 (as against 0.380 in 1980 and 0.500 in 1990) and a world ranking of 108, than in Việt Nam with only 0.572 and a ranking of 113 at the same date. However, Việt Nam started from a lower base and, more importantly, twenty years later. Indonesia’s slight advantage results mainly from its average income per capita – on average 1000 US$ higher than that of Việt Nam – because this factor is very heavily weighted in the calculation of the HDI: in 2009, GDP per capita was US$ 2,349 against US$ 1,113 at current value, and US$ 3,720 against US$ 2,790 in PPP; GNI per capita, in US$ 3,720 for Indonesia against US$ 2,790 for Việt Nam. Taking this into account, progress in the two countries is comparable and the gap starts to narrow, because Indonesia started from a level of about US$ 600 PPA in 1965 as compared to about US$ 200 in Việt Nam;

- On the other hand, as regards the other factors which make up the HDI, Việt Nam does as well if not better than Indonesia. In education the figures are comparable (average duration of schooling in 2010 was 5.7 years in Indonesia as against 5.5 years in Việt Nam), but the difference is very visible in health. Life expectancy in 2010 was 74.9 years in Việt Nam against 71.5 in Indonesia; but above all infant mortality (for the under-fives) was only 14 per 1,000 in Việt Nam against 41 per 1,000 in Indonesia – three times more, as for maternal mortality!

These differences in social development have a clear cause: in terms of percentage of GNP, public spending in Việt Nam in 2009 was three times higher than Indonesia’s in the health sector – 7.2% against 2.4% – and twice as high in the education sector – 5.3% against 2.8%. However, privatization of these two sectors progresses apace in Việt Nam and things are not necessarily changing for the better.

Unsurprisingly, it’s in the socio-political indicators of human development that the differences are greatest. Since 2010, UNDP has significantly changed its development indicators. According to the latest data, Việt Nam is ranked 141st in the world for the rule of law, Indonesia at 117th; for the control of corruption, Việt Nam is 183rd and Indonesia 120th; for the perception of efficiency in government, Việt Nam is at 165th and Indonesia 110th. These are all key factors for the future development of both countries.
indicators so that from now on it takes into account the problem of inequalities. The HDI is now not only corrected for inequalities, but also introduces measures of wellbeing, of happiness, etc. These modifications have been much criticized, but I still believe that they allow us to target more precisely the reality of poverty and inequality. Regarding Indonesia, the country is not only among the most democratic countries in the region and the third largest democracy in the world after India and the US, but above all, it is the largest democracy of the Islamic world. The democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2010 was 6.53 for Indonesia as against 2.94 for Việt Nam and the UNDP’s index of press freedom in 2009 was 28.5 against 81.4! On the other hand, according to Transparency International, the two countries were doing equally as regards corruption in 2010: 2.8 and a world ranking of 110 for Indonesia, 2.7 and a ranking of 116 for Việt Nam.

**Conclusion: Deadlock for this Development Model and Possibilities of a Paradigm Shift?**

This analysis of the process of increasing differentiations and social inequalities in Southeast Asia allows us to draw several conclusions about the deadlock faced by the development model adopted by the countries of this region, and their potential to bring about a paradigm shift and the promotion of sustainable development. It is obvious that the current development model of increasing integration with globalization has afforded these countries high and stable economic growth enabling the adoption of the public policies which lie behind their spectacular poverty reduction. But this growth has been accompanied by an exacerbation of income inequalities and phenomena of social differentiation grouped around the five major divides which we examined earlier.

Now, on the one hand this continuous rise in social inequalities is not sustainable at any level: it is a source of social tensions and political instability, and also constitutes a barrier to the pursuit of human development in terms of improving the quality of life of the whole population. Well-known economists have shown that beyond a certain threshold of inequality, growth is also at risk. On the other hand, the pursuit of this kind of economic growth is itself unsustainable. It depends on ever-broadening inclusion in a globalization which is based on unbridled competition, an infinite quest for productivity gains, ever more privatization of entire swathes of the economy and basic social services, rampant financialization of which we know the terrible downsides, and widespread corruption. Besides, it is ecologically unsustainable.

Moreover, even when economic growth is relatively sustained, as in Indonesia, this doesn’t necessarily mean avoiding the “trap” for middle-income countries characterized notably by growth without creation of additional jobs, which can lead to very high youth unemployment, with the social and political risks which that brings. Finally, as we have seen previously, this development model is completely unsustainable from an ecological point of view, because it is based on unlimited exploitation of natural resources and leads to major environmental damage, which contributes to the global warming that is threatening most of the countries in this region with its extensive coastline.
From this basis, can we not conclude that a change of course is necessary, and even dream that it is possible? It seems to us that Southeast Asia, perhaps more than other regions of the world, would be able, based on some of the main values of its "common cultural base", to gradually adopt a different development paradigm. For example, in Indonesia peasant societies have always traditionally promoted an economic and social system based on principles which are perfectly relevant for defining an alternative development plan for the future. I will only mention here the three most important principles: *hidup sederhana* – the principle of a simple life –, *cukupan* – the principle that what is important is not to accumulate boundless riches but to have enough to ensure wellbeing and happiness –, *pemerataan* – the principle of equitable sharing of riches. The anti-colonial revolutions of Indonesia and Việt Nam broadly ushered in these values of social justice and solidarity.

Although I’m less familiar with Vietnamese culture, I’m convinced that the traditional peasant society of the deltas and the mountains is also stamped by these same values which constitute the basis of the revolutionary principles of Hồ Chí Minh. One can theorise that it would be the same in the majority of the other countries of the region and that one can still find these values of simplicity, solidarity, the sense of sharing and moderation in all the societies deriving from the "common cultural base" of Paul Mus – except perhaps in Singapore and Brunei. In any case, it is certainly on such a base, moving towards what is promoted by the advocates of "ungrowth", that a plan must be redefined for socially equitable and ecologically sustainable development for the planet. Like the other regions of the world, Southeast Asia in fact hardly has any choice, but it does perhaps have assets which will perhaps make the paradigm shift less difficult and violent here than elsewhere.

Despite the fact that my analysis is relatively pessimistic, I do of course believe that another world is possible, but, more than ever, greater political will and courage will be needed to bring it about, as Gramsci has already said. Thank you.
Annexes

**Southeast Asia: Principal Economic Indicators**

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<td>54 (06)</td>
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<td>Việt Nam</td>
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Pc: per capita.
Source: World Bank Database.

**Southeast Asia: Human Development Indicators (1)**

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<td>-11</td>
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<td>71.5</td>
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<td>1,596</td>
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Pc: per capita.
### Table 11 Southeast Asia: Human Development Indicators (2)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI 1990 index</th>
<th>HDI 2000 index</th>
<th>HDI 2010 index</th>
<th>HDI 2010 index adjusted for inequalities</th>
<th>Overall drop (%)</th>
<th>Change in ranking</th>
<th>Average Gini 2000-10</th>
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<td>0.846</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>42.5</td>
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<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.805</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.654</td>
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<td>21.2</td>
<td>+5</td>
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<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.505</td>
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<td>0.478</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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*Source: World Development Report 2010, UNDP.*

### Table 12 Southeast Asia: Indicators of Poverty and Employment

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89.8</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.2 (09)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.4 (09)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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<td>22.6 (06)</td>
<td>45 (06)</td>
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<td>16.6 (10)</td>
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<td>38.5 (08)</td>
<td>14.5 (08)</td>
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<td>66 (08)</td>
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<td>31.7 (08)</td>
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<td>56.5 (07)</td>
<td>30.1 (07)</td>
<td>34.5 (08)</td>
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*Source: World Bank Database.*
### Table 13 Southeast Asia: Indicators of Income and Gender Inequality

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Inequalities % R to Q5 2009</th>
<th>Inequalities % R to Q1 2009</th>
<th>Inequalities ratio Q5/Q1</th>
<th>Inequalities of gender 2010 index</th>
<th>Politics % of women in parliament</th>
<th>Health maternal mortality rate</th>
<th>Education % women completing secondary school</th>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>0.680</td>
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Sources: World Bank Database; World Development Report 2010, UNDP.

### Table 14 Southeast Asia: Other Socio-political Indicators

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<td>4.4 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.1 (09)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.5 (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>2.4 (134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.8 (110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>2.7 (116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2.1 (154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3.7 (09)</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>2.1 (154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>102.7</td>
<td>1.4 (176)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Bank Database; World Development Report 2010, UNDP; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Transparency International.
Selective Bibliography

On the issue of inequalities


On Southeast Asia


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**Exchanges…**

Nguyễn Thu Quyến, Central Institute for Sustainable Development, VASS

Poverty is linked to a historical process and to mechanisms which generate inequalities. If an “exit” from inequalities is possible, what will be its driving force?

Jean-Luc Maurer

Many of the cards are held by the political powers in place and the public policies adopted and implemented. If you make use simultaneously of fiscal and redistributive measures, you can transform the situation.
In practice, it has been the accompanying public policies which have been responsible for the success we have seen in reducing poverty, not the laws of the market. Sadly, very few of the political authorities in place in the world have really seized the issue of inequalities energetically enough to be able to reduce them. When one sees the bosses of large enterprises earning salaries, bonuses and advantages which amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, I think that it’s time to intervene. In fact, the so-called “invisible hand” of the market is a dangerous illusion; markets must be regulated.

**Jean-Pierre Cling, IRD-DIAL**

Buddhism promotes values of sharing and humility, as do Confucianism, Islam and Christianity. In the end, religions promote relatively similar values, which does not explain much, to my mind. Theories on the influence of religions, cultural theories, seem to me to have little relevance in explaining inequalities. Besides, the most inequitable countries of the developed world, like the US or Great Britain, are Protestant countries, and Protestantism promotes similar values. To finish, the five criteria of social differentiation you mentioned seem relevant, but I find that they are missing out the concept of social class.

**Virginie Diaz, AFD**

You have stated that inequalities stem from political, historical and institutional choices, an idea which I share. However, the quest for equality at any price is not necessarily desirable; many authoritarian countries have shown that forced redistribution of riches does not necessarily give convincing results, and can raise issues of social justice and individual liberty. Why does inequality shock us? Doubtless it’s because equality is an ideal, all departure from which needs to be justified. The economist Amartya Sen has demonstrated well that equality is an ideal, and inequality should not be confused with injustice. What do you think of these reflections in the Southeast Asian context?

**Axel Demenet, IRD-DIAL**

I wanted to come back to the issues of the common values in Southeast Asia mentioned by Jean-Luc Maurer, and their importance, notably in relation to inequalities. Inequalities can have a direct impact on wellbeing, and not everyone has the same perception of the inconvenience they can cause. Coming back to the example of Việt Nam, I found you rather optimistic when you mentioned this common base of egalitarian thinking. To me, it seems that there is a new generation in Việt Nam which aspires more than the others to consumerism and demonstrable growth. This is why I question the persistence of this egalitarian spirit which is aware of inequalities.

**Jean-Luc Maurer**

I can only agree with Jean-Pierre; all the great religions, at least in theory, share the same values of simplicity, equality, charity, whether in their holy texts or in oral tradition. And I think that in the great traditions, there are a certain number of values which one could draw inspiration from in returning to a less materialist and consumerist vision of development, leaving an opportunity for what I argue for in terms of an overall reorientation of the development paradigm. Christianity is no exception to this rule. However, there are major differences here between Catholicism and Protestantism. Jean-Pierre mentioned the Anglo-Saxon world and the United
States, which are of the protestant tradition. There is a gulf between Protestantism and Catholicism in terms of their conception of poverty and inequalities. Among Protestants, inequalities are relatively normal; one must achieve one’s heaven on earth; a poor man is responsible for his own situation, it’s his own responsibility if he is poor. In the Catholic tradition, the poor man is rather the victim of a system. As for social classes, I have not mentioned them in the strict sense and I’ve made no analysis in terms of social structure, which would in any case be rather difficult given that this would involve what we call the “elusive” middle classes. But I think that when we talk of quintiles, of income distribution, we are dealing with an issue of class. The lowest quintile corresponds broadly to the proletariat, the three intermediate quintiles to the middle classes (lower middle, middle and upper middle) and the highest quintile to the privileged class.

To answer Virginie, obviously the quest for total equality is absurd and criminal, as the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia demonstrated. I am an advocate of the middle road, the golden mean. It’s normal that there should be inequalities in a society, but beyond a certain level, this becomes a major economic, political and social problem. Some economists have focused on an optimal level for inequality, and a Gini coefficient of 0.4 is often mentioned. This corresponds to the Vietnamese situation; Indonesia is slightly below; China has already passed this (0.5). Obviously, equality and justice are intimately linked. I am a great admirer of the work of Amartya Sen, but I remain surprised by mollifying speeches on justice or equity which dismiss the issue of inequality. In general their authors have a very functionalist view of society and justify inequalities by defending the idea that in order to keep society dynamic, on the move, evolving, one should not “bully” the motor of initiative and profit too much. In fact, they are usually advocates of the status quo. In my view, there is a balance to be found between equality and equity, one can reconcile the two principles.

As for Axel’s remarks, I did perhaps exaggerate the concept of the “common cultural base”, dear to Paul Mus, a little. It’s also true that I’m much more familiar with Indonesian society than Vietnamese. I am also very aware of and concerned by the growing consumerism and sometime shocking sense of ostentation which are developing in Việt Nam. It is perhaps due to long years of restrictions and privations, or to differences between generations, but whatever the cause one would need to do more research before making any statement on the issue.

Yves Perraudeau, University of Nantes

In terms of economic theories and thought, some liberals do not dismiss the role of the State and underline the imperfection of the market and the need to regulate it. It’s true that there are more recent lines of thought which developed in the 1970s and were put into practice notably in the policies of Reagan and Thatcher. According to these, a State intervention to the detriment of market forces is not desirable. However, when one speaks of capitalism, one must differentiate between the economic thought of those who believe in the market whilst seeing its limitations – like Adam Smith, who foresaw
the presence of the State in education, regulatory functions, health – from the new liberals for whom the State should have the minimum prerogatives possible. Some countries nowadays are reliant on the market to an extreme degree. The financial crisis of 1998 demonstrates the absence of regulation. I just wanted to make this observation which relates to schools of economic thought. One cannot lump together all economists in favour of the market; there are different sensitivities as regards the importance and the regulatory role of the State.

Jean-Luc Maurer

I completely share your point of view and I am a great admirer of the work of Adam Smith. How do we escape the deadlock we find ourselves in? I think that the economists have a great responsibility for the situation we’re in, but they also have an important role to play to help us out. I argue for a return to a reasoned political economy, and that we move away from ideas derived from economics that is ultra-liberal, financial and based on mathematical and econometric models. Let’s return to common sense and the sense of proportion of Adam Smith!
1.2. State of Play of the Living Conditions of Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam: Economic and Socio-anthropological Approaches

Christian Culas – CNRS, Benoît Massuyeau – AFD, Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud – IRD-DIAL

(Retranscription)

François Roubaud

After the regional panorama sketched out by Jean-Luc Maurer, we’re going to narrow the focus with a lecture that is the result of a collaboration between economists and a social anthropologist. We are going to present the state of play of the living conditions of ethnic groups, which will put the spotlight on the interdisciplinary dialogue between economics and social anthropology which we started last year in the 2010 summer school. [4]

Our first section will be made up of a lecture on the economics of the situation of the ethnic groups in Việt Nam, then we will examine the policies which have been implemented. Finally, we’ll draw on the socio-anthropological vision of Christian Culas.

Firstly, why should we be interested in ethnic groups? Often, they are subject to discrimination. They are not the only ones: women, the disabled, religious or political communities can be affected, but ethnicity is one of the principal criteria for the analysis of discrimination in many countries. This discriminatory situation can be seen as unjust in the ethical perspective of the Rights of Man and contrary to the principles of citizenship and equity. Moreover, from an economic and instrumental perspective, it is inefficient: the minorities cannot realise their economic potential because of their reduced access

to land, education, credit, public sector investment, and this has an impact on the growth and development of the entire country. Finally, discrimination can be a factor in economic, social and political instability. Consequently, the idea of protecting ethnic groups has emerged, and indicators have been created, such as the "Minorities at Risk" index (Gurr, 1996) to give us a more precise understanding of the economic, social and political situation of different groups.

The negative impact of ethnic "fragmentation" or "splitting" should also be underlined. A whole section of the literature – mainly economic, but also from political science – focuses on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic, social and political outcomes in the world: growth, level of public investment, quality of institutions, interpersonal confidence, social capital, democracy, conflict, civil war, etc. (Mauro, 1995; Huntington, 1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Baquir and Easterly, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The results of these studies are very often significant: the more ethnically fragmented a society, the poorer the indicators. The founding study of Easterly and Levine in 1997, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, shows that the arbitrary frontiers imposed by colonization created the conditions for failure in Africa. Numerous other studies followed.

This work raises a number of questions and issues.

Ideally seven criteria should be met for the definition of an “ethnic group” (Fearon, 2003):
- Its members have a common origin – real or imagined – recognized by themselves and others;
- Its members are conscious of belonging to a group and consider it – conventionally and psychologically – important;
- Its members share particular cultural characteristics, such as a language, a religion and customs;
- These cultural characteristics are valued by a majority of the group’s members;
- The group has a “territory”, a place of origin, or harks back to a shared country;
- The group shares a common History. This History is not completely mythical, and is anchored to some extent in historical reality;
- The group is potentially “self-sufficient” from a conceptual point of view – which sets it apart from castes or their equivalent such as the former nobility in Europe.

Following this ideal archetype, we can see that many of the groups today considered ethnic groups do not meet all the conditions. The concept has become hazy.

Ethnic groups have a History. Unlike the “Primordialists” (Geertz, 1973) who think that ethnic groups are “definitive” biological entities, defined once and for all, the majority – along with general public opinion – agrees with the “Constructivists” or the “Instrumentalists” who propose that ethnic groups are contingent, undefined and dependent on circumstances. The boundaries of ethnic groups are movable and can alter over time. They can be socio-political constructs imposed from outside or from within. Ethnicity can have multiple ramifications, which poses the question of the level of aggregation of quantitative indicators.

Ethnic groups are “endogenous”, i.e. intrinsically linked to the economic, social and
political context: for example, periods of recession give rise to quarrels over distribution which pit individuals against their ethnic opposition; a phase of sustained growth leads not to the hardening of ethnic divisions but to greater value being placed on national identity.

There are also philosophical aspects. If we consider ethnic fragmentation as a negative thing, this runs counter to the idea that “anthropological diversity”, like biodiversity, is a positive resource for a society.

Finally, and this attracts us particularly as quantitative scientists, there are fundamental problems in terms of measurement. How can we quantify this ethnic diversity? In the first place, there are legal aspects. Some countries do not allow statistics on ethnicity, like France, and this has recently been the subject of intense public debate – as much scientific as political. Other countries produce statistics on ethnicity, or race, as in the USA – “White”, “Black”, “Asian”, “Hispanic”, etc. The debate has positive and negative elements. Among the arguments “against”, it seems that ethnic statistics have a tendency to solidify, freeze or accentuate boundaries which didn’t really exist before; moreover, they can be used and manipulated for political or criminal ends – such as the Jews during the Second World War or the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, etc. As for the arguments “for”: to fight discrimination, we first need to identify it and measure it in order to understand and potentially act against it.

What are the existing measures, what are the indicators used and their limits? It is interesting to recall that the first indicators – for a long time the only ones – were created simultaneously by Soviet anthropologists – Atlas Narodov Mira – and by the American team Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) (Lebar et al.) which were both published in 1964. Since then, several other bases have appeared: from institutions with the CIA World FactBooks, Encyclopedia Britannica, Library of Congress Country Studies, Ethnology Project; from researchers like Gurr (1996), Alesina (2002), Roeder (2002) or Fearon (2003). As regards the measures, there are numerous statistical indicators. The best known is the index of fragmentation which calculates the probability of an individual meeting another individual of a different ethnic origin from his own. When the result approaches 1, fragmentation is high; when it approaches 0, fragmentation is almost absent, which signifies that this is a homogenous population group. An entire category of literature has developed indicators of segmentation which are linked to indicators of geographical or spatial segregation, like the polarization indicator.

The limits are also conceptual. First of all, the measures are based on a hazy concept which merges language spoken, skin colour, self-proclaimed ethnic origin, expert view, and so on. What’s more, they also depend on the quality of the sources used: these are almost always secondary sources and not sources which set out by checking the seven criteria set out above. Thus in France, for two research databases one year apart, the indicator of ethnic fragmentation rose to 0.272 in one case (Fearon, 2003) and was 0.1032 in the other (Alesina et al., 2003). The difference is considerable, to say the least.

How is ethnicity treated in Việt Nam? From the general, formal point of view, the country works within a framework of non-discrimination on ethnic grounds.
In Việt Nam, the problem is not *de jure* but *de facto* application of the law. Officially, 54 ethnic groups are recognized: the Kinh or Việt are the ethnic majority which represents 86% of the population; the 53 other ethnic groups total 14% of the population and the second-largest ethnic group in demographic terms comprises only 2% of the population. There is therefore a huge demographic difference between the majority and the largest minority group – which is not at all the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. Finally, ethnic statistics are authorised in Việt Nam, and variables are included in the surveys of the General Statistical Office (GSO).

The demographic growth of the minority groups is faster than that of the Kinh: 17% compared with 12% between 1999 and 2009, which is explained by differences in birth and death rates. Structural change, however, is very slow, and its difference between these two dates is scarcely perceptible: 85.9% in 2009 as against 86.3% in 1999.

A significant characteristic of the ethnic groups in Việt Nam is their concentration in the rural context, and more particularly in mountainous areas, which occupy the majority of the surface area and are remote areas poorly connected to the Centre and the North. The rate of urbanization is almost three times higher among the Kinh.

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**Box 1**

“Like people born from the same womb, whether they are Kinh or Thổ, Mường or Mán, Gia Rai or Ê Đê, Xê Đăng or Ba Na or from no matter what other ethnic group, we are all the children of Việt Nam, we are all brothers and sisters. We will live and die together, we will share moments of happiness and sadness, and whether we are starving or well-fed, we will help each other.”

Speech of President Hồ Chí Minh, April 1946

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**Table 15** Level of Urbanization of Ethnic Groups in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urbanization rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>23,885,666</td>
<td>49,708,761</td>
<td>73,594,427</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>1,551,230</td>
<td>10,701,340</td>
<td>12,252,570</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,436,896</td>
<td>60,410,101</td>
<td>85,846,997</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Population census (2009), GSO, authors’ calculations.
Ethnic fragmentation is relatively weak in Việt Nam (0.233 according to Fearon, 2003; 0.238 according to Alesina et al., 2003), lower than in France and around the level of that in developed countries. In general, developing countries have higher indexes of ethnic fragmentation which rise very residually – from which stems our instinctive feeling that this could cause problems for development.

1.2.1. Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam: What Are the Figures Telling Us?

Since there is no visible discrimination in terms of the regulations in Việt Nam, we must identify potential discrimination through the application of policies and the real situation of ethnic groups, which explains certain differences between the majority and the minorities; in brief, we must make a diagnosis of the socio-economic situation of the different groups.
What do the figures say? From a general point of view, donors cite Việt Nam as an example of poverty reduction. We can see a spectacular drop in poverty, whether among the Kinh or the other ethnic groups, but the rhythm is different. This reduction is much more rapid among the Kinh: in the space of fifteen years, poverty was divided by five for the Kinh against “only” 1.6 for the other ethnic groups.

In 1993, 22% of the poor belonged to a non-Kinh group; in 2006, non-Kinh represented 44% of the poor and 59% of the “starving” – i.e. below the threshold of monetary poverty.

Sources: Baulch et al. (2010), poverty line GSO/World Bank (consumption); VLSS – Việt Nam Living Standard Survey – and VHLSS – Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey.
Inequalities of consumption increase over time. While the Kinh consumed on average 51% more than the other ethnic groups in 1998, this gap had grown to 74% in 2006. The gap is obviously wider where the distribution is highest, as the very rich are mainly Kinh.

Sources: Baulch et al. (2010); VLSS and VHLSS.

**Figure 5** Difference in Consumption per Capita between the Kinh and Other Ethnic Groups, 1998-2006

**Box 2** Techniques for Data Decomposition

- Estimation of an earnings function for two sub-populations 
  \( \ln w_i = \beta_x + \epsilon_i \)
  where \( \ln w_i \) is the natural logarithm of the hourly income of the individual \( i \), \( \beta_x \) is a vector of observed characteristics, \( \beta \) is the vector of the coefficients and \( \epsilon \), a term of disturbance of zero mean.

- Breakdown of the average earnings gap between Kinh and Minorities:
  
  \[ \bar{\ln w}_k - \bar{\ln w}_m = \beta_x (\bar{x}_k - \bar{x}_m) + (\beta_k - \beta_m) \bar{x}_m \]
  
  where \( \bar{w}_k \) and \( \bar{w}_m \) are the average earnings of the Kinh and the Minorities respectively and \( \bar{x}_k \) and \( \bar{x}_m \) are the vectors of the averages of the independent variables for the Kinh and the Minorities; finally \( \beta_k \) and \( \beta_m \) are the estimated coefficients.

The first term to the right of the equation measures the gap in earnings due to the differences in characteristics between the two groups ("the explained part"). The second term corresponds to the gap attributable to the difference in the performances of these characteristics (coefficients; "the unexplained part" or residual, or "discrimination").

Source: Authors’ Constructions.
To go further, we must use techniques for breaking down data which will be the subject of our workshop. The objective is to examine, from the point of view of ethnicity or gender, the differences which could be explained by differences in endowments – education, land, etc. –, and identify what remains, independently of these factors; this could potentially be discrimination.

**Figure 6** Breakdown of the Gap in Consumption per Capita between the Ethnic Majority and Minorities in the Rural Context, 1998-2006

What about the difference between the Kinh and other ethnic groups?

In 1998, the Kinh earned 51% more than the other ethnic groups. This gap resulted in part from known factors: the structure of households – there are more children to take care of in non-Kinh households –, level of education – these groups are on average less educated –, access to land, location – they live more often in remote areas.

What can we learn from this graph? On the one hand, the advantages enjoyed by Kinh households in terms of “observable” characteristics – that is, variables like education or health which we can identify and which we can address with policies – account for less than half of the overall gap. This means that the remainder is residual, and therefore potentially due to discrimination. Despite the policies put in place, this gap has not changed much over the years. On the other hand, some factors have been clearly identified, which is good news for public action: for example, ethnic groups have less access to education, so policies on education could improve their situation, the same applies to their demographic characteristics,
etc. However, there is also some bad news: the differences which were due to access to land, and in favour of ethnic groups, are gradually diminishing. The advantage they enjoyed in this area in 1998 has become almost insignificant in 2006. Furthermore, we can see an increasingly strong geographical concentration of non-Kinh ethnic groups: they are less mobile and more concentrated in the remote areas which operate at the fringe of development.

How shall we interpret the fact that more than half of the financial difference – representing a net gain of about 40% in favour of the Kinh – derives from a better exploitation of their endowment? Do the Kinh simply better exploit the resources they have to hand like education, land, ... etc.? Are there other objective factors which we have failed to take into account in our models: the quality of education or of public services, for example? What results from culture? What results from discrimination? We have arrived at the limits of the quantitative approach.

### Table 16

**Poverty Rate and Median Consumption per Capita According to Ethnic Group, 2006 (rural)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Median consumption per capita (million VND)</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinh/Hoa</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>5,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer/Che/Chém</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thái/Tây/Mường/Nùng</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>2,729</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Mountain areas (North)</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands (Center)</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td>6,882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Baulch et al. (2010); VLSS and VHLSS.

How can we refine the analysis?

In the first place, we spoke this morning of the non-Kinh ethnic groups as a homogenous group. Is it legitimate to regroup them? As quantitativists, we are constrained by sample size: there are 53 non-Kinh ethnic groups, and we would need sample sizes which are out of reach to be able to distinguish them individually in surveys. In the standard survey VHLSS – *Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey* – by breaking them down and keeping an acceptable level of significance, it is possible to differentiate five "minority" groups. On this basis, we can observe on the one hand that the situation is still unfavourable to non-Kinh groups who consume less than the average and have a higher poverty rate – with the exception of the Hoa, of Chinese origin, who have been incorporated into the Kinh and in general are in a better situation. On the other hand, we can see that the differences within ethnic groups are sometimes more significant than the gap that separates the Kinh from the average level of the other ethnic groups. The poverty rate among the Kinh in 2006 was 13.5%. It was 35% among the Khmer/Cham, and 72% among the ethnic groups of the Northern mountains.
Figure 7: Consumption per Capita: Deviation from the National Mean (rural), 1998-2006

Sources: Baulch et al. (2010); VLSS and VHLSS.

In terms of the dynamics, we can see that ethnic groups are diverging, with the exception of the Khmer/Cham who are moving closer to the average over time. Average income among the ethnic groups is moving further from the average, and further from that of the Kinh.
In the context of our research in partnership with the GSO, we have succeeded in introducing into the official employment surveys (LFS 2007-2011), which involve very large samples, a variable to identify ethnic groups – which was not the case before. As the sample is particularly large, we were able to obtain far more detail than previously. Thus, we can distinguish nineteen minority groups – and three aggregate groups. The results confirm our previous diagnosis. As regards income from employment, all the ethnic groups with the exception of the Hoa have monthly and hourly rates below those of the Kinh, the worst paid by far being the Hmong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Hourly Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinh (Việt)</td>
<td>275,543</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngon Kinh</td>
<td>44,513</td>
<td>699***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa (Hàn)</td>
<td>3,163</td>
<td>1,795***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thái</td>
<td>6,266</td>
<td>517***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tây</td>
<td>10,868</td>
<td>602***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mường</td>
<td>3,153</td>
<td>526***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khơme</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>875***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nùng</td>
<td>3,869</td>
<td>556***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hmong (Mèo)</td>
<td>3,352</td>
<td>418***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dao</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>401***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ê Đê</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Rai</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>662***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bana</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>741***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xa Näng</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>422***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra-gläi</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>577***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cơ Ho</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chăm (Chăm)</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>924***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giay</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>481***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities (North)</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>521***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Highlands (Centre)</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>564***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>516***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320,049</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** ** and * significant to the 1%, 5% and 10% thresholds respectively.
Absence of asterisks means that the differences in income between Kinh and the other groups are not significant to the 10% threshold.
Sources: Roubaud (2011); LFS 2007; GSO.
Equation of earnings in principal employment (non-agricultural) by Ethnic Group in 2007

(\text{log of hourly remuneration; MCO})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kinh</strong></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non Kinh</strong></td>
<td>-0.042*** 0.009</td>
<td>-0.050*** 0.009</td>
<td>-0.022*** 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa (Hán)</td>
<td>-0.024 0.017</td>
<td>-0.043** 0.017</td>
<td>-0.062** 0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thái</td>
<td>-0.066* 0.028</td>
<td>-0.080** 0.028</td>
<td>-0.044* 0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tây</td>
<td>-0.026 0.017</td>
<td>-0.032* 0.017</td>
<td>0.026** 0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mường</td>
<td>-0.050 0.033</td>
<td>-0.0419 0.033</td>
<td>-0.061*** 0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khô-me</td>
<td>-0.046* 0.024</td>
<td>-0.044* 0.024</td>
<td>-0.031* 0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nùng</td>
<td>-0.060* 0.027</td>
<td>-0.058** 0.027</td>
<td>-0.024 0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H'mông (Mỏ)</td>
<td>-0.137 0.085</td>
<td>-0.167** 0.084</td>
<td>-0.017 0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Đao</td>
<td>0.004 0.061</td>
<td>0.010 0.060</td>
<td>0.047 0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ê pê</td>
<td>-0.1730* 0.095</td>
<td>-0.202** 0.094</td>
<td>-0.176*** 0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia rai</td>
<td>-0.205* 0.116</td>
<td>-0.243** 0.116</td>
<td>-0.049 0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba na</td>
<td>-0.195* 0.108</td>
<td>-0.224** 0.108</td>
<td>-0.127* 0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xơ-rang</td>
<td>-0.028 0.155</td>
<td>-0.115 0.154</td>
<td>-0.002 0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra-gião</td>
<td>-0.403*** 0.148</td>
<td>-0.405*** 0.147</td>
<td>-0.054 0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cự hòa</td>
<td>-0.229 0.209</td>
<td>-0.228 0.207</td>
<td>-0.006 0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chăm (Chăm)</td>
<td>-0.199* 0.079</td>
<td>-0.190** 0.079</td>
<td>-0.064 0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giày</td>
<td>0.076 0.085</td>
<td>0.088 0.085</td>
<td>0.080 0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities (North)</td>
<td>-0.033 0.054</td>
<td>-0.014 0.054</td>
<td>0.006 0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Highlands (Centre)</td>
<td>-0.060 0.073</td>
<td>-0.091 0.073</td>
<td>-0.013 0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.228* 0.109</td>
<td>0.180 0.108</td>
<td>0.235** 0.068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *** ** and * significant to the 1%, 5% and 10% thresholds respectively.
Absence of asterisks means that the differences in income between Kinh and the other groups are not significant to the 10% threshold.

Note: (non reported) control variables in model 1 are sex, education, professional experience, place of residence (urban, rural); for models 2 and 3 the institutional sector of employment is added.
Sources: Rouboud (2011), LFS 2007, GSO.

After controlling for human capital, there remains an average gap of 40 to 25% to the detriment of non-Kinh ethnic groups. But if we limit ourselves to non-agricultural jobs, i.e. mainly to salaried jobs, we can see that hardly any gap exists between the Kinh and other groups. Thus, in town, ethnic groups which have migrated are not discriminated against because they have equivalent levels of performance – in terms of employment revenue – to those of the Kinh. Until now, research was targeted more on the rural minority groups because the vast majority of these live in the country, and sample sizes were too small to allow the study of minorities in the city. Two questions emerge from these results: why do ethnic minorities so seldom migrate? And are the individuals who have migrated in some way special, non-representative because they have self-selected?
Let’s move on now from this field of analysis, focused on income and consumption. By looking at other aspects of living conditions, we will see that the indicators are systematically to the detriment of ethnic minorities, whatever the dimension of well-being considered. Thus the indicators of childhood nutrition deteriorate over time – again with the exception of the Khmer/Cham.
We find similar results for education: it is improving in Việt Nam but less rapidly for the minorities; this finding is even starker at the higher levels of education.

In the end, all the indicators at our disposal from surveys converge to show that even when broken down, the situation is different for the various non-Kinh groups, but the latter are always at a disadvantage in relation to the Kinh.

The gap between the Kinh and the other groups derives from characteristics which we have identified (see above) or which we can deduce because they are hard to measure, like language for example – the non-mastery of Vietnamese can cause problems when making economic transactions, during interactions with the administrative authorities, at school, and so on. In a survey by Programme 135 (P135), we showed that being able to speak Vietnamese, for a member of an ethnic minority group, reduced poverty when compared to those who could not (Herrera et al., 2009). Obviously, the quality of the land is also important – the Kinh mainly cultivate irrigated land: 88% irrigated land compared to 44% for the other ethnic groups. In addition, the low urban migration by ethnic minorities can be explained by their lack of networks and information, notably as regards the new, more flexible policies regarding residence permits.

The question of culture remains, and will be broached during the qualitative surveys which Christian Culas will speak about. We could imagine that pressure from the community, social and religious conventions and obligations could limit productivity and the desire to accumulate riches, which are perhaps not the most important objective for these ethnic groups. In majority culture, stereotypes have a tendency to stigmatize and discriminate against the minorities. A study of the treatment of the minorities in the Vietnamese press (Nguyễn Văn Chính,
To go further in the area of culture, we have tried to touch on values from a quantitative point of view by doing a national-level survey (including minorities) on integrity and corruption among the young (Dang Giang et al., 2011). We see that the non-Kinh ethnic groups seem, in certain cases, more “accommodating” as regards the principal moral conventions and corruption in daily life. We have created a range of hypothetical questions which converge. For example, a civil servant demands an unofficial payment for a service which is part of his duties: is this unacceptable behaviour? We see that fewer people from these groups than from the Kinh consider this behaviour unacceptable. Which is more important, to be rich or to be honest? Even though they represent a minority overall, there are more non-Kinh individuals who think that to be rich is more important, that it is acceptable to lie, to ignore the law and to abuse power to attain this objective. We have research under way to explain these results.

Table 19: Values, Attitudes and Behaviour as Regards “Integrity” According to Ethnic Group in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B1. What is your opinion of the following types of behaviour?</th>
<th>Kinh</th>
<th>Non Kinh</th>
<th>Crude diff.</th>
<th>Crude diff. (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A leader does something which is illegal but allows your family a better standard of living (reprehensible behaviour)</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>+ 15.7**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A leader does something which is illegal but allows your family a better standard of living (unacceptable behaviour)</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>+ 23.5***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An official demands an unofficial payment for a service which is part of his job (unacceptable behaviour)</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>+ 9.8**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B2. In your view, a person considered as having integrity in daily life means that this person: |
| Shows solidarity and support to his family and his friends in any situation, even if that means breaking the law | 19% | 30.8% | - 11.8** | ** |

| B3. Which is more important: to have riches or to have integrity? |
| Having riches is more important and it is acceptable to lie or cheat, ignore the law and abuse your power to attain that objective | 3.7% | 13.5% | - 9.8** | ** |

| B5. What is most important? |
| Finding ways to increase family income is most important, and it is acceptable to ignore the law and abuse your power to attain that objective | 7.1% | 19.8% | - 12.7*** | *** |

*** significant to 1%; ** significant to 5%; * significant to 10%; n.s.: insignificant to 10%
(1): logistical model; control variables: sex, age, level of education, place of residence (urban, rural), religion, sector of economic activity.
Sources: Dang Giang et al. (2011); Youth Integrity Survey YIS 2010; authors’ calculations.
Experience of Corruption and Confidence in Institutions According to Ethnic Group in 2010

**B7. Have you been confronted by corruption in the past 12 months?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No contact</th>
<th>Level of corruption (among those in contact)</th>
<th>Difference (net)^{(1)}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>Non-Kinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. To obtain a document or a permit</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To get medicine or get yourself treated in a health centre</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. To avoid a problem with the police</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B8. What is your opinion of the level of integrity of the following services today?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Without integrity</th>
<th>Difference (Crude)</th>
<th>Difference (Net)^{(2)}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>Non-Kinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Local/national administration</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Police, Security forces</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Public health centre</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Private health centre</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Public enterprise</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Private enterprise</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant to 1%; ** significant to 5%; * significant to 10%; n.s.: insignificant to 10%.

(1): logistical model; control variables: sex, age, level of education, place of residence (urban, rural), religion, sector of economic activity.

Sources: Dang Giang et al. (2011); Youth Integrity Survey YIS 2010; authors’ calculations.

Our approach towards practices and behaviour has been identical. We see that the Kinh are more affected by corruption. Visibly, the relationship between the State and the other ethnic groups does not always progress in the way one would have predicted. But paradoxically, and although they are less affected by corruption, the ethnic minorities have less confidence in the local and national administration.

This has consequences for a number of development projects, because finding an entry point to reach ethnic groups is really a problem in terms of delivering results from the policies that are implemented. It is important to develop programmes which allow the best possible participation of ethnic groups in the design of policies and in follow-up and evaluation.
The P135 programme, conceived according to the principle of participation, constitutes a step forward in this domain, but it is far from being fully effective. Thus, leaders at the communal level declare that 90% of the populations are consulted and actively participate, while only 50% of the beneficiaries state that they have participated in these reunions and consultation (Herrera et al., 2009). Moreover, looking more deeply, the work of Christophe Gironde and his team (2009) shows that the modalities of this participation, such as voting by raising hands, the order in which people speak at these meetings – leaders give their opinion first, which makes it difficult for anyone who disagrees –, create social pressure, which limits the beneficial effects of this participation, and of course changes the picture painted by the statistics. So we must go beyond statistics to analyze the real situation.

Are the Vietnamese authorities aware of these difficulties, which are not only economic but political?

If we look at action taken in the public sector, we can say that overall, for ethnic groups, there are two types of policy:

- Policies which are not intended only to target ethnic groups. In fact, any policy has a potential impact on minorities: for example if a policy benefits the rural context, and if ethnic groups are over-represented there – which is the case in Việt Nam – they will benefit from it more than most. Thus, policies linked to the coffee boom on the Central plateau are somewhat favourable to certain ethnic groups. Typically and in contrast, the promotion of foreign direct investment in the urban context is unfavourable to ethnic minorities. However:

### Table 21
The Management of Infrastructure Projects within the P135-II Programme: the Reality of the Participative Process

| Phase of project selection                                | P135-II | Non-P135-I
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization of meetings for the selection of projects</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by households in meetings for the selection of projects (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1: according to commune leaders</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2: according to the responses given by households</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households in agreement with project selection: (1: commune leaders)</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households which expressed an opinion (2: household responses)</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households whose opinion was considered in selection (2: household responses)</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervision / follow-up of projects by the local population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure projects followed up by the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by households in meetings (1: commune leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by households in meetings (2: household responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed financial information made public (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households which had received detailed financial information (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Herrera et al. (2009); P135-II Baseline Survey 2007; authors’ calculations.
- There are policies which are implemented specifically for the minority groups, such as transfers or improving conditions for these groups – for example policies which allow exemption from school fees or free social welfare or access to credit. There are also policies which target communes or regions where minority groups are over-represented – such as the P135 programme which we spoke of earlier.

Inter-provincial budgetary transfers, which are particularly massive in Việt Nam and far higher than those seen in Europe – 20% of the GDP created in Hồ Chí Minh City stays in that province, while half of the GDP of the Northern provinces comes from other better-endowed regions –, are one of the first categories of policies. These enormous transfers favour the inhabitants of poor regions of the country, and include a large proportion of the ethnic minorities. However, because the population of these areas is mixed (Kinh/non-Kinh), are these budgets shared out fairly at the province or commune level? Christian Culas will analyze this question in more detail.

**Christian Culas**

In this second part of the lecture, I will summarize the policies implemented by the Vietnamese government to deal with the ethnic groups since the country’s independence, then I will spend longer on an anthropological “state of play” of the living conditions of the ethnic groups.

**1.2.2. What Policies with Regard to Ethnic Groups?**

The various policies followed in Việt Nam as regards ethnic groups from the mid-20th century onwards could not be summarized in this document. In agreement with the authors, we direct the reader interested in these particularly complex issues to the selective bibliography offered at the end of the chapter.

With the reunification of Việt Nam in 1975 came an overall national project, which was to forge a “new man” based on socialism. This was a unifying project both politically and culturally. The two autonomous zones in the North of the country which had been created in the 1950s were dissolved.

The 1981 Constitution brought to light the ambiguity of the State between a desire to defend Vietnamese culture and its unity, and the evocation of its ethnic diversity; one can sense tensions between the singular Vietnamese culture and the plural of its ethnicity.

Significant population movements were orchestrated by the State, with in parallel the creation of new economic zones – displacements of delta populations, notably Kinh, towards the mountainous provinces and the regions seen as isolated. These displacements affected between three and five million individuals. Kinh people, relocated to mountainous areas, became
businesspeople or worked in the service sector – very rarely in the agricultural sector. The cultural mix increases.

Some Measures not Specifically Targeted at the Ethnic Minorities

The land reform law of 1993 marked a significant change in the relationship between the rural population and the State: land would from now on be attributed to households for defined periods – rice terraces for 25 years, forest lands for 50 years, habitable plots for a “long duration” without precise definition. For the first time, a cadastral survey with personal land titles was created. This allowed households to gain land titles, and others were evicted.

François Roubaud mentioned the development of coffee in the Highlands and of rubber; these crops heightened the tensions between local ethnic groups and national production companies which derived a large part of their land from the expropriation of the local population. Overall, the development of the provinces advanced, but to the detriment of the ethnic groups which were often dispossessed of their land and rarely employed in the plantations, in contrast to the Kinh populations displaced from the deltas who became the new users of this land.

Box 3

Numerous programmes in favour of disadvantaged populations: the National Programme to combat poverty, the National Programme for the provision of water and sanitation in rural areas, etc.
Programme 135 or “Programme to reduce poverty in communes facing extreme difficulty in mountainous areas and with ethnic populations”
- Phase 1: launched in 1998 (7 years’ duration)
- Phase 2: 2006-2010
Participation of numerous international donors (World Bank, UN, etc.)
Thorough preparation: many consultations and studies; a particular emphasis on local capacity-building, participatory approaches and decentralization of management which is left to the communes
Implementation under the responsibility of the Committee on Ethnic Minorities (CEMA).

Source: Author’s construction.

Policies and Programmes in Favour of Ethnic Groups

Let’s come back to these policies adopted to restore the balance of development between the Kinh and the ethnic minorities. Programme 135 affects over 40 provinces in Việt Nam and targets ethnic groups. It remains difficult to grasp as it is concerned with almost every aspect of local life: infrastructures – roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries, etc.–, agricultural assistance, training, health, etc. This intervention is limited by its own multi-themed ambition.
In addition, its implementation and attribution, whether at local, communal or provincial level, are cruelly unclear.

Phase 1 of the programme (1998-2005) was mainly managed by the provinces. During phase 2, the donors, realising the ineffectiveness of the programme, altered its scale by intervening at the district and commune level. In reality, the results of the two phases were not very different. Currently we’re in phase 3, and responsibility lies with the Committee on Ethnic Minorities, a national body which has almost the same status as a ministry.

How can we interpret the differences seen between the expected outcomes of an ambitious programme and the actual results in the field? The ethnic groups’ lack of understanding of the programme is often mentioned. However, the Vietnamese authorities who managed the programme at different levels didn’t really grasp it either. How could those on the receiving end at village level understand it better? Communication and language used between the ethnic groups and the programme’s mediators are often cited, but it’s important to nuance this because the bulk of local actors for the ethnic groups did speak enough Vietnamese. We must look to another difficulty, one of relationship: depending on how the State administrators presented themselves to the ethnic minorities, the latter might prove reticent about communicating, and therefore find it difficult to participate in these programmes. So it’s not only a problem of language ability but also of the level of confidence between the representatives of the State and the local population.

Some Data on the Scale and Political Representation of Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam

How are the ethnic groups represented at national level? At the level of the Vietnamese National Assembly, representation is rather good – about 17% of its members belong to ethnic groups, which is higher than the actual proportion, 14%. Do they hold key positions or lowly ones? What is the link between a member of an ethnic community and the defence of that group’s interests at Assembly level? Many members of ethnic groups, when they reach the corridors of power, forget their origins and get caught up in the power games at national level. Thus an ethnic representation does exist at the start, but is hardly effective in terms of acting at the highest levels of the State to improve the realities of daily life for the ethnic groups.

1.2.3. The Socio-anthropological View: Attempts to Unpick these Issues

The observations above about ethnic groups cannot really be challenged, but the statistics can be discussed. Overall, the level of development of the Kinh and of the ethnic groups differs at all levels. Most projects, particularly large-scale ones financed by the international community, prove to have limited efficacy. In this third section, we will see the reasons for this failure and why the relationships between the State and ethnic groups are so complex.

Firstly, there’s a problem of lack of understanding or adaptation. The Vietnamese State applies standards defined at national level, which are based on those imposed internationally. At the ethnic, local level, one can question the effectiveness, utility or
acceptance of these standards. In addition, in numerous projects, ethnic groups resist and struggle against the way in which development is imposed on them. This kind of challenge hardly ever finds its way into the evaluation reports of development projects; adding some descriptions of misappropriation and resistance would however be highly valuable in gaining a better understanding of field realities.

As you may have noticed, I avoid using the term “ethnic minority” because it is linked to a specific ideological position. As François Roubaud has shown, ethnic groups have multiple, heterogenous realities. The Hmong, the Dao, the Thai, the Nung, the Brou and others are present in several countries, and their classification at national level is a political and social construct.

The term “minority” firstly brings to mind a demographic characteristic. It’s obvious at national level – 14% of the Vietnamese population – but the reality can be very different at the province or district level where these groups can become numerically the majority.

One could also unpick the other connotations of the word “minority” – have these populations not reached their “majority” in the sense that they are not responsible? We will see that this “lack of responsibility” is often cited as one of the difficulties for development projects in ethnic villages. We also find this idea in the Vietnamese Constitution which sets out that the State will take charge of the “material and moral development of the ethnic groups.”

Figure 10 “Minorities” Described on What Scale?

At local level
Province of Lào Cai: 65% minorities
- Điện Biên Phủ: 79% ethnic groups
- Hà Giang: 80% ethnic groups
- Lai Chau: 86% ethnic groups (Northern Việt Nam)

At State level
Việt Nam: 14%
- Laos: 52% ethnic groups
- Thailand: 3% ethnic groups

At regional level
(hill regions of 5 countries)
Việt Nam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, China

Source: Author’s construction.
Let’s try to describe the ethnic populations on three different scales. At the local level (province and district), the ethnic groups are in the majority in all the Northern and frontier provinces according to the Vietnamese census of 2009. If we look at the situation in 1995, the percentage would be even higher because that would be before the great waves of migration of the Kinh from the delta towards the mountainous areas. Although five million Kinh from the delta settled in the highlands, there remained a very clear majority of ethnic groups in these areas. Despite being in the majority at local level, ethnic representatives are however in the minority in the bodies of local politics. It would be interesting to look at what percentage of people from ethnic groups have held positions of major responsibility over the last 20 years, whether at provincial level, in the People’s Committee, in the Party or in other decision-making structures.

Let’s compare the situation with those of other countries in the region. In Laos, the ethnic “minorities” are in the majority at the national level. In Thailand, they represent only 3% of the population. At the level of Southeast Asia, looking at land above 500m in altitude, ethnic groups are clearly in the majority. These points show that depending on how you present the data, the results are different. The State term of “minority” is not relevant in all contexts and should be used with care, whilst underlining the preconceptions. Unfortunately, many researchers do not challenge this terminology and the ideological position which underlies it, both of which raise issues.

National and Ethnic Standards of Development

Let’s turn now to ways in which we can evaluate development among ethnic groups. The issues around the construction and choice of criteria are in the worst case Western-centric, in the best case nation-centric – that is to say that each State produces its own logic, in agreement with the majority, dominant population, and this will then be applied to the ethnic groups. Are these criteria really applicable to the minority groups, and how effective are they? Looking at the needs of ethnic groups, it is interesting to note that project P135 is active in many communes with a rather high level of development: strong self-sufficiency in food, households with motorbikes, televisions, refrigerators, etc. Projects often intervene in areas where the inhabitants already have the necessary minimum. How have the needs of ethnic groups been evaluated and according to what criteria? These questions remain as opaque and hazy as the definition of the ethnic groups themselves. Projects take into account too seldom the way in which beneficiaries think of development and would like to achieve it. Not all individuals have the same plans, the same wishes. Wouldn’t it be more relevant to have specific criteria which include the way individuals see their own development at local level?

Earlier, François Roubaud mentioned criteria such as geographical distance, difficulty of access to public services, to schooling, healthcare, etc. These approaches are necessary but insufficient:

- (In)accessibility is not necessarily experienced as a negative issue. For example, some Hmong and Dao groups produce cardamom above 1,000 metres of altitude in the most remote areas of Lào Cai province. These agricultural producers are the richest in the province despite living in the most remote villages. Here, the
relationship between roads and poverty does not operate. Neither did it in the past: the remote villages which were opium producers were far richer;

- As regards cultural, linguistic and communication distances; some groups are thought not to be able to speak Vietnamese. But the major issue is the way in which the representative of the State presents him/herself in the villages. The ethnic groups which usually interact with the administration are often sceptical and suspicious. There are issues around listening, negotiations, and so on;

- The distances involved in identity are even more sensitive and harder to measure. Each person belongs to a different group – has a sense of belonging to his family, his village, his commune, his province, his State or his ethnicity. This sense of belonging is determined by relationships of confidence and identification. It is interesting to note that these criteria have never been measured;

- The level of trust also raises issues. Very often, ethnic groups are very suspicious as regards development projects and the people implementing them. This is never brought out in evaluations. Local memory is also important, as a village which had already had a fairly negative experience with a project would be very hostile towards any new project.

Ethnic Groups Do Not Want to Implement Development Projects such as They Are Proposed by the State?

What autonomous initiatives exist outside the project? Here are three examples which seem significant to me:

- The case of tree-planting from local nurseries, outside any project. The contrast is striking: the national level reforestation project involving five million hectares of forest (project 661) attained a success rate of about 45% locally after three years – despite technical support, training and financial support –; in the same areas, the same types of trees were introduced by ethnic groups from their own nurseries without support. The success rate reached 70%. Naturally, projects rarely mention this kind of local initiative which could undermine the intervention;

- We have the example of “organic” training, designed to support the production of “clean” vegetables, delivered at district level when in fact the techniques had been known for several years. Our interviews demonstrated that the beneficiaries had learned nothing new, but had been thrilled to have spent 2 weeks at district level;

- To show you that ethnic groups are not that disconnected from networks: in 2011, after a sharp increase in the price of manioc, numerous villages in the north of Vietnam increased their cultivated land areas by 40% as compared to 2009. The significant increase in income which resulted was directly linked to their knowledge of stable and durable Vietnamese and Chinese purchasing networks.

How do ethnic groups get along with development projects?

The local population often readjusts projects to suit its own needs. We’re currently working on a case in point. It involves a commune of 16 villages, of which seven are classed poor and should in theory receive assistance from project P135. In reality, we have seen that ten to twelve villages have benefited
from support. At the commune level, the authorities decided to bypass the criteria defined by the national programme:

- This does not appear in any report on the project: so there is no official trace, but this is visible during field surveys;
- This proves the local flexibility of the project, but it is an unanticipated flexibility. We can also see at the local level a very strong capacity for reappropriating projects. Projects are transformed through a local reformulation, and people make of the project what seems important to them. But on the other hand, participation is weak;
- A positive aspect of reappropriation: it allows assistance to villages which need it, but this happens outside the official framework of the P135 programme; these local arrangements make the programme more equitable;
- A negative aspect of reappropriation: powerful families profit from this flexibility to their advantage, and this gives inequitable results.

What methods of resistance do ethnic groups use against changes imposed from the outside, and against development projects?

As was the case with readjustments, it is very difficult to find cases of resistance to projects in written documents. In our case study, we went to Hmong villages with a Vietnamese-speaking interviewer and one who spoke Hmong. We realized that Hmong interlocutors often pretended not to be able to speak Vietnamese and refused to talk to the staff who spoke Vietnamese. However, they were much more open with the surveyors who spoke their language. In reality, the Hmong people we spoke to spoke Vietnamese well, but refused to do so in certain contexts. What we have here is the choice not to communicate, it is not linguistic competence which is in question.

Besides, in the villages the beneficiaries never say “no” to a project even if they are convinced that it is useless. They accept it in order to adapt it or opt for a totally passive attitude towards it.

The State intervenes a great deal with ethnic groups including in the cultural domain – in terms of freedom of expression but also for the length of wedding celebrations or funeral rites. Let’s take a significant example. Many of the ethnic groups in the North are Taoist. During the major communist period when combating religions and superstitions was a priority, government agents came to the villages to destroy ritualistic books. After thirty years, the agents of the same State services returned to the villages to protect the holy books and put them in museums (!). The relationship between the State and the local population is determined by history and political choices. If you read history diachronically, you begin to understand elements of the relationship between the State and ethnic groups.

How can relations of trust be established on this basis? How can the ethnic groups take ownership of projects which, according to them, “have the objective of helping to improve our lives” but which are “dreamt up by people who know nothing of our daily life”?

I will finish this lecture with various propositions:

- The economic dimension is essential, but we must suggest a wider reading of wants and needs. From long-term surveys, we can state that social conditions, social networks,
quality of life defined by local criteria, local equilibrium between needs and working hours, the local balance between independence and consumption, etc. must also be taken into account;

- It is important to consider the point of view of local actors, which is rarely done. Often, in the best case scenario, the main local actor is the village chief; in the worst-case, it’s the head of the Patriotic Front or the head of the commune who have administrative positions of power and are for that reason more likely to make consensual speeches than describe the reality of local conditions. On the other hand, in development, one rarely comes across “ordinary peasants”;

- We should also bypass the verbosity of the “participatory approach”, which only takes account of local actors once the project is finalized on paper and supported by a donor, that is once the project cannot be further altered;

- Finally, if we stand back a little we can imagine that the current standards of international development will be different in a few years, for example as fashions change and have an impact, poverty, biodiversity, climate change, reduction of carbon emissions, good governance, etc. will become obsolete, and we will then ask other things from the ethnic groups to enable them finally to find a normal place in modernity and in the bliss of consumption.

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Exchanges…

Nguyễn Thị Vân, Institute of sociology

Could you pinpoint for us the communities in which you did your research? Did you participate in a particular project, or were you just talking about development projects for reference?

Development projects in favour of ethnic minorities, notably those financed by the World Bank, do an ex ante and ex post evaluation. I myself have participated in different evaluation teams for development projects in the mountainous regions of Việt Nam. I have not come across the same problems that you mention in your presentation. I am not saying that you are wrong, but I don’t agree with your point of view from which, to my mind, the reality of Việt Nam is absent. Research in the mountainous regions of the North and in the Mekong delta show clearly the positive benefits which development projects have brought to poor communities. Moreover, the second phase of the poverty reduction project, financed by the World Bank, prioritizes the issue of gender – women’s participation is encouraged. The participative approach is taken into consideration.

Roeungdeth Chanreasmey, Technology Institute of Cambodia

Like Việt Nam, Cambodia is made up of several ethnic groups who have benefited from development plans and anti-discriminatory measures. What are the needs of the ethnic groups? Will they accept the majority group? In Cambodia, we have developed strategies for access to education, health and political life for these groups, all the while preserving their traditions and ways of life. Do you think that the ethnic groups really want to integrate into the labour market, especially in the service sector and in urban areas?

Mireille Razafindrakoto

Our research work is under way. We are raising questions and suggesting partial answers, which are not in any sense conclusions. In the first place, François Roubaud sketched out the “state of play” using classic indicators for the analysis of the development of different categories of individuals, populations and ethnic groups. After that, we searched for the rationale behind these figures, using an anthropological analysis. These development plans are not totally negative, and fortunately some effective, relevant programmes exist! In addition, we are not criticizing the participative approach itself, but its implementation. Could the projects in which you were involved and which you consider successful be put into widespread use?

At the macro, quantitative level, projects addressing ethnic minorities do not seem very effective – let me ask you to look again at the table on the management of infrastructure projects above. The evidence suggests that the participatory approach does exist, but we must look at the conditions and means of its application. So for example, when asking about the satisfaction a project gives, evaluations often use only closed questions (yes/no). In addition, we can see a clear distortion between the answers given by the project leaders and those of the households involved in the meetings about project selection – 90% against 50%. Where does this difference come from? How are these consultations and meetings organized? Only 30% of households express any opinion. Doesn’t this raise questions?
Christian Culas

I won’t deny that the Vietnamese State puts into place projects which transform the lives of peasants and ethnic groups. However, my objective here is to analyze the weaknesses of these projects – not their strong points. In addition, three levels of data exist: 1) official figures, which are often produced after the surveys; 2) figures produced after short surveys using “mechanical” methods (questionnaires, PRA, etc.); finally, 3) the figures we have produced after a long-term survey – two years of immersion –, where we asked no questions, but participated in local life and left the villagers to express themselves according to their own rhythm. Let’s come back to the anecdote about the “organic” training for peasants; it points to the fact that the donors and the people responsible for the project are either uninformed or leave certain points out of their reports. Either way, this is a problem. Often, these populations are very critical of development projects, but obviously they are not sharing their opinions with the people in charge of project evaluation. What I am puzzled by is the overall relationship between the conception and the perception of projects. Often, projects are designed far from local realities, based on rapid surveys structured to obtain a certain type of response which excludes everything which does not fit with the rest. The data which Ms. Văn mentions are data of type 2, produced through short-term surveys. They are therefore fairly positive but different from thorough anthropological data, which result from immersion in the practices and habits of the inhabitants; these are inaccessible to people who only stay in the village for one week. I’m currently working on a thorough study at Lào Cai in a Tay community. One would think that by scaling up what is known at a small scale, it would be possible to bring a new angle to the larger scale. The anthropological approach – which starts from micro-level studies, presupposing that the neighbouring community is fairly similar – functions in the opposite way from that of economists – who start with large-scale statistics to formulate general laws.

Christophe Gironde, University of Geneva

François has presented the overall differences between the Kinh and the ethnic minorities. Do broken down data exist at the local level? Are the differences at local level greater or smaller than the overall figures? He also showed us a table showing their different evolution over time, respectively. These evolutions – are they not respective but linked? Using the method of breaking down presented, is it possible to connect the progress of one to the detriment of the others? Finally, there is one question which has not been asked but to my mind is obvious: why are participative sessions biased? To my mind, social pressure is strong: how can one contradict the project leader, the Party secretary of the commune, the president of the People’s Committee, the representative of the Patriotic Front; how can one defend one’s point of view publicly, on the platform? On another point, representatives explain that it is very complex to run truly participatory processes, which would result in potential tension between individuals’ different aspirations. One must take into account not only how populations function, but how the administration does so too.

Virginie Diaz, AFD

I would like to underline that there are several types of international aid. There are not only the projects described by Christian Culas,
but also budgetary aid, given directly then managed by the Departments at the central and national level. As a donor representative, I can tell you that there are many projects which do succeed and are positive for the population. Obviously, projects fail too, some spending is not justified on the ground, which can create numerous problems. Finally, I'd like more details on the origins of programme P135 and its design.

**Grégoire Schlemmer, IRD**

As regards discrimination, to my mind we have spoken more about minorities than about ethnic minorities. A whole range of issues which can discriminate against groups has been presented: geographical distance, linguistic factors, poverty, rural way of life, etc. However, very few truly ethnic aspects have been put forward, in terms of belonging to a specific group. Obviously the factors are often correlated, but the ethnic factor is rarely exclusive. I agree with what has been said by Christian Culas. But this concerns any local population, not only ethnic groups. It’s above all a problem of communication within a dominant relationship. One must find an interlocutor who has known the population over the long term.

Ethnicity is also a form of political affiliation. This is not often argued because it touches on the sensitive question of competition with the State. When one speaks of “ethnic groups” I question that term – the Kinh are an ethnic group. When one uses the term “minority”, that doesn’t specifically refer to ethnicity.

**Nguyễn Thị Thiện, National Economics University of Hà Nội**

It seems to me that the definition and the use of the term “minority groups” should not be so politicized. The label refers above all to demographic significance, and we know that the Kinh represent about 80% of the total population of the country.

**Christian Culas**

I welcome the interventions which take a critical approach, citing local examples. I re-emphasize that my intervention is focused on what does not work. If you read the evaluation reports of development projects, you will find very little on what does not work. My work relates to a few particular cases, which does not stop me recognizing that the Vietnamese State does implement projects that work. I’ve worked in Việt Nam for fifteen years now, and I am absolutely aware of the efforts that the government makes towards the Hmong, for example, which is a population that does not easily accept standards and constraints imposed from the outside. On the other hand, the Hmong are one of the most successful ethnic groups in economic terms, and one of the best integrated into the administrative system in Laos and Thailand. That’s something worthy of reflection.

Qualifying a population as a “minority” is certainly demographic; but another interpretation is possible, I would even say necessary, to gain a broader comprehension of the relationships between the State and its various different populations.

**François Roubaud**

The definition and the statistics used in our presentation are the official ones. This is not a reinterpretation using different definitions or data.

As regards programme P135, it covers all communes with ethnic minorities living in
poverty, which corresponds to 43 provinces out of 63.

To answer Christophe Gironde, we have the means to examine the gaps at local level. When we use our techniques for estimation and breaking down, we take account of the gap caused by geographical location. In this presentation, we have shown you the figures at regional level. I believe that at the local level the gaps between the Kinh and other ethnic groups should be smaller, because in the mountains the populations are on average poorer than in urban areas or areas of rapid development.

On the second question, relative to the Kinh who monopolize the resources of other ethnic groups, my immediate response is negative. Vietnamese growth and redistributive policies are not a zero sum game. Overall, the poorer socio-economic development of the ethnic groups is not to the advantage of the Kinh.

Finally, to reply to Grégoire Schlemmer, the equations show that there always remains something residual in the differences between living standards, something which is not linked to geographical location, nor to educational level, nor to capital, etc., and which is therefore entirely due to ethnicity.

Lecture text (www.tamdaoconf.com)

1.3. Biography and Differences between Generations

Philippe Antoine – CEPED-IRD
Andonirina Rakotonarivo – Catholic University of Louvain

(Retranscription)

1.3.1. Biographical Surveys

Philippe Antoine

Biographical surveys are a type of collection and analysis of life histories. This plenary session is not only an introduction to this technique, but also an attempt to whet the appetite of those who are going to participate in our workshop at Tam Đảo. It’s possible to get confused because the notion of life histories is also used in sociology, but our surveys are more quantitative. This is a social, quantified approach to the life history of individuals. We will show, through this work and some examples, how to “harvest” and quantify a life. We won’t go into the survey techniques which will be covered next week in the workshop. I will only present their broad principles. More than the examples, it’s the philosophy of these surveys which is important.

Biographical surveys have a strong link with the theme of social differentiation and inequalities, because they allow us to grasp the social changes between generations or between different populations. How does social change happen differently for men and for women? Do life histories follow the same evolutions for both genders? Life history methods are also used for the analysis of migration, mobility, processes of urban settlement. The examples chosen will often relate to this issue. In addition, we have often used biographical surveys to study matrimonial behaviour in relation to other elements of life.

What is Different about Biographical Surveys?

Most quantitative surveys in economics, demography and social sciences are transverse surveys: they study the situation of individuals at a given moment, without taking their past into account. If for example, they question a person who is currently unemployed, they take no account of the route which led him to unemployment.

There are different principles of retrospective biographical surveys. Those on which we will work during our workshop are surveys which cover the period from the birth of the individual to the moment of the survey, but other kinds of biographical survey exist which look at a particular period in the life of the individual. For example, a researcher who works on reproductive health will focus on life histories from the moment that a woman
knows she is pregnant, to the birth and the months afterwards. Thus one can structure these biographical surveys either from birth to the moment of the survey, or more simply on sections of a life.

One of the main originators of biographical surveys was Daniel Courgeau who in the 1980s invented the tool of the “tri-biographical survey” which combined matrimonial, residential and professional biographies. It’s possible not to limit oneself to these three aspects, and to add reproductive history, health history of the individual, etc. So it’s entirely possible to adapt this kind of survey to different issues.

The major element of biographical analysis is the study of relationships in time between different life events. So it’s essential, when collecting facts, to fix them in time in relation to each other. In this perspective, accurate recall of the order in which they happened is more important than their precise date, although the latter is obviously preferable.

As in biographical surveys in sociology, the introduction of time into the analysis brings us a diachronic vision of phenomena and allows us to clarify the evolution of behaviour, the mechanisms behind actions and influences, through the chain of events experienced by the individual.

**Biographical Analysis and Methods**

It is essential to fix events in relation to each other. What do we call an event, what shifts can we analyze? In a biographical survey, it is possible to identify a certain number of events as we structure it. This can be linked to precise dates, like obtaining a degree, getting a first job, marriage, etc. But it can also be the shift from one state to another: the shift from being single, to living as a couple; the shift from being “hosted”, to “having an autonomous residence”.

**Scheme 1 Observing, Treating and Interpreting Time**

1. **What marker?**
   - Event
   - State

2. “Photographic” effect of the combination of space and time

3. Development depends on:
   - Chosen timeline
   - “Distance”

Thus there are several markers evident in clearly determined events or changes in state. Biographical surveys adapt themselves to their subject: it is possible to "zoom in on" or stand back from whatever one wants to analyze. For example, as regards marriage, it’s possible to stick to an overall concept – single versus married – or to focus more precisely on the different stages which mark this entry into union, into marriage. In different societies, the rules are different: for some societies, marriage is very formal and is preceded by an engagement and the agreement of the parents; whereas for Western societies, notably, there can be cohabitation and gradual formalization, or not, of the union. We can also stay at a very general level, by asking people to point to the moment when they consider they entered into a union. Thus markers of states and events are equally useful. One can either focus on events and date them precisely, or study changes in state, like the shift from one type of employment to another, relocating from one city to another, etc. The more precise the questioning, the more detailed will be the trajectories gathered. This can sometimes be complex, as there can sometimes be changes in state without any event. For example, we often make a distinction between the rural and the urban context; but an individual can pass from one to the other without “moving”. An individual can live in a locality which changes its state: it can be considered administratively as a village, then transform itself into a commune and be classed as a town.

Another situation is when someone changes their state without being aware of it. This is the case for example in Senegalese society where the existence of polygamy can lead to situations of change which are independent of the individual: a woman can marry a man and live in a situation of monogamy; but if her husband takes another wife, she will change her state from monogamy to polygamy without having played an active role in her change of state.

Other situations can be more or less inexact: being hosted by a succession of people and changing address often without being classed as “without fixed abode”. Another example: an individual who lives in the home of his parents, whose belongings have been shared among different heirs without anyone really considering themselves the owner.

Another aspect which can lead to difficulties of interpretation is the order of events: an initial event can be the trigger for a second event. Let’s take the case of the relationship between marriage and birth:

- If there is a marriage then a birth, it’s possible to conclude that the marriage gave rise to the birth;
- If there is a birth then a marriage, it’s possible to conclude that the marriage “regularized” the birth.

But individuals can anticipate events. Within the dynamic of marriage, and even before the marriage has taken place, the individual and his/her partner can anticipate and initiate the birth of a child. It all depends on the habitual rules of the society which one is studying as regards conception outside marriage. Moreover, gradual transitions can take place, as can be the case when people finish their studies. The period of apprenticeship and training can represent a period of transition between studies and a paid job.
Different Temporalities

The advantage of biographical studies is that one can place events both in individual time and also in collective history. One can therefore see individual trajectories in relation to historical shocks, the development of legislation, politics, economic situation, etc. according to the issues which the researcher is working on.

The individual interacts with his family, professional and acquaintanceship networks, but also with the context in which he operates. Numerous issues lend themselves to this perspective, like the evolution of fertility, which depends on couples but also on public policy. For example in the framework of divorce analysis in Canada, the first unified law on divorce in Canada was voted in 1968. Obtaining a divorce was thus made easier than previously. Following the modifications made by the Divorce Law of 1968, one notes a sharp rise in divorce. If one doesn’t know the date of this law, it is difficult to explain the change in matrimonial outcomes after 1968 and one might give erroneous explanations for the acceleration in divorce: behaviour can change because the law allows it. A new law in 1985 further speeded up the process. Individual temporalities must be embedded in collective time.

Biographical Analysis: Why do it? Who might need it?

Why do we do biographical analysis? We have two kinds of surveys in demography:

- Transverse data provide very detailed information on the current situation of the population, but are poorly suited to causal analysis – censuses, demographic and health surveys (DHS) –;

- Longitudinal data are harder to gather – cost, time, training – but integrate the temporal dimension, which is fundamental for causal analysis. They sometimes act as observatories which follow all the demographic events which affect a population.

Retrospective transverse data can also exist: instead of looking at what happens in year \(n\), then in year \(n+1\), \(n+2\), etc., we take the year \(n\) as a reference then move back in time \(n-1\), \(n-2\), etc. These are retrospective longitudinal studies. All the history of the individual is considered, from the moment of the survey looking back in time until a certain date, often the date of birth of the individual.

What are the main differences between the transverse surveys and the longitudinal ones? The DHS, for example, analyze changes in fertility. During a transverse survey, the precise reproductive history of women is collected, but we cannot link this to their residential or professional trajectories. We know the characteristics of the woman at the time of the survey, but we know nothing of her past. Longitudinal studies allow us to understand better the evolution of types of behaviour in their entirety. They take more time, because the questionnaire is much weightier, they require more training for interviewers, they cost more and are harder to analyze, but they have the advantage of giving a more complete picture.

These biographical surveys have their origin in epidemiology. They can be analyses of survival which allow, for example, the testing of a treatment. They are also used in engineering, for example in looking at the lifespan of a piece of equipment. Generally, in this kind of study, only one phenomenon
is analyzed. At a certain moment, the event will happen: a death, the reaction time of a substance, the equipment stops working, etc. Thus, in these analyses where the event will inevitably take place, we can observe the time which elapses before the event happens.

In social sciences, the events do not inevitably take place, so there are a number of open intervals. If we analyze single people, it’s not certain that all will marry before the survey finishes; if we are analyzing access to employment, it’s not self-evident that each individual will enter the labour market before the end of the period of observation. Not everyone, therefore, will experience the event. However, even if the individual does not experience it, the fact that he doesn’t do so is a piece of data in itself. This is an open interval, as opposed to those individuals who did experience the event and for whom the interval is called closed – we know the start date of the observation and its end date, which is the time the event took place.

Who can do biographical analyses? Anyone who uses time, whether it is demographers, economists, historians, sociologists, and other social scientists. The great difficulty with these demographic studies is to structure them in terms of the objectives and the issue one is setting.

How can the survey be adapted to the issue in question?

![Figure 11: A Long Line of Inquiry](image)

Source: Author’s construction.
There is already a certain amount of experience of biographical studies. In this figure I have shown a series of studies from GRAB (Reflection Group on the Biographical Approach, whose website is “grab.site.ined.fr/fr/grab/”), a group led by Éva Lelièvre of the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED). Some of these surveys have been linked to each other since the 1970s. In general we undertake three kinds of questionnaire:

- Detachable sequential questionnaires which cover the dating of events;
- Detachable sequential questionnaires with an Ageven form – a form for the dating of events;
- Questionnaires in matrix or raster form – a long questionnaire on which all the events are placed on a matrix.

Here we have classified surveys according to the kind of model used. We’ll stick with sequential surveys accompanied by an Ageven form, with examples dealing with Africa and migrations.

**Biographical Surveys in Africa**

At the start, the general issue was to look at how individuals settled in towns. This then evolved into an analysis of coming of age: first job, autonomous residence and marriage – three stages which mark the passage to adult life. The comparison focused mainly on the different generations, the question being to find out whether the younger generations faced greater challenges than the older. In general, three generations were examined, that is: those aged 25-34 at the time of the survey; those aged 35-44; and finally those aged 45-54 (or 59). The questionnaire included different modules and touched on several themes like the various residences inhabited – everything which concerned housing, what it was like, its location; economically active life, including schooling; the arrival of children and married life, which consisted of collecting data on marriage but also on widowhood, divorce, remarriage.

One of the main criticisms one can make of biographical surveys is the difficulty of dating events. It is sometimes an illusion to ask people, especially where there are no civil records or other temporal references, to try to place the events in their lives precisely. To facilitate dating, in 1987 we created a form called AGEVEN (age event), adapted from a form used in Senegal. The example given concerns a survey undertaken in Dakar in 2001. This form is used to classify in time the different events experienced by the person being surveyed. This can mean events in family life, migration and professional life. Each of these events is recorded in one of the three columns of the AGEVEN form which has three groups of columns:

- The first column concerns the main events of the family (dates of birth of the surveyed person and their children) and of marriage (marriages, divorces and widowhood). Each event is recorded on the left of the column and must be followed by its number in order of the sequence of events, the forenames of the children or of the spouse, and possibly by the precise date. A cross is made on the axis of time (in the middle of the column) to mark each event as regards the calendar on the right of the AGEVEN form. For divorces and widowhood the order number is the same as that of the corresponding union. For live births, only the order number of the child is mentioned. Changes in marital status appear on the right of the column, if they are separated by periods of six months or more. Two types of change of status are...
The second column concerns the residential trajectory. These are towns or villages outside the capital, as well as the parts of Dakar, where the surveyed person has lived. The names appear to the left of the time axis, while changes in status appear on its right, if they are separated by periods of

distinguished. One is a change in the type of marriage: customary, civil or religious. The other is any change in co-residence of the spouses: we indicate “NC” for periods of non-cohabitation, voluntary or otherwise, by the spouses;
six months or more. Two kinds of change in status are distinguished. Changes in occupancy status: hosted person, tenant or property owner. Changes in household status: here we indicate the link between the surveyed person and the head of the household;

- The third column is for recording changes in schooling and activity (business activity, status within an enterprise). Periods of unemployment are also mentioned in this column. To get the chronology straight, we only take account of the person’s main activities. Changes in establishment or enterprise appear at the left of the column. Changes in status lasting six months or more in establishment or enterprise appear at the left of the time axis. Two kinds of changes in status are distinguished. Changes within the schooling system: primary, general secondary, technical secondary, higher. These various types of schooling cannot run simultaneously: one cannot study at secondary and higher levels at the same time, nor at primary and secondary. If the surveyed person has been through a period of schooling at two different schools in succession, this appears in the left-hand column of the time axis. As regards changes in occupation status we indicate the person’s status within an enterprise.

On the far left the last column contains a historical timeline which also helps to place personal events in time with reference to national events which most people remember.

The AGEVEN form allows us to record not only events given with a precise date, but also events for which only an age or a duration is given (surveyed person was married for the second time four years ago, etc.). When we carried out this kind of survey in the Senegalese capital, we used a form to place events as they emerged and gradually completed it. We considered events of family, residence and activity. This form was later used by other colleagues who were not necessarily doing biographical surveys, but simply wanted to get an interview or a life history done without having to quantify it.

The advantage of this form is that there is no set order in which you have to complete it, you can take events as they emerge, as they are narrated by the person, and place them in time during the conversation. The form was designed to be filled in before starting the questionnaire.

The researcher does not actually carry out the demographic survey, he trains the interviewers; the success of the undertaking depends on this training. It requires a certain amount of finesse to record all the events mentioned in a conversation, without repeating a question. We put a lot of detail into the questions concerning employment, where we recorded activity, enterprise and status within it. In every town where I was asked to lead research because my colleagues were responsible for different issues – activity, residential section, familial aspects, etc. – columns were added – health, perception of life, etc.

The Constraints of Remaining Young?

I’ll use as an illustration a survey on coming of age done with Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud. This comparative study was done in three African capitals – Dakar, Yaoundé and Antananarivo – and analyzed the increasing difficulties young people faced in accessing employment, marriage and a place of residence.
This figure by Mireille Razafindrakoto covers three generations: those aged about fifty at the time of the survey, those aged about 40 and the youngest generation between 20 and 35. Two timescales are represented: years and ages – a person born in 1942 is 0 years at the moment of his birth and 55 years old in 1987. Also recorded is the evolution of GDP per capita as an indicator of the economic context in which individuals find themselves. Two countries are represented: the black line is the evolution of GDP in Madagascar, the dotted line is GDP in Cameroon. We can see a slow recession in Madagascar and an economic boom then a rapid recession in Cameroon. We have emphasized the age of 25, because this represents entry into the labour market. We can see clearly that according to a person's generation, entry into the labour market in Cameroon happens in very different economic contexts. If we don't take account of this differing general context, there will be problems in understanding the lives of individuals.

From all the stages which could mark coming of age, we have chosen three elements:

- Getting a job, which is often the most worrying moment because access to work has a major effect on social and economic success;
- Marriage;
- Residential autonomy, which is defined by the fact of leaving the family home to take up one's own residence.
We have selected a relatively simple indicator, the median age – that is the age when half the population has undergone an event. For example, for the oldest generation in Antananarivo the age of entry into employment is about 20 years. There’s hardly any change from one generation to the next, we see only a slight rise in the age at marriage between the oldest generation and the intermediate one. In this city, the changes are slight, there’s only a shift from 24 to 26 years. Events are relatively stable over time. In contrast, in Dakar, changes are much more significant. In terms of age at first employment, there’s a change from 21 years to 23 and finally to 24 for the youngest generation. The greatest change is in residential autonomy; access to a separate residence comes later and later.

Looking at the relatively slow changes in Madagascar and the much faster ones in Dakar, it is evident that big changes and very different evolutions over time have taken place in the two cities.

Source: Antoine, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud, 2001: The Constraints of Remaining Young?
Even thirty years ago, the model seen as “traditional”, with relatively synchronous entry into these stages marking the shift to adult life, was far from being the rule in the three capitals. For men, the median duration of the “transitional” period from the first stage – generally finding a job – to the third – most often marriage – was seven years in Yaoundé, nine years in Antananarivo and eleven years in Dakar for the oldest generations. But this period tended to be particularly long in Dakar where the median age at “coming of age” was impossible to calculate because most young people had not completed this transition at the time of the study.

We prepared a number of explanatory models, which we will present during the workshop. We can see that the threshold to “adult life” has a tendency to rise in Dakar. This “new coming of age” brought about by the lengthening of youth is not the result of burgeoning opportunities for the young, but rather the direct consequence of the ongoing deterioration in living conditions.

The difficult “launch” of young people, in the countries of the North as well as those of the South, shows that they are the first to be affected by the restructuring of the labour market. In African capitals, the best-educated are the worst affected by the impacts of the crisis. We are seeing the extension of the period during which young people, whilst experiencing certain aspects of adult life, remain in a position of dependence. The question is whether this delay in autonomy reflects a change in the values of the younger generations, or is simply an adjustment in behaviour towards a consistently difficult economic environment.

1.3.2. Student Migration and Professional Establishment: The Case of the Congolese in Belgium

Andonirina Rakotonarivo

I will present another example of the practical application of biographical analyses, with the analysis of the integration into the world of work of Congolese migrants in Belgium. Philippe touched on issues concerning the differences between generations, and for my part I will look at the different timing of an event when we compare different groups of people. Our subject here is the event “employment” and we will be comparing access to employment by three groups of migrants, divided according to whether they have studied in Belgium or not. We will compare the timing of their access to their first job in Belgium, or to put it another way, the time which elapses between their arrival in Belgium and their first job.

The retrospective data which we use in this study, and which will be used in our workshop, was collected within the project MAFE, which is an international research project on migration between Africa and Europe, involving several African and European countries. The innovatory aspect of this project is that biographies were collected from migrants in six European destination countries – France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands – and also from people living in the countries of origin of these migrants, which were Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ghana. The benefit of this approach was to be able both to talk to migrants in their destination country but also those who had returned to their country of origin, so as not
to exclude the life histories and particular characteristics of these “former” migrants.

We are looking at the migratory flow between the DRC and Belgium. A survey was undertaken of Congolese migrants living in Belgium between 2009 and 2010. It allowed the collection of 279 biographies, through a sequential questionnaire with several modules. The main modules of the questionnaire retraced the places of residence of the surveyed people from birth to the moment of the study; their activity/occupation status since the age of six; their family situation, notably conjugal history and the existence or not of children; their administrative situation for each period of residence outside their country of origin, allowing us to retrace their legal situation in terms of residence and work permits. The questionnaire also contained an AGEVEN form to facilitate dating certain events.
Why are we interested in the professional integration of Congolese migrants in relation to their educational background? The Belgian census of 2001 shows us that the Congolese are particularly well-educated. Comparing the proportion of people with a university degree in Belgium, more people of Congolese origin have a university degree than of Belgian or people of any other foreign origin.

The results of the MAFE survey also show that 60% of the Congolese in Belgium have reached university level. In the UK, 49% have. One point in particular differentiates Congolese migration from other African migrations, notably those from Senegal: it’s not principally a migration of a labour force, with the aim of finding work in Europe, but a migration embarked upon with the aim of accessing higher education.

Nevertheless, this higher level of education does not necessarily mean straightforward integration into the labour market. The percentage of unemployed people is higher among Congolese migrants than among the Belgians or other groups of foreigners. When comparing the number of job-seekers with the total number of people between 18 and 64 in the Brussels area in 2002 – which is only an approximation of the active population because it doesn’t exclude some categories of people who are not seeking work – we see that job-seekers make up about 12% of those with Belgian nationality, 22% of Moroccan nationals and 45% of Congolese nationals. This example gives an idea of the weak integration of Congolese migrants into the Belgian labour market and in particular in the Brussels region – and this despite their higher qualifications.
What effect do studies – especially those undertaken in the country of destination – have on professional integration? Let’s compare three different groups: the non-students – i.e. people who have never studied since their arrival in Belgium – they represent 39% of those surveyed; people who have studied in Belgium since the very first year they arrived – let’s deduce that they came to Belgium in order to follow a course of higher education – these make up 45% of the sample; and people who took up studying again after a certain period of employment or inactivity in Belgium.

Biographical surveys give us different states – residential, family occupation and administrative situation year by year from birth to the moment of the survey – and allow us to compare their situation to periods other than that of the survey. Thus we can compare the situation of individuals at the moment of their arrival in Belgium, and we can see that these people arrived in their country of destination in very different conditions and at different stages of their lives.

Those who have not studied and those who took up studying again some time after their arrival both came to Belgium rather late – between the ages of 35 and 40 on average – while those who had studied since their first year in Belgium arrived younger – between the ages of 18 and 25. The non-students and the people returning to studying already have a family and often arrive with spouses and children, while the students arrive as single people.

We can also see a difference between the administrative trajectory of these migrants. The students have a very stable administrative situation during their residence in Belgium – very few of them experience a period without a residence permit, for example – while the non-students and those resuming their studies experience several periods without a residence permit and have often requested asylum.

In the same way, if we compare the duration of studies in Belgium by the two groups of students – students since arrival and students returning to studies after a certain period – we can see that the first group studies for longer – on average 6 years – while the second group undergoes far shorter training – on average two years – in very different areas.

Transverse data would have led us to conclude, for the situation in 2010, that people who had resumed studying were those most in employment. In 2010, the year of the survey, this was the case: 75% of people who had resumed studying were employed, compared with 43% who had been students since their first year of arrival, and 47% of non-students. However, the biographical nature of the data allows us to show that the trajectory followed by these people was far more complex.
This figure represents the employment history of individuals in each group. Each line represents an individual and shows the different states of employment he has experienced. The x-axis represents duration of residence in Belgium. You can see the diversity of employment histories on the three graphs. We can see people employed since their arrival in Belgium who then move to education, then back again to employment. We can also see people who study from the moment they arrive in Belgium, then shift to inactivity, then to employment. The non-students experience only transitions from inactivity into employment and vice versa. The biography of occupation shows a wide diversity of trajectories, both in the order of transitions and in the length of periods spent in each state, and this is also seen in the other modules of the survey. The tools of biographical analysis allow us to measure this diversity more precisely.
The survival curve for individuals demonstrates the existence of a difference in first job access, among the three groups we are looking at. The period of analysis is the time of residence in Belgium, represented on the x-axis. At time 0, no-one in the survey is in employment, because this represents arrival in Belgium. We can see that first job access is more rapid in the first four years for those who are not students from their first year of arrival. These people are looking for work as soon as they arrive, in contrast to the students who are still occupied with their studies. This trend is reversed over time: between five and ten years of residence, the people who took up their studies later obtain work more slowly, while the students gain their first job more quickly. This period is often when migrants will take up some training again, and are therefore less available for work. After 5 years of residence, 50% of the non-students have found their first job, but this proportion does not rise significantly over time. After eight years of residence, about 55% of those who came to study have found a first job, and this figure is 47% for those who have resumed studying and 50% for non-students. We can see that the proportion of those who studied immediately on arrival who have still not found a first job after 20 years of residence in Belgium is very small. This proportion is around 20% in the group of migrants who resumed studying, and 35% of the non-students do not find a first job 20 years after their arrival. The timing of first job access is visibly different for the three groups, and varies considerably over time. It is possible to use different models to study the probability of accessing a first job, using a logistical regression model. The population used in
the model are all surveyed migrants living in Belgium. The event studied is accessing one’s first job, and the analysis time is the duration of time between arrival in Belgium and access to the first job. The model used here is simplified, with fixed variables – gender or education level – and variables which change over time – matrimonial status, duration of residence.

**Figure 17** Probability of Obtaining One’s First Job (1)

- Having one’s spouse in Belgium has a positive effect
- Level of education is insignificant

Other control variables: age, period, presence of a child under 6 years of age

Sources: MAFE Belgium, authors’ calculations.

The results of the model are represented on a graph. A key point that we can see is that having one’s partner in Belgium raises the probability of accessing one’s first job.
Having no residence permit lowers the probability of accessing one’s first job. As for the “studies” variable, it is very significant. People who have studied in Belgium have a higher probability of accessing their first job as compared to non-students. People who resumed studying have double the probability of people who have not studied in Belgium of accessing their first job, as against 1.5 for the migrants who studied since the first year. Moreover, duration of residence in Belgium is equally significant: between 5 and 9 years of residence, the probability of finding one’s first job is much higher than in the previous years. Beyond 9 years, the duration of residence no longer has any impact.

Finally, the situation according to transverse data in 2010 would not have been sufficiently informative. Retrospective data are essential here to obtain a clear understanding of the situation of the individual at the moment of his journey towards the first job. A precise analysis of explanatory factors will be gone into at our workshop.

1.3.3. Conclusions

Philippe Antoine

In general, information taken from these biographical surveys allows us to retrace changes over a long period. The biographical survey is a real longitudinal approach where each event experienced by the individual is situated in the context of that moment – in individual and collective time – and not in the context of his situation at the moment of the survey.
The experience accumulated shows that it is possible to apply these techniques in different contexts. Biographical surveys adapt themselves very well to reality, at a relatively low cost: with a preferable sample size of 2,000 to 2,500 people at the level of a town or a region of a country, one can obtain very reliable results on complex inter-relationships between economic, demographic and social variables.

In countries where continuous observation is rare, biographical surveys can retrace over a relatively long period the main socio-economic evolutions at individual level. Their methods, as descriptive as they are profound, provide us with indicators in a range of dimensions of time, age, generation or date. These surveys allow us to chart better the links between the different trajectories populations have experienced.

The work which will be undertaken in our Tam Đảo workshop will aim to provide a practical introduction to biographical surveys. This will involve going through all the practical processes which lead from the design of a survey to deeper biographical analysis. The training will cover the understanding of a biographical form, the different ways of using it, the definition of the event to be analyzed and the main techniques of univariate and multivariate analysis used in the analysis of the biographies.

Selective Bibliography


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Exchanges…

François Roubaud

In the case of Việt Nam, there would be excellent reasons to undertake biographical surveys: reasons relating to the data – the first quantified survey on general household life dates back to 1993; before that date, we have nothing on the whole quantified economic dimension. It would really be of great value in better understanding, at the individual level, what has happened over the long term in Việt Nam. Time and History have an exceptional role in this country. We’ve seen that biography allows us to look back 50 or 60 years. So it would be possible to go back to the middle of the last century. I make an appeal to Vietnamese researchers and those from the region to collaborate in this novel approach.

Hoeung Vireak, ONG Nyemo Cambodia

You said that biographical surveys had a relatively low cost, and that it was possible to run them in a developing country. Could you say more on this subject? In Cambodia, there would be problems facing the method of dating events: it is very hard to find out dates, particularly in the rural context where natural calendars are often used, public records are not widespread everywhere.

Philippe Antoine

As regards time and History, the first time we did this kind of survey we focused on the situation of young people and compared them to the preceding generations. Daniel Courgeau, on the other hand, chose the opposite approach by surveying the older generations to examine the exit from the agrarian world in France and the depopulation of the countryside. According to the questions one has, the target population for the survey will change. If one is studying past changes in Việt Nam, the target population will be older. The older the person, the richer and more informative the biography. If you are doing a biography of 15-year-olds, it will not be very interesting given that hardly anything has happened, outside their school timetable. The more one questions older people, the more biography makes sense. We saw it in Dakar: when you ask people of 25-35 years about marriage, when marriage often takes place later than 35 years old, it’s hard to obtain any relevant information. The same target population is rarely taken into account, as it changes depending on the country where the survey is undertaken and on the issues studied.

About costs, that depends on the size of the sample envisaged, whether it’s a town or at national level. The cost is variable, proportional to the size of the sample and its geographical spread. In reality, it’s not that much more onerous than a transverse study. The main
costs are salaries and transport costs for the interviewers, and costs also depend on the duration of the survey – the time needed to identify a person, to convince him and obtain a meeting, and so on. There can be fairly long periods of latency. The time spent on the questionnaire varies according to its length and the age of the person being surveyed.

We do manage everywhere to date events fairly precisely, whether or not there are public records. Individuals succeed in placing events in time in relation to each other. AGEEVEN forms are less "violent" than a questionnaire, because there are no rules to follow. One can start with one event, then come back to others without chronological constraints.

Thomas Chaumont, Royal University of Law and Economic Sciences of Cambodia

I have worked at the Centre for Economic Research of Phnom Penh University on the Chinese influence on Cambodia, which is essential in order to understand the country. We have concentrated on the business class and the Chinese presence, which has been formed by successive waves of migration of very different generations, localities and types of behaviour. To what extent would it be possible to use biographical surveys to study this dynamic? I also wanted to come back to the difficulties at field level in Cambodia in terms of undertaking this kind of survey. One shouldn’t underestimate these, as public records are very incomplete and flexible. Moreover, Cambodia’s history is such that people have great difficulty in speaking about their past and their individual and family history. On the other hand, I’ve seen that some people can present themselves in very different ways, even in opposite ways, depending on their interlocutor. Can this skew surveys and is it taken into account?

Nguyễn Thị Vân, Institute of Sociology

In 1994-1995, we used a biographical survey at the Institute of Sociology for a study on the fertility rate and aspects of the family in Việt Nam. There are a huge number of interesting issues to study concerning the family and its evolution following the political trajectories followed by the North of the country and the South. We are really interested in collaborating with you to undertake a serious study in this area.

Yves Perraudeau

In Europe I had to supervise a survey of 5,000 people, which could be costly. As a teacher and researcher, it’s valuable to involve students not only to give them field experience but also to reduce the costs of surveys. In your presentation you mentioned "university level": was this undergraduate, Master’s or Ph.D. level?

Andonirina Rakotonarivo

When it’s a question of migrants who have studied at university level I consider all levels of university studies together. As regards the methodology for a survey in Cambodia, it’s perfectly possible to do biographical surveys with a sample containing different generations, it’s simply necessary that the people to be surveyed are still present and capable of answering the questionnaire, especially all the questions which draw on respondents’ memories. The perception held by those being surveyed of their own history is interesting. In our study of migrants, we included in each module some open
questions about their subjective perceptions of certain periods of their lives. In parallel with the dating and recording of events, these questions allowed us to interpret individuals’ trajectories better and also enriched the responses we gathered to closed questions; they allowed a certain linkage between the quantitative and the qualitative.
1.4. Gender, Sexuality and Reproduction in Việt Nam

Catherine Scornet, LPED (Laboratory on Population, Environment and Development), Mixed Research Unit Aix Marseille University and Institute for Research on Development

Discussion of sexuality is very present in Vietnamese daily life – at the office, in the market, in popular restaurants, in cafés, etc. I’d like to draw attention to the work of Lê Bạch Dương and Khuất Thu Hồng on sexual issues, and notably one of their 2009 works, “Easy to joke about, but hard to talk about”. This title is revealing in introducing sexuality in Việt Nam; the fact that it’s joked about reveals particular gender relationships.

In the first part of this presentation I will sketch out the theoretical framework, the issues and some hypotheses from my ongoing research. Then I’ll move on to the emergence of sexual issues in public debate in Việt Nam: a demographic situation with falling fertility and the politicization of sexuality; the emergence of sexuality in public debate. In what context did sexual issues emerge in Việt Nam? We’ll see that they surfaced from the 1990s onwards, linked to issues of health. I will then present some of the results of my research.

1.4.1. Sexuality, a Social Construct

Firstly, I refer to Michel Foucault and his History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1976) which stipulates that sexuality is not a biological function with an immutable meaning: sexuality responds to social processes not biological factors. Sexuality is not a given, it’s a product of history. Thus the limits of what is considered sexual vary from one society to another and even within the same society. The sociology of sexuality is a labour of social and cultural contextualization which aims to establish relationships between sexual phenomena and other social processes; what one could call the “social construction of sexuality”. The complexity of changes in sexuality derives from the fact that they must be interpreted in terms of changes in their social, economic and cultural context.

This social construct is formed around sexual practices, interactions with partners, emotions, representations, which vary around cultural conventions and as a function of history. The anthropologist Margaret Mead (1928) was one of the first, in her research in the islands of Samoa, to put forward the
thesis that social factors, more than biological ones, form sexuality. I would also like to refer to Alfred Kinsey (1948; 1953) who showed that sexual identity is not static. He was one of the pioneers of research on human sexual behaviour in the 1930s, at the Institute for research on sexuality at the University of Indiana. He invented the concept of “sexual behaviour”, the definition of which disassociates sexual activity from procreation, which was very novel in the early 20th century as sexuality was emerging for the first time from the area of procreation. In 1938 Kinsey launched a large-scale sociological survey the results of which would be published in two works, one on the sexuality of men in 1948, and the other on that of women in 1953 (Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin, 1948; 1953); female sexual pleasure was recognized and delinked from the duty of maternity. Kinsey trivialized what some called “deviance” or “perversion” and refused to separate homosexuality and heterosexuality. He proposed a scale with seven levels, which set out a continuum of sexual possibilities over the lifespan of an individual: 0 corresponded to those who were exclusively heterosexual and 6 to those who were exclusively homosexual. The door was open to a completely new vision of sexuality: diversification. Thus, level 2 represents a “heterosexual predominance, occasionally homosexual”, level 5 a “homosexual predominance, with heterosexual experience”, etc. He put forward the idea that it is possible to have several sexual practices during one's lifetime.

I'd also refer to Anthony Giddens, who in “The transformation of intimacy: sexuality, love and eroticism in modern societies”, published in 1992, says: “My initial intention was to ask myself about sex, but as my work progressed I surprised myself by writing as much about love, as well as about the distinction between men and women” (Giddens, 1992). In Việt Nam as elsewhere, changes in intimacy happen in parallel with other changes in the family, the couple, the policy background, gender relations. Following on from Giddens, I would also refer to the anthropologist Maurice Godelier who wrote in the review Esprit in 2001 “Human sexuality always hides other things within itself”. The anthropological approach developed here is that what's at play in sexuality is subordinate to the reproduction of other social, economic and political relationships. It points out that the area of sexuality is marked by inequalities, notably between men and women, which echo other inequalities which persist in other social spheres. In this perspective, and taking up the ideas of Nathalie Bajos and Michel Bozon (2008), this differentialist vision of sexuality – which places the origin of male/female differences in nature – legitimizes inegalitarian practices between the genders in other social spheres. The thesis of biological determinism – which can be very widespread in Việt Nam for example in the context of sexual desire – the statement that men have greater sexual needs than women – legitimizes inegalitarian practices which are socially constructed.

One of my hypotheses explores “the way in which the elements which structure relations between men and women, particularly everything which creates a power imbalance between them, contributes to a style of sexual interaction in a context of risk management and prevention – of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases – which do not put the partners on an equal footing” (Bajos, Bozon, 2008). For example, in the context
of contraceptive practices, is it common in Việt Nam for a young girl to ask her partner to wear a condom the first time they have sex? This is a question I ask myself when I see the significant number of abortions which Vietnamese women undergo, which can reach three or four abortions before a woman marries.

I also refer to two American sociologists, John Gagnon and William Simon, who collaborated at the end of the 1960s with the Kinsey Institute to put forward a theory of sexual scripts in “Sexual Conduct: The Social Sources of Human Sexuality” (1973). For these two authors, all our sexual experiences are constructed like scripts, that is to say that they are learned, organized, written into our consciousness, structured and delivered like speeches. These sexual experiences result from the inculcation of rules, prohibitions and a range of speeches, as if acquiring a "sexual savoir-faire". Individuals learn to identify and produce potentially sexual situations, the context of a sexual scenario, with actors, a plot, a framework likely to create sexual availability. These scripts thus state the scenarios of potential sexuality. In human sexuality, it’s not possible to do everything at any time with anyone in whatever circumstances. Cultural scenarios set out what is possible and what should not be done in sexual matters, and are interpreted by social actors.

But this individual appropriation varies according to the social and historical context. For example, in a traditional context where individualism is weak, there will be little improvisation. With historical and social evolution, cultural scenarios have little by little lost their homogeneity and sexual conventions have become hazier, less defined. Individuals have been able to appropriate them for themselves, and have been in situations of adaptation and improvisation which can gradually detach themselves from the cultural norm. For example, virginity before marriage in Việt Nam was a shared value, on which there was consensus. Today, many individuals detach themselves from that norm. What makes someone break away from a shared model? Are globalization and democratization linked to the break from this model? Who are the first people to go against these particular norms?

A fundamental notion held by the feminist movements in the West was “what is private is political”. This brings me to sexual democracy. The private sphere shapes the political one to the extent that the rules which govern relations between men and women – as far as sexual attraction, love, daily life are concerned – shape the interactions between the sexes in the public sphere. Again I refer to Giddens who affirms “Whoever says sexual emancipation, says sexual democracy”. What he means by sexual emancipation is a democratization of everything which is personal in the private sphere. It’s not only sexuality which is at stake, democratization extends to relationships between spouses, between parents, between children and between friends. The democratic order attaches itself above all to the development and blossoming of individuality. Giddens affirms that the democratization of the public sphere provides the essential conditions for the democratization of personal life. The opposite is also true: the democratization of personal relations provides the essential conditions for the democratization of the public sphere. The development of personal autonomy within the couple can have implications for democratic practice within
the entire community. Thus in Việt Nam, terms of address are inegalitarian; one’s interlocutor is addressed according to his status, his age, etc.

1.4.2. Conditions for the Emergence of Sexual Issues in Việt Nam

In the context of the policy of Đổi Mới — Renovation — which began in 1986, one of the major aspects of the dynamic of change in the political system was the emergence of spaces for public debate, notably in the National Assembly which would become a real debating chamber (Salomon, 2004). Democratic logic applied everywhere, even in sex, with a double requirement: liberty and equality. Following this policy, are we confronted by new rules of the game, and of sexual negotiation? What are the changes in representations, in attitudes and sexual practices in the context of a rapid transformation of Vietnamese society? Of course, ideals and reality are not the same thing. Have we shifted from a rigid conventional context with sexual norms which were monolithic, exterior, dictated by tradition, morality, religion, to a diversification of affective and conjugal trajectories and a growing individualization of standards? As soon as there is an individualization of practices, we are confronted by injunctions which can be completely contradictory.

What is the context of the emergence of sexuality? What has changed in Việt Nam in order for sexuality to become a subject for debate and discussion?

Decreasing fertility is one of the conditions and the result of a change in the relations of gender and sexuality (Bozon, 2002). Women are no longer confined to the reproductive role, and sexuality no longer has the sole outcome of reproduction, it can also result in wellbeing and enjoyment.

How has the drop in the birth rate and mortality rate in Việt Nam changed the age structure of the population? The demographic transition is the shift from high birth and mortality rates — of 40% or so — to lower levels. In the first stage of demographic transition, falling mortality is a factor in the population becoming younger, as this often begins with a drop in infant mortality — from 0 to 1 year — and of infant-juvenile mortality (birth to 5 years). The years gained are therefore mainly years of childhood, and the gains are more modest for more advanced age groups. During this whole period of the initial drop in mortality, the population has a tendency to grow younger, as the drop in infant mortality has the same effect on the age structure as a rise in births.

Infant mortality — the number of deaths of children from birth to 1 year, per 1,000 births — is recognized as a good indicator of the state of health of a country. After a sharp drop, it has tended to stabilize since the end of the 1970s. Evaluated to be 300‰ in 1936, it fell to 105‰ in the 1960s (Lâm Thanh Liêm, 1987), to reach 45‰ in 1979 and 1989, then 37‰ in 1999 and 16‰ in 2009.


[6] Data on infant mortality are variable, depending on the source.
The life expectancy of the Vietnamese has risen steadily and quickly, shifting from 50 years in the 1970s (Banister, 1992) to 72.8 years according to the data from the most recent census in 2009.

We are seeing an ageing process supported from below, that is to say a diminution of the proportion of the population which is younger – while those under 15 years represented 42% of the total population in 1979, they only constituted a quarter in 2009 – which precedes any rise in the proportion of the elderly. In Việt Nam the latter tendency, which characterizes the second stage of demographic transitions, is still not very apparent. In twenty years, between 1979 and 2009, the proportion of people aged over 65 years rose only slightly, from 5% to 7%.
This table presents the demographic transition in Việt Nam, plotting in parallel the evolution of the birth rate and death rate during the 20th century and at the start of the 21st century. You will find high birth rates in the 1930s – around 45‰ – while mortality had already started to dive. In the 1960s, the contrast was greatest between birth and death rates, which led to particularly high natural growth rates of the order of 3% on average per year. The government therefore made decrees limiting the number of births – following in the footsteps of India and China. The first decree dates from 1961,[7] then 1963 saw the first restriction on the size of families and the first standard for the spacing of births: Vietnamese families were advised to have two or three children, spaced about 5 or 6 years apart (decree 99/TTg of 16 October 1963) (Scornet, 2000). This Malthusian policy would reach its peak in the 1990s, through the policy of "one or two children" per couple (decree of the Council of Ministers 162 of 18 October 1988).

One of the particular features of Việt Nam, which is a factor in the emancipation of women, is the rapid fall in fertility. This emancipation is accompanied by autonomy, whether familial, economic or sexual. The index used is the synthetic fertility index (SFI). This transverse, cross-cutting indicator – at time \( T \) – represents the average number of children which a fictitious generation of women would have if they had the same fertility rate for the whole of their child-bearing years as in the year of the study. The longitudinal indicator which could be associated with this would be final descent – the actual number of children at the end of reproductive life.

[7] The Malthusian orientation of Việt Nam’s demographic policy was demonstrated by decree 216-CP of the Council of Ministers of 12th December 1961 which recognized that sustained demographic growth put economic development at risk.
How has this indicator evolved? In the 1960s, the SFI was over six, then it fell rapidly to stabilize today at two children per woman. The differences between urban and rural contexts are small – 1.8 and 2.1 children on average per woman, respectively.

### Table 26  
Evolution of the Synthetic Fertility Index in Việt Nam, 1959–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Synthetic fertility index (children per woman)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959–1964</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964–1969</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1974</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–1979</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–1984</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984–1989</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–1994</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 27  
Synthetic Fertility Index by Vietnamese Region from 1989 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mountains and middle region of the North</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>Mountains and middle region of the North</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red River Delta</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>Red River Delta</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>Red River Delta</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRE-NORTH</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>CENTRE-NORTH</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>CENTRAL COASTAL REGION</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Highlands</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>Central Highlands</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>Central Highlands</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong Delta</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>Mekong Delta</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>Mekong Delta</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>Việt Nam</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SFI: Synthetic Fertility Index.

The marked regional inequalities in fertility in the 1980s gradually diminished, even if they persisted. In 1989, in the Central Highlands region of the country women had almost, on average, 6 children as compared to 2.9 in the region of the Southeast – a difference of 3.09 children between these women. The fertility transition has been particularly brutal for the women of the Central Highlands because the index was of 2.65 children per woman in 2009. Thus, there are still marked differences according to region, but with a tendency to diminish. The gap between the highest number of children – 2.65 children per woman in the Central Highlands – and the lowest number – 1.69 children for a woman of the Southeast – is only 0.96 of a child.

When we are working on the evolution of fertility in Việt Nam, we are often faced with the issue of sources. The first demographic and health survey (DHS survey) took place in 1988, and was followed by an inter-census survey in 1994 then a second survey of demography and health in 2002. Since 1988, questions relative to fertility and contraception are only addressed to married women. The survey conducted annually by the General Office of Statistics on demographic changes and family planning follows this rule: the most recent, in 2010, did not ask unmarried women these questions. There are therefore no data at national level on the contraceptive practices of women who are unmarried, divorced, separated or widowed. It’s true that in Việt Nam, fertility is legitimate in the vast majority of cases, with births taking place within the framework of marriage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Censuses of the population of Việt Nam 1989 – 2009. Author’s construction.

The average age at marriage calculated from the last three censuses has not changed to any great degree. We can see a slight rise in the age at marriage for men – rising from on average 24.5 years in 1989 to 26.2 years on average in 2009 – and relative stability for women – 23.2 years in 1989 and 22.8 years in 1999 and 2009.
Marriage is a universal phenomenon in Việt Nam. In 2009, 2.1% of men aged 45-49 were unmarried, and this figure was 5.6% for women.

The appearance of birth control signals “the emergence of a calculation in the relationship of individuals to reproduction and to life and also in the relations between men and women, and thus contributes to bring sexuality and gender out, away from evidence and nature” (Bozon, 2002). For the first time, women could dissociate sexuality from the imprisonment of pregnancies and births. It’s in this context of progressive differentiation between sex and the imperative of reproduction that sexuality could emerge.

In Việt Nam, the development and rapid spread of contraception contributed greatly to this drop in fertility. According to the last survey on demographic change of 1 April 2010, more than three Vietnamese out of four – 78% – use a form of contraception. With the general availability of contraception, we’ve shifted from “children beyond count” to “the child who counts” to use the terms used by Henri Leridon in his book “The Children of Desire” (Leridon, 1995).

The child becomes the object of desire for couples and pregnancy is no longer feared. Nevertheless, in Việt Nam, given the frequent abortions among young girls, it would seem that the taboo of births outside marriage persists before marriage.

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**Table 29** 
Proportion of People not Married, by Gender and Age, from 1989 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of unmarried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of unmarried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>45-49 years</td>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>45-49 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Censuses of the population of Việt Nam 1989 – 2009. Author’s construction.
How has contraception evolved according to the demographic and health surveys? The IUD (intra-uterine device) is clearly prevalent – 38%. Now, the IUD is usually only used by women who have already had children. The second “method” of contraception is withdrawal and abstinence, and in this way Vietnamese women (especially young women) remain dependent on the good (or ill) will of men. The annual survey by the GSO tends to report slightly higher prevalence of modern contraceptives like the condom – 13% – or the Pill – 15%. We must remind ourselves that these surveys only cover married women.

The increasing availability of contraception has progressed in two ways, therefore: the spread of “masculine” contraceptive methods which depend on the will and discipline of men (withdrawal, condom) and increasing usage of methods directly controlled by women – medicalized, more reliable means of contraception (IUD, Pill).

Until the end of the 20th century, research on sexuality in Việt Nam was rare. In the area of population, political and scientific preoccupations focused on demographic growth and the means to halt it (Scornet, 2009). Today, we’re seeing the emergence of sexual issues in public debate, in particular questions around the sexuality of young people. What’s changing today is the politicization of sexuality, the politicization of the private domain, of intimacy. Sexual issues emerge in the public debate, and this politicization is happening under the influence of international organizations like the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), following on from the Cairo conference in
1994 and the World Conference on Women which was held in Beijing in 1995 and which promoted reproductive health. These conferences set in motion international mechanisms which resulted in types of international legislation which were the initiative of Northern countries but had wide-reaching effects in the South. Intimate sexual questions had until this point not been discussed outside the family, but now sexuality became a legitimate political issue in Việt Nam, linked to sexual and reproductive health. In the 1990s, the first surveys dedicated to reproductive health were undertaken, but the sexuality of young people did not become a research topic in itself, separated from reproduction and married life. Sexuality was studied only in terms of the risk it posed to health – pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases –, and from a sanitary, preventative perspective. It was really a question of research on health issues linked to sexuality. Strong resistance persists, as can be seen by the continued refusal at national level to ask questions about contraception to unmarried women. This resistance to change also persists as regards laws affecting the relations between men and women.

In contrast, in the West the politicization of intimacy and sex life happened through social and feminist movements in the 1960s, then later in connection with the gay rights movement in the 1980s. These movements demanded equality before the law and a legalization of contraception and abortion. In France, it was the Neuwirth law of 1967 which legalized oral contraception, and the Veil law of 1975 which decriminalized abortion in certain circumstances. By seeking equality before the law and demanding that women should have control over their own bodies, feminist movements participated in these legalizations, and this was totally different from the Vietnamese paradigm where contraception and abortion were already widely practised.

Today, research is carried out into representations of sexuality and its practices, independently of health issues or birth control – as shown by the work of Lê Bạch Dương and Khuất Thu Hồng (2009).

Finally, it’s important to distinguish in contemporary Việt Nam a young male sexuality – a distinct time where it’s socially acceptable for boys to have multiple sexual experiences with women who will not necessarily become their wife – and a premarital female sexuality – which isn’t yet really socially acceptable, and which is experienced as a preparatory period leading to marriage (Chamboredon, 1985). Sexuality only really has a place in the context of an already-formed couple, especially for young girls. The couple must exist before sexual relations occur. As a result, there is a period of chaste pre-marital “dating” before a relationship becomes sexual. Sexual relations come second to the prior existence of the couple. However, men practise a double standard: they have both the conjugal model of sexuality, and more individualistic representations of it. Although some young Vietnamese girls are no longer required to remain “pure” until marriage and are gaining, little by little, the right to experiment sexually, in fact they have neither the same freedom of action nor the same right to self-expression through sexuality as do boys (Löwy, 2006). These differences in sexual behaviour, which are monitored by adult figures of authority – parents, neighbours, teachers, health professionals, etc. –, are maintained by the collective pressure of
young people and the importance of sexual reputations, especially for young girls. A girl can gain a negative sexual reputation, but a boy cannot. This asymmetry derives from male domination of the representation of sexuality.

We're also shifting from a model of vertical transmission of sexual mores, based on authority (from parents, adults, schools, etc.) to a model of horizontal transmission (by peers and the media) which is based on less rigid principles. A sexual transition is under way.

**Selective Bibliography**


Exchanges...

Jean-Luc Maurer, IHEID

How can we explain such low usage of the Pill? Don’t our observations in Viêt Nam bring Giddens’ approach, which links democracy and sexual democratization, into question?

Jean-Pierre Cling, IRD-DIAL

There’s a growing differentiation between sexuality and reproduction. I find it paradoxical that this differentiation is happening simultaneously with a growing equality in sexuality and growing inequality in terms of reproduction. I’m thinking particularly of the selective abortion which in Viêt Nam is a problem which is getting worse. The programme on the policy of gender equality does not foresee a stabilization of the boy/girl ratio, which is already very unequal, but an increase in inequality.

Yves Perraudeau, University of Nantes

As in France, I was wondering about research into the use of eroticism in advertising in Viêt Nam? On another issue, are there regional differences in sexual behaviour?

Catherine Scornet

Regarding the use of the Pill, I only have data on married women, not unmarried ones. According to the survey on family planning and demographic change of 2010, 2.1% of married Vietnamese use contraception before having a child, which shows that fertility – and the demonstration of it – are important right from the start of a marriage. Generally, contraceptives are not used before having a first child. Moreover, the Pill is the subject of many rumours, e.g. it causes infertility, and this makes it unpopular.

As regards the question about the link between sexual and political democratization, I was also asking myself this question. Giddens’ theoretical framework is still interesting, though. Does the democratization of relationships within the family have an influence on democratization in the public sphere? It remains an open question.

To answer Jean-Pierre, I still don’t think the Vietnamese make a distinction between their sexual and their reproductive life, particularly when one observes the significant number of abortions. One of the remarkable features of first sexual relations in Viêt Nam, and in particular the very first sexual experience, is that there isn’t much preparation or protection of the young, i.e. anticipating the consequences of sexual relations.

As for the evolution of the ratio of boys to girls at birth – this reached 110 boys for every 100 girls in 2009 – several conditions must come together to result in this distortion towards male births: fertility must have fallen to a low enough level; the technical means for gender detection in utero must be available; and there must be a preference which discriminates against girls. We can also
see a regional difference, i.e. this voluntary selection is far more marked in the North of the country than in the South.

There has certainly been a rapid change as regards eroticism in advertising. Eroticized behaviour is displayed in magazines, on television, on the Internet and so on. The body is more and more eroticized, which could become a strong indicator of gender inequality. This phenomenon is not necessarily accompanied by increasing equality between men and women.

Audience member

What are the conditions for abortion or selective abortion? Is abortion easy to obtain or not? Is abortion used as a means for spacing pregnancies? Are women who undergo abortion subject to stigma? Is marital rape recognized in Vietnamese law?

Christophe Gironde, University of Geneva

I have a question about the different trajectories of fertility. Does this result from economic factors – standard of living, material conditions, etc. – or rather from cultural factors? Also, you touched on the fact that the SFI has fallen most sharply in the Central Highlands region of the country: is this linked to the fact that this is the region which accepted the highest number of (Kinh) migrants? In addition, I wonder whether the transition in sexual behaviour is linked to rhetorical, rather than real democratization, which would result in a distortion of the true situation.

Catherine Scornet

As for abortion, which is used as a means of fertility control, it’s very easy to find places which practice it. In the demographic and health survey of 1988, abortion featured on the list of means of contraception. Nevertheless, in 1994, abortion was removed from this list. In countries where the issue is not really addressed in law, abortion is usually practised without much restriction. As regards the question on marital rape, I believe that this principle is included in the Law on gender equality of 2007.

In practice there are variations in fertility among ethnic minorities. However, I don’t know whether this fall in SFI is due to changing behaviour among the ethnic minorities, or to Kinh migration.

Audience member, Cambodian student

What is your methodology for calculating the number of abortions? Do you count clandestine abortions?

Emmanuel Pannier, University of Provence – Aix-Marseille

Doesn’t abortion before marriage indicate female juvenile sexuality?

Catherine Scornet

The national survey on demographic change of 2010 estimated an average of 0.8 abortions per married woman. It’s true that it is hard to obtain official figures on abortion because it is also performed on private premises.

It’s possible that female juvenile sexuality is starting to spread, but it is still not entirely accepted by society. The fact that there are a lot of abortions does not mean that
the sexuality of young girls is accepted before marriage. On the contrary, it is an indicator of the unacceptability of births outside marriage – even if it does tell us that a liberalization of sexual behaviour before marriage is under way. Things are changing quickly, and we’re in a situation of transition.

I will finish by emphasizing that the interviews I’ve been able to undertake until now show that sex education is lacking in the school syllabus, or is a subject of much reticence for teachers. We are seeing a liberalization and an eroticization of Vietnamese youth, in parallel with the apparent maintenance of a moral code which champions abstinence. This lack of information also results from the methodologies used, such as the national survey on demographic change which does not include unmarried women in its questionnaire on contraceptive practices.
Dear colleagues and friends,

I am very happy to be here for the 5th consecutive time, and I heartily congratulate the organizers of this summer school, in particular Stéphane Lagrée and Bùi Thu Trang. This summer school in the social sciences has got off to a flying start and the first part, the plenary sessions held in Hà Nội, are just finishing now before we depart for a week of workshops at Tam Đảo. This year’s summer school is already clearly a great success: having participated in all five annual meetings since 2007, I measure progress in terms of participation from the region but also from all parts of Việt Nam, in terms of thematic coherence, the quality of debate, visibility and so on. We could justifiably ask ourselves this question: when will this annual progress stop, is it possible to continue to improve in this way each year when the standards are already so high?

The theme chosen this year was “Social Differentiation and Inequality: Methodological and Cross-disciplinary Approaches to Questions of Gender and Ethnicity”. Four lectures were given on this theme by contributors from very diverse disciplines: a political scientist, economists, an anthropologist, demographers and a social demographer. These lectures referred to Việt Nam, Southeast Asia and Africa.

Before I come back to these presentations and the debates which followed them, I’d like to underline three messages which emerged from the opening remarks made by the representatives of the institutions which organized this summer school. I’ll conclude this synthesis with a brief presentation of the thematic workshops, organized at Tam Đảo to take the work of these plenary sessions further.

Three Messages which Emerge from the Opening Remarks

Firstly – something which was emphasized by everyone who spoke – this summer school is now an intrinsic part of the landscape of training in the social sciences in Việt Nam, with an influence throughout Southeast Asia.

With regard to this, I would like to remind you that the summer school has been twinned since 2009 with a programme of doctoral seminars designed to support Ph.D. students in the social sciences in Việt Nam – and more widely in Southeast Asia – in preparing their thesis. This programme was started at the initiative of the DIAL team of IRD in Việt Nam, along with the Francophone unit of the VASS. Thus, just before the summer school started, a doctoral seminar was held right here on the same theme. The level of the debate was excellent and allowed for discussion of...
theoretical and conceptual questions linked to social, ethnic and gender inequalities: in particular, I think, of the sources of inequality, concepts of social class and so on. These are all fundamental questions, but ones that we have hardly touched on in our plenary sessions owing to a lack of time.

The VASS, which hosts us today and which is the co-organizer of the JTD and the doctoral seminars – with the National University of Human and Social Sciences – has an important training mission which was reinforced and expanded by the Government in January 2010 to include awarding doctorates. This decision led to the establishment of a Training Institute within the VASS, led by Võ Khánh Vinh. The AUF, which is also one of the co-organizers of the doctoral seminars (and the JTD), has just launched a proposal for a doctoral college in the social sciences in Southeast Asia. This college could bring together the VASS, the IRD, the universities of Nantes and of Northern Paris, and other French-speaking universities which are interested. Its aim would be to support Ph.D. students and their supervisors by consolidating their skills. As Olivier Garro pointed out, the JTD could play a pivotal role in this initiative, which is due to kick off in 2012 and build on the programme of doctoral seminars held since 2008.

Secondly, this summer school is a venue for scientific debate between researchers on issues of development, potentially with a direct bearing on actors in the development process.

The subjects addressed this year pose particularly delicate problems for development policy, which generally doesn’t tackle them head-on, neither in Việt Nam nor anywhere else. The problem is firstly on the research side, where results are inconclusive on these issues. The link between gender inequality and development is a good example of these uncertainties: Emmanuel Todd considers that female education triggers development, but this theory is hotly contested. These uncertainties increase the difficulties of defining policy in this area. The same is true for policies intended to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which particularly aim to reduce social and gender inequality, the theme of the JTD 2011. This difficulty was demonstrated in the film “8” produced by the Agence Française de Développement and presented by Alain Henry. The latter referred to the MDGs as a “motivating myth”.

Finally, the multi-disciplinary character of the presentations is an undeniable asset, and a major innovation.

Alain Henry referred to this as “decompartamentalization”. This is happening in several ways: in the selection of profoundly multi-disciplinary themes – the struggle against poverty in 2009, transitions decreed and experienced in 2010, social differentiation this year – which make for very rich debate; in the exploration of these themes using a range of academic disciplines, according to the lecture topics; in the multi-disciplinary mix found within groups (plenary sessions, workshops); and finally, obviously, in terms of participants’ academic backgrounds.

On this point, we should note the very strong presence this year of researchers from the IRD, which reflects the thematic diversity of that institution. Six researchers from the IRD are taking part in this summer school, as well as a lecturer and researcher from a
mixed research unit (Catherine Scornet), an international volunteer (Axel Demenet), and so on. IRD researchers participated in half the plenary presentations and will be present in all the workshops. This level of interest is not new, as shown by the support given by the IRD and the active participation of the DIAL team in the JTD since 2007. The summer school is a perfect fit with the mission of the IRD, as Jean-Pascal Torreton reminded us, whether it be a matter of transferring knowledge, building networks or South-South partnership.

**Synthesis of the Plenary Sessions and the Debates**

I will now return to the four presentations and the debates of the last two days, to give them some coherence and put them in perspective.

**Social Differentiations and Inequalities in Southeast Asia**

Jean-Luc Maurer, a political scientist, presented in his introductory lecture a vast historical tableau bringing us right up to present-day inequalities in Southeast Asia. First, he reminded us that the scale of, and the increase in, inequalities was a problem at global level. This analysis includes international inequalities (between countries) as well as within countries (internal inequalities). Asia is not exempt from this phenomenon, as shown by rising Gini coefficients over the last few decades. There’s one notable exception: Malaysia, where policies of positive discrimination in favour of the Bhumiputra have resulted in diminishing inequalities. Given this overall rise in inequality, it is imperative that development researchers address this question, and the choice of theme for the JTD 2011 is especially pertinent for this reason.

In his intervention he drew a clear distinction between the different kinds of inequalities: inequalities of income/consumption, of the factors of production (capital, land and so on) and of access to global public goods (health, education etc.); to these he could have added inequalities of power, which were picked up in the subsequent presentations on ethnic groups and gender, and which are harder to measure. Jean-Luc Maurer put forward five significant divisions in this domain: rural/urban (sectoral); centre/periphery (regional); majority/minority (ethnic); formal/informal (employment); men/women (gender). Inequalities between social classes do not appear explicitly in this categorization but they are hinted at in the analysis.

The evolution of inequalities in Southeast Asia is particularly irregular if you look at the long term, in the sense that this region (Asia in general) is, on the contrary, notable for its low level of inequalities, in global terms. This characteristic was noted in 1993 by The World Bank in its report *The East Asian Miracle*. This report focused on the Asian model of “growth with equity” as one of the reasons for these countries’ success. According to the orientalist Paul Mus, cultural and religious factors also help to explain this distinctive feature.

But all these countries gradually joined the dynamic of capitalist globalization. This integration stimulated economic growth, poverty reduction, but also the growth of inequalities. Jean-Luc Maurer accepts the idea that economic development can generate inequalities, but considers that this is not inescapable – in the sense of a “natural” law – and that it depends on the kind of
development chosen. I share this view, more so because the famous Kuznets curve demonstrating the inescapability of rising inequalities alongside economic growth is now seriously contested. In brief, Southeast Asia today is certainly a mosaic of ethnic, demographic, cultural, religious and political diversity; but it also displays significant unifying factors in economic, social and political terms, in particular as regards the rise in inequalities.

To refine this analysis, it was particularly relevant to focus in on two typical cases: firstly Indonesia where Jean-Luc Maurer worked for many years; secondly Việt Nam which he knows less well but which is at the heart of this summer school. In these two countries, revolutionary processes reduced inequalities, but these have recently risen again whilst remaining moderate; in both countries, new elites close to the sources of power are profiting greatly from the liberalization of the economy. This is particularly true of the nouveaux riches in Việt Nam where liberalization has been most stark. Different kinds of inequalities are on the rise in the two countries: the urban/rural split is deepening; the same for the division between the ethnic majority and minorities – especially in Việt Nam –; and finally, most employment is in the informal sector. Several differences can be pointed out between the two countries in terms of inequality: gender inequality is higher in Indonesia than in Việt Nam, whether in terms of material goods, income or parliamentary representation, and notably maternal mortality is also higher. Việt Nam’s Human Development Index is clearly superior to that of Indonesia if you take into account the lower level of development of the former.

These differences confirm the importance of public policies in this area.

Much of the debate has concerned acceptable inequality. In other words, what is the degree of inequality which is acceptable in a society? We know that there is no society in existence which is perfectly egalitarian. But the acceptance of inequality differs from one country to another. For example, opinion polls show that the French population has a certain aversion to inequality of income. Authors like John Rawls or Amartya Sen for example make a distinction between inequality and justice. But Jean-Luc Maurer considers that the concept of justice – in the sense of “equity” – is used to get around the problem of inequalities, and that these authors stick to a “functionalist” explanation of inequalities which he refutes.

The three lectures which followed this introductory lecture each touched on a particular aspect of inequality and discrimination, particularly looking at questions of ethnicity (second lecture) and gender (third and fourth lecture, given by demographers and a social demographer). Despite their differences, it seems important to me to underline that they present numerous points in common as in both cases the inequalities/discriminations can be seen as discriminations against “minorities” in qualitative rather than quantitative terms: the minority refers to a dominated group (ethnic groups, women, etc.) whatever its quantitative importance in the population.

Besides, discrimination can be practised by a small ethnic group against the majority (cf. apartheid in South Africa) or to a lesser extent in Malaysia for example with
the Chinese-origin population formerly controlling the economy.

Ethnic Inequalities in Việt Nam

Christian Culas, Benoît Massuyeau, Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud – that is, an anthropologist and three economists – presented a summary of the current living conditions of ethnic minorities in Việt Nam according to a twofold economic and anthropological approach. The study of ethnic minorities raises two preliminary questions. Firstly, the definition of ethnic groups: in general, researchers consider that the dividing lines are flexible, rather than defined for all time, that they change according to different time periods, in brief that they are “endogenous” – linked to the political, historical and social context – and subjective. To simplify, an ethnic group can be defined according to common characteristics – language, etc. – and sense of origin. Secondly, should one collect statistics on ethnicity? Opinion is very divided on this subject. On the one hand, statistics are indispensable to establish a proper analysis and to define policies. On the other hand, statistics represent ethnic groups in rigid categories, and can in certain cases be used against these population groups – with the extreme example of the deportation of the Jews in Europe.

The issue of ethnic minorities is relevant in most Southeast Asian countries, but is very important in Việt Nam when seen in relation to poverty and inequalities. Poverty has fallen greatly here overall, but far less for the minorities. As a result, half of all poor people today belong to ethnic minorities. So the pockets of poverty are found more and more in the regions where minorities live. This demonstrates a problem of social differentiation which is worsening and which is not being solved. We can see the same divergence in non-monetary indicators – malnutrition, stunted growth, education and so on – where outcomes are improving more slowly for the minorities.

We were then presented with an anthropological analysis of development projects for an area inhabited mainly by ethnic minority communities in North Việt Nam. The question asked was this: “Why are large-scale programmes ineffective and what is the relationship between the State and the ethnic minorities?” The study emphasized the lack of knowledge of local context during the design of projects, and also the resistance of ethnic minority groups towards implementing development projects. In brief, we can see a dominant relationship where the State, which represents the majority, thinks and conceives of the ethnic minorities in a certain, usually pejorative, way. Moreover, a development path is imposed on these groups which is not adapted to their specific demands and which they therefore reject. We were given several examples of poorly-conceived initiatives, with peasants commenting, for example: “We went to the district for two weeks, we enjoyed ourselves but we learned nothing about producing vegetables”.

One recommendation suggests studying the forms of development which ethnic minorities do and do not expect. Without this, projects are doomed to fail. This is also why the projects which work are those which stem from initiatives which have come from the ethnic minority groups themselves. This conclusion can be applied to development
projects in general – notably the example of microcredit, which originated principally in Bangladesh as a local initiative. One could also widen the conclusion and consider this dominant/dominated relationship as a feature of development aid in general on the international scale. In any case, the interest shown here in analyzing the failure of development projects is very unusual, since very few researchers look into this question which is nevertheless fundamental.

This innovative work presenting the results of still ongoing research sparked a lively debate, especially as regards the criticism of development projects set out by the contributors. Several of those who contributed defended the development aid offered to ethnic minorities in the programme P135, usually without concrete examples. The divergence between different participants’ visions stemmed from the fact that each was using different data, unlikely to produce convergent results: representative statistical surveys using a large sample; official statistics from the projects themselves; careless, unrepresentative quantitative surveys; anthropological field surveys.

Finally, this presentation raises a major issue; is it desirable or not to integrate the ethnic minorities? This poses the problem of finding a compromise between improving living conditions – but measured by what criterion? – and the benefits to be accrued from better social cohesion; but at what price? The losses associated with the process of homogenization must also be taken into account – the disappearance of specific cultural and linguistic characteristics, and so on. As we touch on this question we should pay our respects to the great ethnologist Georges Condominas, well-known in Viêt Nam. I remember attending a lecture in Hà Nội in 2008 where he answered a question on the cultural differences between the Kinh and the Mnon Gar, the ethnic group which he had studied the most: “The Kinh are for example closer to the Japanese than the Mnon Gar in terms of their values. A Mnon Gar does not wish to become rich. As soon as he accumulates riches, cattle for example, he distributes them to other members of the village – by sacrificing a buffalo for example.” This issue is relevant not only in Viêt Nam but also in particular in Europe, where there is an important ongoing debate about “multi-culturalism”. While France is supposed to be a country which assimilates minorities into a single mould, countries like Britain or Germany traditionally follow a very different “multi-cultural” model which accepts the co-existence of several cultural communities.

Biographies and Differences between Generations

Philippe Antoine and Andonirina Rakotonarivo, both demographers, have sought to measure inequalities in Africa, bringing together gender and intergenerational inequalities and inequalities related to the individual’s level of education. With them we were taken back to the field, but on another continent, and that widening of scope towards other developing countries was welcome. This presentation had a lot of methodological content, which corresponds to a central function of this summer school, and was illustrated by several examples.

[8] Georges Condominas died on 17th July 2011, the day before this synthesis was presented. The quotation in this paragraph is faithful to the spirit of his response but does not reproduce the exact terms used.
The tool used for this kind of study is called “biographical surveys”; Philippe Antoine is one of the most eminent specialists of these surveys in Africa.

These original surveys allow one to grasp individuals’ lives – their “biography” – in three dimensions: family (in the sense of matrimony and fertility), professional and residential (residence throughout lifetime, migrations and so on). They involve “quantifying” the life of individuals, gathering quantified “life histories”, which is obviously a considerable challenge. The goal of these surveys is to follow social changes, particularly their gender dimension. The contributors offered two practical examples: the study of how people integrate into urban life and matrimonial behaviour closely linked to other major life events; and the analysis of migration and mobility, for which these studies are also much used. The originality of the biographical surveys lies in the fact that most statistical surveys are cross-cutting: we observe the situation of individuals at a given moment, but we know nothing of their past. For example, Demographic and Health Surveys gather information about the reproductive history of women but provide no information about their past – residential arrangements, etc. In contrast, biographical surveys can look at an individual’s life from birth to the moment of the survey. The passage of time is thus taken into account, using a diachronic concept: in the form of “events” or “movement from one state to another”.

Longitudinal surveys such as biographical surveys allow us to better understand changes in behaviour by analyzing groups and comparing them. These advantages are offset by drawbacks: these surveys take more time to answer; they require the greater training of survey interviewers; for these reasons, they are more expensive; they rely on the memory of the people surveyed, who are asked to date events, and thus on the trustworthiness of answers to questions referring to a long time period. In addition, these surveys are more difficult to analyze. Biographical surveys were derived from epidemiological surveys, where the events examined – for example death – are generally fixed-term. But in the social sciences, we look at less definite events – for example marriage – which are therefore by their very nature more complex to analyze.

We were presented with a study done by Philippe Antoine with Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud, which was carried out in three African capitals (Dakar, Yaoundé and Antananarivo) and analyzes the three stages of entry into adult life: starting to earn a living; marriage; residential autonomy. This work shows the increasing difficulties faced by young people in these three countries. Here we touch on a new aspect of inequality; not only between genders but between generations, and the two dimensions combined. The results are very rich and original: a drop in inequality of education between men and women when you look at two generations born 20 years apart – before and after independence; an increase of the age at marriage and a very marked reduction in underage marriages; this is linked to the economic crisis, as young people have no jobs and no money to get married; a reduction in residential autonomy for the same reasons. This increase in age at marriage tends, as in Việt Nam, to lead to women becoming sexually active before marriage, particularly educated women.
Finally, there is differentiation according to the level of education, in the opposite sense from that seen in developed countries: it’s the best-educated who have the most difficulty finding a job.

The second example was taken from a large biographical survey undertaken in Europe, the “Migration between Africa and Europe” survey. The example studied looked at the link between migration for study and professional integration for Congolese in Belgium. These people are usually well-educated and often come to Belgium initially to study. Slightly paradoxically, their average unemployment rate is high. The biographical survey of these migrants in 2010 improved our understanding of this phenomenon, by measuring the time elapsed between arrival in Belgium and the first job, and by asking the migrants how they had first arrived in the country – to study, after having studied, etc. After 10 years in Belgium, those who had the most jobs were those who had come to study. In addition, the analysis showed that having a spouse in Belgium had a positive effect on the likelihood of getting a job, while the individual’s level of education had no significant effect.

The discussion revealed an interest in undertaking this kind of biographical survey in Việt Nam, but also more generally in Southeast Asia. As François Roubaud suggested, there are at least two reasons to take this approach in Việt Nam: firstly, the first representative national household survey was undertaken only in 1993 and we have no statistical information from before that date – other than censuses; moreover, this country has known a turbulent history, so there are many individual events to relate. But we must move fast, before the people who witnessed them die. Undertaking such surveys requires finding significant funding and can falter owing to the difficulty the survey population has in recounting traumatic events from the past – cf. Cambodia.

**Gender, Sexuality and Reproduction in Việt Nam**

Catherine Scornet, a demographer, has for many years studied the link between gender, sexuality and reproduction in Việt Nam, which was the subject of her lecture. Following on from many anthropological works such as those of Maurice Godelier, she considers that inequalities in sexuality are linked to other inequalities in the social sphere. In this regard, her intervention is central to the theme of the JTD 2011. She shows that in Việt Nam we have moved from a conventional social context to increasing individualization of sexual norms. The striking drop in fertility authorized by contraception – because it allows the disassociation of sexuality from reproduction – is the necessary condition for this differentiation.

For women, the differentiation between sexuality and becoming a couple allows this individualization, which has been authorised for a long time for men. Her presentation, of a very didactic nature, was made up of two parts, the first theoretical and the second empirical.

The first, theoretical part set out the concepts used and the research questions studied, as well as the hypotheses to be tested: first hypothesis, sexuality is a social construct – a theory supported in particular by Michel Foucault and Margaret Meade, from whom derives the “sociology of sexuality” on which Catherine Scornet bases her approach; second hypothesis, sexuality is not static,
as shown by the well-known work of Alfred Kinsey which makes a distinction between sexual behaviour and sexual activity for reproductive purposes. This approach, which was very innovative in its time in the mid-20th century, opened the way to sexual diversification. These two hypotheses steer research into two directions:

- We must first study the power relationships between genders; in other words, the way in which the elements which make up relationships between men and women – especially whatever constitutes a power imbalance between them – contributes to a style of sexual interaction and a context of risk and prevention which put the partners on an unequal footing. To quote Anthony Giddens, "Whoever says sexual emancipation, says sexual democracy". Here, sexual emancipation means that each person makes their own choices and democracy is understood in the sense of the pursuit of personal fulfillment;

- Also, we must look at the transition in representations of sexuality and its practices; we're moving from a rigid context – with rigid, monolithic, external sexual conventions dictated by morality or religion – to a divergence of the trajectories of love and marriage and a growing individualization of the conventions affecting sexuality and its practices – which produce contradictory pressures. This is also to say that the rules are becoming less clear-cut.

In the second part of the presentation, by analyzing numerous indicators and policies affecting demography in Việt Nam, Catherine Scornet tested her hypotheses. The presentation particularly focused on changes to the age structure of the population, the fall in mortality and birth rate, and the rise in life expectancy. The sharp drop in fertility, which coincided with greater convergence of fertility indicators between regions, was linked partly to public policy controlling the number of births. The State effectively pushed for the reduction of the birth rate from the 1960s onwards, well before the adoption of the two child policy. Contraception, which allows the disassociation of sexuality from reproduction, was reserved mostly for married women who already had children, and abortion was widespread.

Despite all these changes, certain behaviour and inequalities between the genders remained constant: matrimonial practices have changed little, as shown in particular by the average age at marriage, which remains almost universal; sexual behaviour differs between young men and women, with strong variations according to region and ethnic origin. As noted during the debate, one indicator that discrimination against girls remains strong is the very high male/female ratio at birth in Việt Nam due to a rise in selective abortion. This is a serious problem affecting numerous Asian countries – China, India, Korea, etc. There is a need for research on the relationships within couples leading to this kind of behaviour.

This presentation focused on inequalities seen through the lens of sexuality and reproduction, and did not touch on other inequalities of gender – income, inheritance, power, etc. –, a dimension presented in the doctoral seminars and which will be studied in the workshops. But there is a close link between these different kinds of gender inequality. The strongest proof of this is that feminist movements fight to defend
female sexuality and to reduce the other inequalities.

**Overview of the Thematic Workshops**

As happens each year, the thematic workshops will allow us to deepen our examination of the themes touched on in the plenary sessions, whilst providing methodological training in survey and analysis techniques. As usual, you will meet those who made presentations in the plenary sessions again in the four workshops organized at Tam Đảo, as well as other contributors who are already among you but have not yet led a session.

**Workshop 1** concerns "Ethnic and Gender Discrimination: Measurement and Methods of Classifying Data used in Việt Nam". This workshop will be led by economist-statisticians from the DIAL team in IRD. This training in statistical analysis of survey data is being organized for the fifth successive time, but each year it looks at a new theme and different techniques. This year, participants will be introduced to standard methods of measurement and analysis of discrimination using Vietnamese data with the help of the statistical software STATA.

**Workshop 2** is dedicated to "Biographies: from Quantitative Survey to Analysis". It will be led by Philippe Antoine, Mody Diop and Andorina Rakotonarivo, all demographers, who will undertake a direct application of the tools set out in their plenary session. Participants will be introduced to biographical analysis and provided with the basic know-how to draft a questionnaire and conduct a survey. As in Workshop 1, participants will use STATA software to analyse real survey data.

**Workshop 3** “Constructing and Handling Ethnicity in Southeast Asia: Cultures, Policies and Development" will be led by Christian Culas, Trần Hồng Hạnh and Grégoire Schlemmer, anthropologists. The workshop’s aim is to “deconstruct” concepts of ethnic groups, to study the relationships between the State and ethnic groups and to apply anthropological study methods and reasoning to the examination of various case studies in Việt Nam and in the region. The practical work will be based on the study of documents and tables of data.

Finally, **Workshop 4** “Differentiation and Inequalities: Realities Perceived, Realities Experienced in a Commune in the Plains near Tam Đảo” will be led by Christophe Gironde, Pierre-Yves Le Meur and Olivier Tessier, that is, one social economist and two anthropologists. It will provide training in field survey methods in social anthropology. Like Workshop 1, this is being organized for the fifth consecutive time, which is proof of its success and the interest it attracts. However, the theme and the fieldwork will be different this year, as the workshop takes place in a village where the majority of the population belongs to the Sán Dìu ethnic group.

Thank you for your attention.
Part 2
Workshops
2.1. Ethnic and Gender Discriminations: Methods of Measurement and Breaking Down Data


The question of ethnic and gender discriminations is central to Việt Nam: are women really better treated than in other developing countries, as is often claimed? How can we explain the growing gap observed over the medium term between the Kinh majority and the other ethnic groups in terms of poverty reduction? This question is equally valid at the Southeast Asian level, and more widely in most developing countries.

The objective of this workshop is to introduce and apply methodological tools developed mainly by economists to examine these questions. Relying on a series of mainly Vietnamese household surveys (VHLSS - Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey, LFS – Labor Force Survey), participants will be introduced to the standard methods of measuring discriminations (theoretical foundations, limits); practical exercises will follow, for teaching purposes, on paper and on computer using Stata software. We will then put these into context by comparing them with results obtained on other continents, notably in Africa, so as to stimulate reflection.

(Retranscription)

Day 1, Monday 18th July

Presentation of the trainers and participants (see list of participants at end of chapter and biographies)

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Your expectations as regards learning to use the Stata software prompt me to emphasize that our objective is not only to use this computer-based tool but to try to understand our approach and analyze the theme of this Summer School, based on exchanges of skills.
We’re going to cover ethnic and gender issues from the quantitative point of view in Việt Nam, but then also move on to look more widely at other countries and regions of the world.

The theme of the 2011 Summer School is important both for the understanding of societies in general but also to implement development policies. Judging from the evidence, the issue of gender is universal; that of ethnic groups reflects the diversity of situations in different countries. We could widen our perspective to other favoured or disadvantaged groups: religious groups, social groups, age groups, etc. What we will present to you this week on gender and ethnicity can be extended to other subjects, and to very different research themes.

Economics and quantified social sciences have developed instruments for measurement (surveys) and for analysis (techniques for the breaking down of gender and ethnic gaps) which are powerful instruments to try to respond in a quantitative sense to the questions of discrimination. Our approach is quantitative and must be combined with a qualitative analysis before an in-depth diagnostic can be reached.

The training programme is divided into two main periods: firstly, a transfer of knowledge, punctuated by an exchange of views until Thursday morning; then the end of the week structured around group work. You will thus produce your own results which will be presented in the workshop but also in the collective report-back session on Saturday morning.

The days will be divided into four sub-sections: two clearly identified sessions in the morning and two further sessions in the afternoon. We will alternate knowledge transfer – concepts, results of methods – and practical exercises of introduction then of calculation with the Stata software.

Let’s get started together on the programme for the week:

- Today we’ll deal with gender statistics: why and how do we produce them? This afternoon, we’ll kick off an introduction to Stata using a database from the Việt Nam employment survey of 2007. We’ll finish the afternoon in the second session with a presentation on the issue of gender in Việt Nam;
- Tuesday. We will work on indicators for the labour market linked to the issue of gender: entry into the labour market, concepts of the labour market, unemployment, underemployment, etc. Then we’ll move to an applied session which will be given over both to the programming of indicators and the discussion of results. The afternoon will be dedicated to a presentation on the state of ethnic groups in Việt Nam and in the Southeast Asian region. In the second part, we’ll have a new applied session on Stata, looking at the quality of employment according to gender and ethnicity;
- First session of Wednesday. We will examine the techniques of breaking down data: what are the principles for this and how do we implement them?
- The two half-days of Wednesday and Thursday morning will be reserved for finishing the lecture on techniques for the breaking down of data;
We'll move into group work on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning. You will need to set out a diagnostic of the ethnic and gender situation in one of the six provinces of Việt Nam – one province per group. The database will allow you to form this diagnostic. You will be asked to draft a document that takes a global perspective, and to analyze results on the gender situation and that of ethnic groups in a region, based on group work. The groups need to be diversified and multi-disciplinary with at least one or two people in charge of the calculations; you must have a mix of nationalities and genders;

- The presentation of the results to the entire workshop will take place on Friday afternoon;

- Finally, the last step, we will all together finalize the synthesis of the week’s work, for an oral presentation by two of you next Saturday morning to all the participants and trainers of the 2011 Summer School.

2.1.1. Developing Gender Statistics

[Christophe Jalil Nordman]

We're going to continue this morning with a plea from the World Bank for the development of gender statistics.⁹

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Figure 20  Why Develop Gender Statistics?

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To the question above, we must respond that gender statistics is a field which cross-cuts all statistical domains. It’s about identifying, producing, disseminating and analyzing statistics so as to understand how the issue of gender affects individuals and society.

It’s a way of showing how the differences between the sexes can influence the economic and social development of countries.

Sex isn’t identical to the notion of gender, but the two are often confused. The category “sex” refers to the biological differences between men and women, while the notion of gender is a social construct which gives men and women a particular role in society. We will use these two terms in a differentiated way, referring to these two particular notions; the difference in sex is unchanging while the difference in gender can be influenced by policy choices.

Gender statistics are not only concerned with women, but also the role of women and men in society. Let’s take the example of the UK in 2005, where employment rates were plotted on the basis of an employment survey.

The employment rate for men is slightly higher than that for women – in statistics, we would say that the difference is not significant. The difference between the employment rates rises to about 8%, but if we examine the carefully broken down data, introducing the “gender” dimension, i.e. whether individuals are responsible for children or not, the results appear very differently:

**Figure 21 Understanding the Labour Market – UK Example. Employment Rates of Men and Women in the UK, 2005**

The employment rate is higher among those with children than those without. For the population group which has children, the difference in the employment rate between women and men rises to 22%. The percentage of women working falls to 68% and that of men rises to 90%.

Let’s take another example which shows that even when women do participate in the workforce, their participation differs from that of men.
For Germany in 2005, over half of salaried working women with children work part-time. This proportion is only 5% among salaried men. The proportion of men working part-time is therefore relatively independent of the number of children, whereas the proportion of women working part-time rises with the number of children they have.

The importance of sexual equality is not just a unit of labour statistics but should be included in all statistical fields. The decision-makers – policymakers – need to work with statisticians to identify the areas where social and economic realities are different for men and women. The areas of major preoccupation for decision-makers are: poverty, education, training, health, the family and households in general, violence, armed conflict and in particular ethnic conflicts in certain countries, the economy, power, the decision-making capacity of individuals, the rights of men and women, the media, transport, sports and leisure. All these domains are affected by gender statistics.

The importance of gender statistics was recognized during the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. The programme of action which emerged from this conference became the basis for work in gender studies.
The production of statistics has implications for the development and improvement of concepts, definitions, classifications and methods.

All data which are linked to people need to be produced, broken down and disseminated according to sex, but it is important to remind ourselves that individual data are not only collected in the social and economic domains; they are also collected in businesses which must also observe the gender dimension. This means that gender statistics are as relevant in demographic and social statistics as in other domains like business, agriculture, transport, new technologies, etc.

Numerous hypotheses are made in traditional analyses, according to which the gender dimension is not the most relevant: there are other social dynamics which are more important to analyze; the evolution of women in society is often aligned on that of the husband, so analyzing the situation of men would allow us also to obtain an image of the dynamic of women in society.

It’s important to state that the objective is to provide information to support development policies and research, and to shed light on the public debate in the media and other channels of communication. Gender statistics are an essential basis for the surveillance and evaluation of the effectiveness of public policies; they are part of the institutional mechanisms necessary for the development
of a policy of sexual equality. It is thus important to examine the gender dimension of policies even if the policy isn’t obviously linked to gender. Finally, it is important to make gender visible in the evidence base which underpins the development of policies.

We will now concentrate on labour statistics linked to the gender dimension; this involves a presentation which is like a guide to good practice in collecting information.

What are labour statistics and why include gender? The main objective of labour statistics is to give a precise description of the size, the structure and the characteristics of participants in the labour market and of its evolution. This is a domain where the realities of men and women differ, and must therefore be examined. These differences can touch on different aspects: working hours, type of tasks, income, etc.

The histograms indicate the distribution of jobs in 2008 according to employment sector, sex and region for different groups of countries. It shows industrial employment as a proportion of total employment, and the gap between men and women. This gap is seen in all regions but differs significantly by continent: from 0.5% in East Asia to over 20% in the other industrialized countries, in particular those of the European Union. For example in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia, the primary sector represents over 60% of female employment.
This diagram shows the distribution of women by employment status in 2007, for a large sample of countries. We have here not an image of distribution at a given moment but percentage points which represent changes, i.e. an evolution over a period of ten years, from 1997 to 2007. Among women, salaried work accounts for the largest share, followed by own–account or independent work which has seen a sharp rise, while family-based work has fallen significantly. This data comes from the International Labour Organization (ILO) based on a sample of about 100 countries.

When labour statistics make a clear distinction between the realities of employment for men and women, users can understand and analyze the position and the constraints; and it is only when these differences are measured statistically that it is possible to define them correctly.

Let’s concentrate on two essential factors, coverage and gender roles:

- Coverage shows what labour statistics are really measuring. The first point to emphasize is that the contribution of women to the economy, in general, is often poorly recorded and misrepresented. Labour statistics allow us in general to identify and characterize the fundamental situations of work and unemployment, focusing only on those workers with a regular full-time job in a business in the formal economy. In this case, it’s important to realize that an essential part of the information on women’s work is lost: women usually have jobs which are atypical of those we are measuring – full-time,
structured work in the formal economy. So it’s indispensable to have a good understanding of women’s work and society’s perception of it, to produce labour statistics which are complete and relevant;

- Gender roles have an important impact on the participation of men and women in the labour market, and its measurement. We all know the roles commonly assigned to women, as housekeeper and economically dependent member of the household, or that of the man who is often seen as the breadwinner and decision-maker within the household. However, these traditional roles assigned to women often prevent them from having a professional activity. In certain cases, women cannot work without the permission of their husband – or of other men in the family – and these barriers can be imposed by the social and educational context. A survey conducted in Azerbaijan on the attitudes of men and women to work shows that if you ask women, 36% of them say that the woman should not work if the man earns enough. Even if one asks the woman about her role in society, she will have a tendency to integrate the social role which is assigned to her by men in that society.

What are the stages of the integration of the gender dimension in labour statistics?

- Firstly, one must determine the subjects to be covered. We focus on the questions to ask so as to describe as equally as possible the economic activities of men and women. This helps to explain the differences and similarities in the labour market;

- In the second stage, it’s important to define the variables and their classifications. All these variables must reflect the different situations between the sexes;

- We must look closely at the methodology of measurement. The objective is to assure oneself that all work situations are identified in a clear and coherent way during collection but also during treatment of the information;

- Finally, the fourth and last step, we explore the best ways to present and disseminate the results, so that the differences and similarities, as well as their causes, are demonstrated.

Stage 1, which defines the theme of the analysis, is a fundamental stage for the collection and analysis of data disaggregated by gender. All the conventional subjects of labour statistics are relevant for the reflection of gender distinctions. Obviously, we must focus our attention on the subjects where the disparities are more marked, like informal employment: income gaps, employment segregation, entrepreneurship, casual labour, the workplace, work/life balance.

How can we best address these subjects? In order to describe the different contributions of men and women, labour statistics need to identify and cover separately work done in parallel to domestic tasks, as is often the case with agricultural activities, for example. All subsistence activities, informal, domestic, intermittent, as well as unpaid services, need to be identified separately.

Let’s look at employment segregation, a subject which is frequently dealt with in labour economics.
Each bar indicates the number of occupations where women represent half of the total workforce in that occupation in 2004. In most OECD countries, the female workforce is concentrated in a relatively limited number of occupations. On average, half of the female workforce is concentrated in about 10 occupations, as compared to about 20 for men – with the exception of the Czech Republic. It is also important to know in which specific occupations men and women are concentrated; if the activities dominated by women require lower qualifications, are worse paid, of a lower social status than the jobs done by men, or if the social status of the activities depends on the sex of the workers.

Let’s look now at the case of the thirty principal occupations in Sweden in 2005 (Figure 32). These occupations are represented vertically, with to the left, horizontally, the percentage of women in each of them, and to the right, the corresponding percentage of men. The length of the bars indicates if the occupation is dominated by men or by women. What conclusion can we draw?

In this case, the occupations are completely dominated either by women or by men: less than 1% of women work as mechanics; 97% of secretarial work is done by women.

Let’s take the example of income. Do women earn on average as much as men? Is equal pay for equal work a reality?
In the countries cited here, men earn on average 30% more than women. The gap reaches 50% in Georgia. What is it in Việt Nam? We'll come back to that.

Another example is to look at the evolution of the pay gap along the earnings distribution. This case study concerns the Moroccan manufacturing sector.

*Confidence interval of 95%.*

Is the pay gap between a poor man and a poor woman at the same level of the distribution?

The pay gap between men and women increases, almost linearly, along the earnings distribution: the poorest individuals have the smallest pay gaps, the richest individuals have significant pay gaps. We have here a brutal acceleration of the pay gap in the upper part of the wage distribution, which reflects an invisible obstacle preventing women from attaining the best-paid positions and the most sought-after posts – the “glass ceiling effect”. This effect is also illustrated in the case of Sweden.

Another example which is often used to examine the issue of gender disparity is the work/life balance. A major constraint on the participation of women in the workforce is their family responsibilities. Marital status, very young children, or other people needing care, can be constraints on their participation in the labour market.

These examples underline the importance of reviewing the data collected on the work of men and women. To collect data like this,
we use employment surveys, which in many countries are the main source of statistical information on these issues.

For this, we must define and classify the variables.

The notion of employment must:
- Measure better the seasonal and casual jobs which women do often to a greater extent than men;
- Include people who only work a few hours and whose social role is often that of a housewife, a student or a retired person;
- Measure the production, without exchange, of produce outside trade or market. These are activities often dominated by women;
- Integrate the informal sector.

There is a current distortion relating to the income earned from a job. The concept used often only refers to direct salary, which excludes bonuses, benefits in kind, services and other social advantages such as family allowances. These elements must also be measured by the survey to understand gender differences.

Classification is another problem. Are distortions linked to gender inherent in classification systems? For example, the standardized international classification of professions possesses fewer subdivisions for jobs dominated by women – like secretarial work – while male-dominated occupations – like craftsmanship – are more finely delineated.

In the 2001 census in Nepal, the Commission of Classifications of Professions and Sectors focused on distortions linked to gender. It then produced new codes which delivered a more detailed disaggregation by sex.

**Table 30**

*Example of Classification of Activities Typically Done by Nepali Women in the NSCO, 2000*

This table shows the new occupations introduced with greater detail into the classification of activities: wood craftsman, canning of fruit and vegetables, etc.

Once one is sure that gender differences have been taken into account in definition and classification, the next stage is the choice of measure to avoid all stereotypes. The measure must be independent of the perceptions of people being questioned, and of the prejudices of the interviewers. It can happen that the interviewer him/herself introduces biases into the formulation of questions.
Another example of methodology is taken from the employment survey in Pakistan – Pakistan’s Labour Force Survey. A list of occupations was added, so as to take account better of people engaged in informal work, agricultural tasks, food processing, construction work, garment workers, etc.

This table shows the results obtained with standard questions and those obtained with the new list of activities. The activity rate of women, obtained with the new questionnaire, has more than doubled, rising from less than 20% to over 40%, while the activity rate of men remains unchanged.

Let’s look finally at the fourth and final methodological step: the presentation and dissemination of the results of the analysis. All the indicators can be calculated on the basis of a variety of break downs so as to identify the link between the professional situation of men and women. These indicators are sex, level of education, age, family context, etc. The way in which data are presented has a considerable impact on the understanding of disparities.

Table 31  Activity Rates in Pakistan (percentages), 2005-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity rate (standard questions)</th>
<th>Activity rate (with activity list)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pakistan’s Labour Force Survey.

Figure 32  Economic Activity Rate of Men and Women in Sweden, 2000-2005

Source: UNECE Gender Statistics.
This figure shows an almost equal participation by men and women in the workforce in Sweden between 2000 and 2005. We can see trajectories of activity rates which are almost identical. The same rate can be described in detail if you distinguish part-timers from full-timers, unemployed from inactive. However, we can see major differences in the evolution of this participation over time. Women take up a greater share of part-time employment, while men predominate in full-time work.

To conclude, let’s keep in mind the list of four key questions adopted during the 17th international conference of labour statisticians in Geneva in 2003, which give a guide to good practice in integration of the gender dimension into labour statistics:

- “Are the relevant subjects covered?” so as to describe problems linked to gender such as unpaid work, jobs in the unstructured economy, etc.;
- “Are all work situations correctly reflected, so as to measure work?”;
- “Are the variables correctly defined then classified?”;
- “Are all the statistics sufficiently detailed so as to reflect clearly the differences and the similarities between men and women in the labour market?”

This week, the examination of the national labour statistics of Việt Nam will give you the opportunity to learn, on the basis of these four questions.
Work on Stata began at the start of the afternoon. The work was done in pairs made up of a mix of competences so as to avoid skill gaps. The objective of this first session was to familiarize the participants with the main commands of this software; the theoretical explanations were interspersed with practical application, using a representative employment survey of 165,331 individuals in Vietnam. Practical work was done on the statistical treatment of a target population, construction of cross-tabulations, etc.

Selective Bibliography


2.1.2. State of Play: The Situation of Women in Việt Nam

[Axel Demenet]

We’re going to move on to an analysis of the situation of women in Việt Nam by examining two complementary aspects: their professional activities and their role in the home. Firstly, we will see how the rights of women and sexual equality are safeguarded in legislation – is the Vietnamese legal framework discriminatory? We will develop this reflection by examining synthetic indices on the position of women in Việt Nam in comparison to elsewhere in the world. We will then discuss the major social indicators – touching on demography, education and health – and the economic indicators, and lastly take a look at some studies on the division of tasks in the family.

Is the law a good guarantee of male/female equality in Việt Nam?

The Communist Party has considered male/female equality a key objective since the 1930s, when the Women’s Union was created.

- Gender equality is written into the constitution;
- The CEDAW Convention (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) was ratified in February 1982;
- 2006, law 73/2006/QH11 on gender equality;
- 2007, law on the control and prevention of domestic violence;
- April 2007, resolution 11-NQ/TW of the Communist Party on women’s labour.

At the heart of the legal texts, the equality of women in society and in social and family life is recognized. As well as the Women’s Union, a structure which is present at all of the country’s administrative levels, there is a National Committee for the progress of women, founded in 1993, which works with several Ministries.

What is your feeling about the situation in Việt Nam, from an overall point of view?

[Phạm Quang Linh]

Việt Nam’s legal framework covers the promotion of gender equality relatively well, but in reality many factors of inequality still exist.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, Việt Nam is ranked 72nd out of 134, and according to Gender Inequality Index the country is 58th out of 169.

Let’s look at demographic indicators and at education and health.

From a demographic point of view, gender selection at birth is a problem: today the sex ratio is 110 boys for every 100 girls. There are strong regional disparities: in the Central Highlands, the ratio is balanced; in the Red River Delta, the imbalance rises to 115 boys for 100 girls.

On these points, the reader is referred also to the lecture from Catherine Scornet in the plenary session.

The educational level is linked to the fertility rate at the age of marriage. At the provincial level, there is a positive correlation between this rate and the illiteracy rate; as for the average age at first marriage, it is negatively correlated with the attainment of a degree for women. As a general trend, the gender gap in
terms of illiteracy has significantly diminished over the last 20 years, dropping from 10% in 1989 to 4.4% in 2009. When we combine two potential types of discrimination – ethnic and gender – the gaps widen: 67% of non-Kinh women are not schooled further than primary level. A comparable diagnostic can be made in terms of access to health care since, for example, two-thirds to three-quarters of non-Kinh women give birth at home without assistance.

Let’s look quickly now at relative poverty levels (defined in monetary terms) by gender – as well as issues of access to capital.

Initial information from the figures: for the households where the head of family is a woman, the poverty rate is slightly higher. However, let’s keep in mind that female-headed households are rare and that these statistics do not reveal situations which may be very different in terms of vulnerability, which is not only a function of income: women who are widowed, divorced or abandoned by their husband, with or without children to look after. Just bear in mind that monetary poverty is a reductive measure from this point of view.

The possession of capital is key to development. It’s also a source of power for women, involving them more in decision-making processes. Let’s look at the situation of property ownership and access to credit:

- While land distribution is, in theory, egalitarian in Việt Nam, the vast majority – nine out of ten – of land title documents feature only the husband’s name – thereby de facto depriving women of security against which to borrow and of negotiating power in decisions within the household;
- Households with a male head have on average more access to credit – 35%
compared to 25%. The Women’s Union plays a major role in access to credit, but particularly vulnerable groups like non-Kinh women remain relatively disconnected from mass organizations.

Let’s come now to women’s place in the family, which is potentially the most interesting to analyze, because it’s more difficult to measure. Let’s base our theories on a recent study from quantitative sociology (Knodel et al., 2004). The authors base their analysis on about 1,300 interviews. They aim to compare the situations of married households at three different periods: 1963-1971 (wartime), 1977-1985 (post-reunification), 1992-2000 (economic openness).

At the outset, we should ask ourselves what determines the division of tasks within a couple. A possible typology draws on three explanatory factors (Shelton and John, 1996):

- Available time. If a spouse is economically inactive or undertakes little activity, their activity level in the family sphere will be high. In Việt Nam, women are very economically active and hardly interrupt their careers (Haub and Phương Thị Thu Hương, 2004);

- Earnings. The general idea is that the person who earns more money dedicates less time to domestic tasks, the education of children, etc.

- The ideology of the family. Certain values determine the division of tasks – cf. Confucianism.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this study, of which the first part focuses on perceptions of the division of tasks.

Looking at all three periods, unsurprisingly women are overall more involved than men in domestic tasks in Vietnam. In terms of tiresome duties which contribute to the functioning of the house (cooking, cleaning, washing), only one respondent in ten (at the most) indicated male involvement which was equal or more to that of women. The
imbalance in domestic contribution is flagrant, because almost all women participate in at least one task, compared to only one man out of two. The management of the budget is the activity in which men are most often present: 32% of respondents considered that the man was at least as involved as the woman. This area can be seen as a source of power within the couple just as much as a time-consuming task, so the greater involvement of men isn’t necessarily a positive signal for women.

The comparison of the three cohorts of households gives us some indications of the evolution of the division. The involvement of women is remarkably constant, while that of men has risen significantly as regards budget management... and much less so for the other tasks – about three points on average. One can thus detect a trend towards a slight balancing-out, keeping in mind that these figures date from 2004 and don’t tell us about the last decade.

The second aspect of the study looks at decision-making during the first years of marriage, on the basis of reported perceptions. Claims vary greatly as to whom carries most weight in decisions, depending on whether your respondent is the man or the woman. Nevertheless, it does appear that decisions are taken in a more equal way when they concern social relations, whereas both sexes say that the husband is more involved in decisions on long-term expenditure and domestic production; these decisions can be quantitatively high, given the number of individual enterprises. Contrary to the
tendency towards balancing-out seen in household tasks, it seems that the woman’s role in all types of decisions is significantly less important within more recently formed couples, while that of men is rising.

Overall, what emerges is that in the domestic environment, women are more involved than men in tasks, while they carry less weight in decision-making. The first gap seems to be getting slightly smaller, while the second is widening for more recent couples. These results are intuitive, but until now seldom backed up with figures, and would benefit from being completed by “timetable”-type surveys on the actual time spent on activities, and by a closer analysis by sub-group (regions, rural/urban, education, etc.).

In the end, Việt Nam shows us a situation of contrasts, in terms of the situation of the female population. The legal framework is solid, because equality between the sexes has been an objective for a long time. Results in terms of demography, education and health are broadly encouraging. The position of the Vietnamese woman isn’t institutionally inferior, nor does she suffer systematic discrimination, and her place in society is in many ways comparable to that of men. All of this assures the country a good position within the ranking of overall indices for international comparisons. Having said that, fundamental gaps remain. Gender birth selection is a reality, particularly in the Red River Delta. Levels of education are still significantly different according to sex. Women’s access to credit and capital is undermined by the structure of land titles. Finally, the contrast within family life remains: this facet remains unexplained, other than by blaming the inertia of existing behaviours and conceptions. You should note that absolute equality between men and women in the home is not necessarily an objective in itself, and is not conceived as such in our approach, because the differentiated roles which each spouse plays are, judging from the evidence, the product of social norms and the reflection of conventions anchored in individuals’ identities.

A more in-depth economic diagnostic is indispensable. Women’s access to the labour market and the positions which they occupy within it are particularly important indicators, as are the potential differences in earnings for equivalent activities which are often claimed. Taking our database as a starting point, we will work together this week, on these aspects.

Selective Bibliography

ADB (2005), Vietnam Gender Situation Analysis.
Viet Nam Population and Housing Census 2009 (2011), Profile of Key Sex-Disaggregated Indicators from UNFPA.
Day 2, Tuesday 19th July

2.1.3. The Labour Market. Concepts and Elementary Indicators or an Analysis of Discrimination

[François Roubaud]

We are going to present to you the main indicators and concepts of the labour market by gender and ethnicity, then we will examine the questionnaire from the 2007 employment survey in Việt Nam, on which we are basing ourselves for this training period.

Relevance of a Discriminatory Analysis of the Labour Market

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Why have we chosen the labour market to deal with issues of ethnic and gender inequalities? The main reason is that in developing countries most individuals, and the poorest, have work as their only source of income; they have neither capital nor savings.

We must, therefore, look closely at the issue of participation in the labour market, at the types of jobs, at incomes from work and at positions within work to try to identify vulnerable populations and touch on issues of gender and ethnic equality. Information on working conditions gives us a real appreciation of living conditions, and offers relevant quantitative comparisons between different groups.

Our objective is to show you the indicators which are indispensable to understanding the labour market. We will take three approaches to this:

- Position in relation to employment and the labour market;
- The structure of the labour market;
- Characteristics of work and working conditions.

Position in the Labour Market: Concepts, Definitions, Indicators

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**Scheme 3** Position in the Labour Market - Concepts

1. Population of working age
   - Active population
   - Inactive population
     - Active and working
     - Unemployed

Source: Author’s construction.
This diagram allows us to mark the position of an individual in relation to the labour market and to employment, covering the population of working age. This population is made up of inactive individuals – individuals who have decided not to work: the rich, women looking after children and not working outside the home, etc. – and the active population – individuals who work or who would like to work. The labour force thus includes employed workers and the unemployed.

Let’s define these different concepts more precisely:

- Population of working age: all individuals of 15 years and over (Vietnamese threshold);
- Labour force: all people of 15 years and over who participate in the labour market – employed workers or those looking for a job (unemployed);
- Employed workers: individuals who worked for at least one hour during the period, paid or not, or who were temporarily absent;
- Unemployed: people of 15 years and over without a job, looking for work and available.

Let’s move now to the indicators linked with these different concepts.

The first indicator is the activity rate, which corresponds to the working population divided by the population of working age. One can ask oneself about the determinants of the activity rate, and how this rate can vary for different categories of the population. One might imagine a certain number of determinants – economic and cultural factors, etc. – allowing us to differentiate between countries, or the activity rates of individuals within a country. Female fertility, for example, determines a greater or lesser activity rate by country. This rate fluctuates, in practice, from 30% to 80%-90%.

What are your ideas about the value of the activity rate in Việt Nam? What interests us here is not only the average for the country, but also the rates for men and women, between the Kinh and other ethnic groups.

Trần Phương Nguyên

I think that the female activity rate is lower than that of men. That derives from traditional values and concepts. It will stay lower than that of men.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

This figure shows the gaps in activity rates between men and women in 1998 and 2008 for different regions of the world.
For South Asia, i.e. principally in India, the activity rate of women is 35% and 85% for men. One might question certain issues about measurement, definition of activity rates of women, etc., but on the evidence, there are wide variations by region of the world. Look at the example of Africa, where male and female activity rates are close. One might think that in the poorest countries, activity rates would be close, but in some regions of the world, cultural factors affect this – in the case of North Africa, where the gap between men and women is wider. In Muslim countries, women would be less able to work, for cultural reasons.

Another important type of indicator is the unemployment rate – i.e. the number of unemployed as a ratio of the labour force. This rate is hard to interpret in developing countries, because unemployment insurance doesn't exist, which makes it difficult to declare yourself "unemployed" in a country like Việt Nam. This indicator reveals important differences between different population groups: in France, for example, the unemployment rate is 10% overall but 25% for young people.

Structure of the Labour Market

The labour market can be classified in different ways: by sectors of activity, by types of occupation, by types of employment status and by institutional sectors; obviously, these different structures can also be broken down by gender or by ethnic group. The type of occupation corresponds to what was presented to you by Christophe Jalil Nordman yesterday morning, showing the structural differences between men and women. It is very important to ask oneself...
this kind of question: are men found more in industry, for example, or ethnic minorities more in agriculture? We will proceed to shed light on the structure of employment by institutional sector in the case of Việt Nam.

Agriculture plays a central role – half of all jobs – and the informal sector accounts for a quarter of jobs. Here too we can expect to see significant structural differences between men and women and between the majority and the minorities.

**Working Conditions**

Working conditions are a major element determining entry into the labour market, and in the first place under-employment, which is an indicator of imbalance and of under-utilisation of the workforce. Visible under-employment: worked hours under a threshold (35 hours a week in Việt Nam), willingness to work more and availability to do so. There are obviously lots of other indicators linked to working conditions: whether you work in the street or in a specific workplace, contractual conditions – do you have a contract, days off, social protection? – income, etc.

This table shows informal employment, defined as being work done without social protection, in Việt Nam.

### Table 34 Structure of the Labour Market – Institutional Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Enterprise</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Enterprise</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal HB</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LFS, 2007, 2009, GSO. Total: Occupied population; authors’ calculation.

### Table 35 Working Conditions – Indicators. Informal Jobs as a Principal Activity, by Institutional Sector, 2007 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Structure (1,000)</th>
<th>Public sector (%)</th>
<th>Foreign enterprise (%)</th>
<th>Domestic enterprise (%)</th>
<th>Formal HB (%)</th>
<th>Informal sector (%)</th>
<th>Agriculture (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>37,705</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38,288</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The total number of jobs is not exactly equal to the sum of all jobs by sector; 0.3% of jobs cannot be classified within an institutional sector.

Source: LFS, 2007, GSO, authors’ calculation.
80% of employment was informal in 2009. Note the share of informal jobs within formal individual enterprises, domestic enterprises, enterprises with foreign investment and the public sector – more than 10% of informal jobs. Informal employment is present in every sector in Việt Nam, and not only – as one might think – in agriculture and the informal sector.

The second part of the morning was devoted to practical work on Stata. To start off, the employment survey of 2007, led by the General Statistics Office (GSO) with the participation of IRD-DIAL, was presented by François Roubaud – alignment with international standards, and adaptation to the specific context of the Vietnamese labour market. Since 2011, the survey has been carried out continuously in the field. It is thus possible to produce figures monthly, quarterly or annually and to follow very closely the economic conditions of the labour market. It’s a household survey; families are chosen at random over the entire national territory then, in each household, all members are questioned about their situation as regards the labour market. Since the data emerging from the 2007 survey are still confidential, the training was organized to look at a sub-sample: one person in four was selected, which represents a database of 165,000 people. The employment survey is made up of two distinct parts: socio-demographic characteristics of individuals (age, sex, ethnicity, level of education, situation in relation to the head of household, marital situation); and the indicators of the labour market.

The session on Stata focused on the construction of variables allowing us to identify those who were working, not working and unemployed. The task of disaggregating data was started, so as to identify the position of each target group within the labour market.

Measurement of Diversity and Discrimination: Issues, Constraints and Risks

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

We’re going to examine the issue of ethnic inequalities in the world via a number of illustrations. The aim of this presentation is to question ourselves about the notion of inequality, the underlying issues and questions.

How do we deal with the issue of the rights of certain minorities? In different regions, we can see today a weakening of policies openly aiming at assimilation. There are different types of devices, depending on the recognition of specific cultural characteristics (cultural mediation, representation and political participation of minorities) or on assimilation policies (these are fewer and fewer in number), or on policies of positive ethnic discrimination (for access to employment, to the public market, to higher education and so on) with quotas reserved in business, in schools and universities, etc.

The researcher’s objective is to try to identify the origin of and the factors which cause these inequalities, which indicates the need to question not only the natural factors, individuals’ characteristics, but also the policies and measures implemented. Measures to reduce inequalities often include
devices which unify and integrate different groups under a generic framework which applies to the whole population without necessarily taking account of specificities – integration policies. Are these policies adapted? Shouldn’t ethnic specificities be taken into account so as better to reduce inequalities? Should one clearly recognize the differences and specificities or favour the integration of groups into a single framework? In fact, policies of positive discrimination can cause problems: for the sake of equality, public action defines itself in terms of ethnic and cultural criteria and poses the question of legitimacy; the crystallization of stereotypes can result in even stronger discrimination.

There are two types of method for measuring diversity and discriminations: experimental or testing methods and statistical methods, which are the subject of our workshop this week.

- Experimental methods consist of the artificial construction of pairs – job-seekers, those in need of accommodation, etc. – within which the two members only differ in one characteristic (ethnic group, origin, etc); if one member is less well treated than the other, we consider that there is discrimination on the basis of that one characteristic – an “all other things being equal” observation. For example, we assume that there are inequalities due to the origin of individuals, between “hereditary” French and French of foreign extraction. We create a situation of access to accommodation in which two people with almost identical characteristics can interact – same level of income, education, age, geographical location, etc.: two individuals with the most similar characteristics possible, apart from their origin. We then observe, in a direct test, whether a difference exists in the treatment of these two people in access to accommodation, which would indicate discrimination.

In our work, we seek to reproduce these experimental methods, using survey data based on a representative sample of a large number of individuals;

- Statistical methods are based on representative surveys of the population with enough individuals brought together, individually or collectively, to allow a comparison in the form of categories, and the construction of divergences. We are aiming to observe divergences between ethnic groups and to examine whether they could be explained by another variable, or not – does the ethnic origin explain the divergences? For this, it’s important to control for the various variables which could explain the divergences noted: the age of individuals, their sex, income, social position, place of residence, etc.

Let’s take the example of earnings from work. We can note that in Việt Nam, as in many countries, the “minority” ethnic groups have a much lower income than the rest of the population. This difference can result, at least partly, from the kind of employment which the different groups are engaged in, from the number of hours worked, from the level of education and qualification, and from individuals’ experience. After taking account of – correcting for – these factors, the earnings gap to the disadvantage of the minority group can provide an indicator of “discrimination”.

Another major question. It is important to ask what exactly one is measuring. What are the criteria retained? What are the variables and how are they gathered? Are the criteria
for ethnic differentiation under consideration relevant? Should we give more weight to objective or subjective criteria, imposed criteria or the self-declaration of individuals?

Ethnic Discrimination and Inequality in the World: Some Illustrations

Globally, in different countries in the world, minorities have a far higher poverty rate than the rest of the population – the divergence can be as much as double (Gabon, Peru). The differences do not diminish and even tend to widen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous People (%)</th>
<th>Non-Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Note: Head count poverty rates are national.

a. Refers to white and “black/brown” (African origin).
b. Refers to white (Telles, 2007). Head count poverty rates are national.

Note: Indigenous population refers to groups known by terms such as ethnic minority, aboriginal, minority nationalities, tribes, etc. in the different countries (World Bank Operational Directive 4.10)

Even though poverty is diminishing, the pace of poverty reduction is much slower for minority groups.

The number of years of schooling is a major variable, and one where minority groups are still at a disadvantage: it can explain income inequality, and we should therefore ask ourselves the reasons for this difference of education between majority and minority populations. It reveals the existence of a vicious circle: certain population groups might not invest in education, if that investment doesn’t bring them the same salary as other population groups.

Let’s look at this experiment in India, which underlines the impact of stigmatization.

This study looked at a group of individuals from different castes. At the outset, these people were not asked to what caste they belonged: a slight difference to the disadvantage of the inferior castes was noted. In the second stage, they were asked to specify to which caste they belonged: the results showed a much wider gap between the two groups; the higher-caste people had much higher results than those of lower caste. This leads us to ask about the effect of internalization both among those subject to discrimination, and also among the higher caste.

The diagram below examines the gap between the income of indigenous workers and that of other workers in four South American countries:
We can clearly distinguish the shares of the earnings gap, the part which can be explained by productive characteristics and the part which might bear witness to discrimination. Let’s take the case of Peru in 2001: a divergence in earnings was noted between the “indigenous population” and the others – an overall gap of 44%. About 20 percentage points can be explained by productive characteristics; thus 25 to 26 percentage points remain unexplained.

This other graph also concerns income gaps linked to ethnic origin.
What is particularly interesting in the case of Guatemala is that the more educated people are, the more the income gap between the majority population and the indigenous groups widens.

This last example from Canada underlines the importance of taking the diversity of situations into account and emphasizes that we should not group all minorities into one single category.

**Figure 39**  
*Divergence in Income According to Gender and Ethnic Origin in Guatemala, 2000*


**Figure 40**  
*Divergence in Income between White Workers and Other Workers in Canada, 2005*

Source: Canada, 2006 Census data (Hou and Coulombe).
We can distinguish three types of populations: black, Chinese and other South Asian populations. What’s interesting is the wide diversity of situations according to gender. In Canada, women of Chinese or South Asian origin have higher incomes than black workers. From the second graph, we can see whether the gaps are due to the level of education, to individuals’ experience or to other identifiable characteristics; we see again the gap in favour of women of Chinese origin; on the other hand, the income gaps are always disadvantageous towards the black population.

Jean-Luc Maurer

It is important to differentiate discrimination from inequalities, because often there is inequality without necessarily discrimination. We are lucky in Việt Nam to have access to data which have to some extent an ethnic basis. A close analysis of inequalities and discriminations on the basis of ethnic origin is not really possible in Indonesia.

Let’s take the example of New Caledonia, which is indirectly of interest to Việt Nam, and where I worked for several years studying the Javanese minority. This country has had a settled Vietnamese minority since the late 19th century. I used in my research the 1996 census, which, contrary to the French tradition, was done on an ethnic basis. I was therefore impatient for the 2004 census, but the French President cancelled it precisely for ethnic reasons. So it wasn’t possible to measure the evolution of the socio-economic situation of the Javanese minority, nor the Vietnamese minority, nor above all that of the overwhelming Kanak majority. In reality, it was to avoid measuring the evolution – or rather the non-evolution – of the Kanak population that the census was cancelled. You can see from this example that censuses with an ethnic basis provide economists and sociologists with very precious data with which to measure the differences which exist between groups according to their ethnic origin.

Grégoire Schlemmer

If you measure something you necessarily have to categorize it. I’m an anthropologist and I work on ethnic groups, I try to understand these categories but I admit I’m not succeeding in grasping them! When I use pre-formed categories, this causes problems because they are social constructions. I’m studying a province of 160,000 inhabitants in Laos; I’ve seen races, castes, minorities, aboriginals, native and indigenous people and it’s hard for me to establish a comparison.

Besides, there are potentially always variables which one cannot observe in the statistics, which are visible in the field. In Nepal, where I’ve worked, there is a correlation between ethnic statistics and armed conflict. Across the Indian world, where there is positive discrimination, this creates divisions and an incredible level of violence. These tools are highly dangerous to use.

François Roubaud

These comments raise three major points for our workshop: beware of pre-established categories – a fixed total of 53 is quoted for the number of minority groups in Việt Nam but the concept remains hazy and, without taking a critical approach, the issue of real ethnic identity is missed; beware not to approximate inequality and discrimination, I personally would speak more of differences
which result in inequalities. We see that with our quantitative instruments we try to identify what is left in fine and could be a kind of discrimination; finally, downstream of and alongside policies, if you work on ethnic groups you take the risk of solidifying identities and potentially of generating or maintaining ethnic conflict – as in the case of Nepal.

Selective Bibliography


The day finishes with the work begun in the morning on Stata, to break down data by ethnic group and gender – calculation of employment rates according to context (urban or rural), area of residence and ethnic group, etc.
Day 3, morning of Wednesday 20th July

[François Roubaud]

This morning will be devoted to a presentation on the issue of discrimination, and the session will be completed tomorrow morning. We will then go on with the practical use of Stata, with your results on labour market indicators by gender and ethnic group; finally, we will form working groups for the study of the eight geographical regions of Việt Nam.

2.1.4. Discriminations in the Labour Market in Developing Countries

[Christophe Jalil Nordman]

We’re going to cover theoretical and methodological aspects which economic science has developed to explain the presence of discriminatory phenomena in the labour market; our angle of reflection will focus mainly on theoretical approaches to discrimination and the measurement of discrimination, approaching it by breaking it down, and some international comparisons.

What is the Legal Framework which Governs Discrimination? Definition of the Concept of “Discrimination”

The expression discrimination describes any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, family background or national origin – age, sex, religion etc. – which has as its aim or effect to destroy or compromise the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, in conditions of equality, of the rights of man and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social and cultural domains or in any other domain of public life.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) also defines discrimination in a relatively precise way:

**Box 4 Definition of the Concept of “Discrimination”**

“Any distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, religion, public opinion, national origin, which results in the destruction or alteration of equality of opportunity or treatment in terms of employment or profession.”

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination of 21st December 1965: http://www2.ohchr.org/french/law/cerd.htm

“Any other distinction, exclusion or preference which results in the destruction or alteration of equality of opportunity or treatment in terms of employment or profession, which can be specified by the interested person after consulting organizations for the representation of employers and workers if these exist, and other appropriate organizations.”

Convention 111 of the ILO on discrimination in employment and professional life of 25th July 1958: http://www2.ohchr.org/french/law/emploi.htm
Theoretical Approaches in Economics

Following the analysis by Becker (1957), numerous works focused on the theoretical problem posed by discrimination, concentrating mainly on the pay gaps between men and women. These studies all took the same definition of discrimination – different treatment of workers with identical productivity – and can be divided into two categories:

- Theories based on discriminatory preferences, which can be termed neoclassical: the employers have perfect knowledge of individuals’ productivity. We’re dealing here with a tendency towards discrimination (Becker, 1957) coming from employers (Bergmann, 1971; Arrow, 1973) or from male workers or consumers, which discourages the hiring of women in, or excludes them from, a number of jobs reserved for men (occupational segregation; Bergmann, 1971; 1974);
- Following the work of Phelps (1972), discrimination is based on the employers’ lack of information about the productivity of workers. For Phelps (1972), knowledge about productivity depends on individual signals. He refers to statistical discrimination. For Arrow (1973), the employers have beliefs based on observation or prejudices about the correlation between gender and performance.

More complex analyses brought additional information about the justification for discriminatory behaviour or the enduring nature of discrimination over the long term, adding onto the initial approaches to the theory of human capital and models of demand and supply in the labour market (Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Stiglitz, 1982; Oettinger, 1996).

The Measurement of Discrimination: The Break-down Approach

One way of measuring discrimination is the break-down approach. For the sake of argument, we will measure an aspect of discrimination, that of earnings from work. Before developing the methodological aspects, with these methods and those which you will learn on Stata, we will only attempt to make an approach to measurement. Why are these methods useful but imperfect?

To measure discrimination, whether it be the income gap between a man and a woman or between two ethnic groups, you must have a variable of income, of salary, and then a group of characteristics – \( X \) – which is supposed to measure the productivity of the worker in his job. Two economists, Oaxaca and Blinder in 1973, became famous for their break-down methods: they invented a way of separating, within the variable of income, one part which could be attributed to differences in productivity between workers, and another part which could be attributed to discrimination or to all the aspects which were not being measured. The first stage of the analysis consists of econometrics.

We could spend months doing econometrics together, so my presentation will be a very brief summary. Economists and (above all) epidemiologists have developed this technique for relating variables to each other for individuals, households and enterprises. These researchers have developed statistical methods to be able to identify a relationship between different variables and to show that one variable can explain the variation of another variable with a statistical model.

- Here’s an example. We have a series of observations on income – variable \( Y \) –
and another series of observations on workers’ level of education – variable X. Through econometrics we will try to find a relationship, possibly linear, between variable X and variable Y. The idea is that the variation of variable Y will depend on the variations of variable X and on a random term which measures exogenous shocks (everything which is not measured in X and could cause variable Y to vary).

\[ Y = \alpha X + u \]

- If we make a linear projection of X on variable Y, we will hypothesise that the random term, u, is zero mean and that the expectation of u equals zero.
- This is about identifying the coefficient associated with the variable X which will measure an effect \( \alpha \) – percentage of variation of variable X on variable Y.
- We measure the income of worker i and the education of worker i, then a term which measured random shocks, whatever is exogenous and unconnected with education:

\[ \text{Income}_i = \beta \text{education}_i + u_i \]

- The coefficient \( \beta \) will tell us if the individual has five years of education; an additional year will result in an effect \( \beta \) – percentage of variation of variable X on variable Y.

The most widely used approach to evaluate the percentage gap in average salary between two groups (men and women, nationals and foreigners, etc.) which could be attributed to discrimination, that is a gap not justified by the differences in the composition of the manpower, is the approach recommended in the work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).

The recommended break-downs are based on the estimation of earnings functions of “Mincerian” type for men and for women. They take the form:

\[ \ln w_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i \]

where \( \ln w_i \) is the natural logarithm of the hourly pay rate observed for individual i, \( x_i \) is a vector of observed characteristics, \( \beta \) is a vector of coefficients and \( \varepsilon_i \) is an error term of zero mean.

We will estimate this equation for a group of men and a group of women, and we could
proceed in the same way for different ethnic groups. The result will be two vectors of different $\beta$ coefficients. We could reproduce this exercise for different sectors of activity, making a distinction between a $\beta$ for the formal sector and a $\beta$ for the informal sector.

We will try to get closer to the characteristics which could justify men and women having different incomes. What could we include over and above education and experience which would explain why a man or a woman should be more productive in their work?

**Yves Perraudeau**

In work done in the USA and in France, age is an important factor; above 55 years old, age becomes a disadvantageous factor.

**Nguyễn Thị Vân**

I think that income can be explained in relation to the location, the place where a person resides; the cost of living can explain the income level of an individual.

**Lê Thị Hồng Hải**

I think that the age variable is well coordinated with professional experience.

One must assume that one will study men and women of the same age group. I think that age should not be introduced into this equation. I suggest another variable, which is type of job.

[Christophe Jalil Nordman]

The geographical place of origin is not a true measure of productivity, but it is a measure of the differences in income between individuals. In econometrics, we would use a set of variables known as controls, which can capture effects which are not individual but have an effect on the variable. On the other hand, introducing the kind of job which the worker has doesn’t seem relevant to me, because what we’re trying to measure is all variables which do not result from discriminatory practice by the employer – or from occupational segregation.

**Phạm Quang Linh**

The choice of variables must satisfy two conditions: they must have a direct impact on the person’s productivity, and they must depend on the differentiation between men and women. I suggest introducing into this equation the person’s health and the time they have available.

[Christophe Jalil Nordman]

These are excellent suggestions. Health is a dimension of human capital which isn’t used enough in surveys – and little used in employment surveys. I would add some other characteristics like having children, or being married or single for example.

Let’s come back for a moment to the equation above. The measurement of income level is relatively imperfect, as we cannot completely explain all the variations of the variable $w$. There remains an element of explanation – $\varepsilon$ – which is left to econometrics, without which we cannot extract information. This problem arises when we have a survey database with a representative sample population. We lack certain pieces of information to say that the only observed difference in the level of the dependent variable between two groups is gender or ethnic group.

How can we obtain two groups of individuals – men and women, minority and majority
ethnic groups – which are absolutely identical with the exception of their sex or ethnicity?

One simple method depends on using large numbers. Imagine that you are in Hanoi, on a very busy road and that you are sorting men to the right and women to the left so as to form two completely random groups. You will notice, if you remain on this very busy street for long enough and therefore obtain a large number of men and women in each group, that the two groups will be absolutely identical in terms of age, education and experience. For all these characteristics, and many more, they will have the same level on average. This principle depends on the law of large numbers – by selecting enough individuals in a random manner, one obtains two groups with absolutely identical average characteristics, with the exception of the one characteristic on the basis of which the two groups were sorted. On the other hand, employment surveys don't usually allow this kind of random experiment, and we won't therefore have two groups of individuals who are absolutely identical in every way with the exception of the variable which causes the discrimination we are trying to measure. This is why I said to you in my introduction that it is an imperfect measure of discrimination which we are going to apply here.

I would add that if we wanted to measure income discrimination using the two groups of individuals which we had formed by the random method, we would simply need to calculate the difference in income between the two groups. One would then have a perfect measurement of discrimination if the random protocol was correctly constructed – if we had stayed long enough in the busy street, if our two groups were large enough, etc.

Selective Bibliography


The participants follow their training in Stata using the database from the employment survey: they analyze unemployment rates, pluri-activity, under-employment, etc. The objective is to find an opening according to gender and ethnic origin, and to bring back elements of analysis to the workshop; correlations are also found with age, level of education, place of residence, institutional sector, gross income, etc. The end of the morning is given to forming working groups to establish a diagnostic by region which will be the subject of a report to all participants in the 2012 summer school.

Day 4, Thursday 21st July

[François Roubaud]

We’re going to conclude our discussion of methods for breaking down data started yesterday morning. The end of the morning will be dedicated to practical exercises on Stata, and then you will get started on the gender and ethnicity diagnostic in the regions which you have chosen.

[Christophe Jalil Nordman]

On Wednesday morning, we touched on issues of discrimination in terms of legal bias at the international level. Then we developed the theoretical approaches to discrimination in the labour market, emphasizing the economic theories of the 1970s; finally, we concluded with methods of breaking down data by working out equations of gains by gender.

Let’s come back to this last point. When we speak of equations of salary, we refer to workers who are employed in a private or public enterprise, whether this is in the formal or informal sector; when we talk of gains, this is a widely defined notion of salary, including self-employed workers and all forms of remuneration for work. So we’ll look from a generalized point of view at discrimination in the labour market.

We seek to work out a gains equation, with the logarithm of the worker’s gain \( i \) as the dependent variable; this will be identified by a group of characteristics – \( x_i \). These characteristics \( x_i \) are supposed generally to measure the productivity of the worker – his work and active life. For the sake of our argument, the coefficient \( \beta \) will be estimated by Stata: the software calculates an average coefficient which represents the average effect of characteristic \( x \) – education, experience, marital status, number of children, etc. This coefficient \( \beta \) will be assigned to each of the characteristics and will represent the average effect of this characteristic on the logarithm of salary or gains. It will therefore be possible to interpret it as a percentage effect of variation of the variable \( X \) on the dependent variable.

What is the relationship with discrimination? In reality, \( \beta \) represents the way in which characteristics of workers are remunerated in the labour market. It is the yield of characteristics in the labour market – of a man versus a woman, of someone from a particular ethnic group, etc.

Let’s take an example:

- You are a woman; your level of education brings you a certain yield, which is linked to the qualification you achieved; i.e. your Master’s for example brings you 10% more remuneration over and above that which
you would have earned if you had not obtained this qualification;
- You are a man; you have the same qualification level, and you enter the labour market; your yield is not 10% higher but 12%. The difference in yield of two percentage points is what one can interpret as discrimination – the difference in yield from education on the labour market.

The idea of this approach is to estimate the yield difference in the labour market which stems from one characteristic – e.g. education, experience. We will therefore estimate the coefficient \( \beta \) both for men and for women, so as to be able to argue that the difference between them represents discrimination in the labour market.

We will look at difference in salary by gender. The recommended breaking down of data depends on estimations of functions of gain of the “Mincerian” type, for men and for women. They take the form:

\[
\ln w_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i
\]

where \( \ln w_i \) is the natural logarithm of hourly salary rates observed for the individual \( i \); \( x_i \) is a vector of observed characteristics; \( \beta \) is a vector of coefficients and \( \varepsilon_i \) an error term of zero mean.

Put simply, the use of a logarithm implies a transformation of the salary variable allowing us to obtain percentage effects of our dependent variables; the logarithm function is useful, notably to obtain reasonable variations.

We have an econometric equation with an estimator which allows us to assume that the random term \( \varepsilon \) is zero mean. If we want to measure the difference in average salary between men and women, we will use a sample mean and the random terms – \( \varepsilon \) – will cancel out; they are out of the equation. We develop the expression:

\[
\ln w_m - \ln w_f = \beta_m x_m - \beta_f x_f
\]

I explained earlier: the issue that causes problems in measuring discrimination is that we’re seeking to compare two groups – men and women for example – and we must be certain that the two groups are absolutely identical in every way, with the exception of one characteristic, sex. To meet this requirement, econometrists and statisticians often use an income distribution described as “counterfactual” (fictitious), i.e. a situation where, for example, women would be paid as men are in the labour market. As soon as the difference in these two distributions has a non-zero average (and is positive), we can posit the existence of income discrimination to the disadvantage of women, and therefore formalize it.

Formally, the salary gap using this kind of counterfactual is written in the following way:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ln w_m - \ln w_f & = \beta_m (\bar{x}_m - \bar{x}_f) + (\beta_m - \beta_f) \bar{x}_f \\
\text{Explained part of the differential} & \quad \text{Unexplained part or part generally attributed to discrimination}
\end{align*}
\]

- \( \ln w_m \) and \( \ln w_f \) represent estimated average salary;
- The indices \( m \) and \( f \) indicate male and female workers;
- \( \bar{x}_m \) and \( \bar{x}_f \) correspond to averages of the characteristics;
- \( \beta_m \) and \( \beta_f \) correspond to the yield of these characteristics estimated in a gains equation.
The gap in average revenue (expressed in a logarithm) breaks down into:

- A first part which corresponds to the difference in the averages of these characteristics in the labour market (or “explained” part);
- A second part which represents the gap between the two populations under consideration in terms of the yield of these characteristics (or “unexplained” part).

If the structure of the two populations was similar for the variables under consideration (education, experience, etc.) any gap in revenue would result solely from a gap in the yield of these characteristics. We would then be in a case of “pure salary discrimination”. If the yields were equal, the gap in revenue would be explained entirely by structural effects, i.e. average characteristics, which themselves could potentially be the consequence of other forms of discrimination – for example access to education.

Even if there are no differences in the yield from characteristics in the labour market, the difference in characteristics itself can still bring about effects which are discriminatory. Generally, women have less professional experience than men because they remove themselves from the labour market more often – e.g. due to maternity – and employers hesitate to employ them or to offer them long-term contracts.

The breakdown below has been used a great deal in academic work since the 1970s. The main difficulty is to be able to determine a priori a non-discriminatory “norm” for the yield from individual characteristics, and to measure against this norm the male advantage, the female disadvantage and the share which results from the gap in characteristics. With a hypothesis of salary discrimination, for example, it’s possible that men receive competitive salaries – they are paid according to their marginal productivity – but that women are underpaid. In this case, the norm of non-discriminatory remuneration would be that of men.

In the first equation quoted, the gaps in yield are weighted by the average of the characteristics of women and the gaps in characteristics are weighted by the corresponding yields of men. However, it is also possible that we are seeing a situation of preferential treatment in favour of men, a situation in which women would receive competitive salaries but the men would be paid more. In this case, the non-discriminatory salary norm would be that of women. Empirical studies show that the choice of weighting can have important effects on the results of the breaking down.

Several other ways of weighting have been envisaged, notably those of Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988). In many recent studies, the authors use the weighting recommended by Neumark (1988); he recommends using as the non-discriminatory norm the results of the estimation of a gains equation for the whole of the population under consideration, both sexes mixed together. The breaking down of the mean revenue is thus written in three parts:
The first term represents the “explained” part of the salary gap, using as a weighting the average yield of the entire sample;

- The second term indicates the gain in yield from characteristics due to the fact of being a male worker, compared to the norm;

- The third term corresponds to the deficit in yield from characteristics due to the fact of being a woman. The two last terms added together thus represent the total salary discrimination.

The example below on West African capitals uses these breaking down methods to estimate gaps due to gender and ethnicity.

\[
\ln w_m - \ln w_f = \beta^* (x_m - x_f) + [(\beta_m - \beta^*) x_m + (\beta^* - \beta_f) x_f]
\]

- The most significant term (0.8) corresponds to the “raw gap” – the most important part, which we’re trying to explain.

Here we have represented the gap between men and women or between ethnic groups, and the difference in revenues is expressed in a logarithm. As for gaps due to gender, men earn 80% more than women. The dotted histogram represents what remains of the gap once one has controlled for characteristics \(X\). We have filtered the effects: the explained part has been removed and we’re currently measuring the unexplained
part of the total gap. Obviously, we will have a smaller histogram when we’re looking at the gap adjusted for the individual characteristics of men, women or ethnic groups.

We have a tendency to interpret this graph as representing discrimination, but you must understand that it’s about an unexplained part. If we look at the ethnic gap, it’s almost non-existent, even if we take the “raw” measurement. This gap is even smaller when it’s adjusted, because when we take into account the differences in characteristics (education, experience) between workers of minority or majority ethnic groups in these West African capitals, hardly any difference in average income remains.

Practical exercises start mid-morning and last until the end of the day.

The objective is a practical application of the various theoretical points of view and challenges presented by Christophe Jalil Nordman: a calculation on the logarithm of hourly or monthly income as a function of gender or ethnic origin – starting from the treatment of descriptive statistics from the employment survey, participants attempt to identify the dependent variables linked to remuneration in the labour market.

- For example: from a regression divided by gender, the workshop highlights certain aspects of the situation in Việt Nam:
  - Lower yields from education for women;
  - In contrast to men, an ethnic variable disadvantageous to women – the quality of the adjustment, from the variables introduced, shows that it’s possible to account for about 40% of the variance of women’s salaries;
  - For men, the fact of having children under 4 years of age has no effect on income received – significance test of zero coefficients, confidence interval of probability at the 90% threshold. For women, the examination of coefficients and of significance underlines a negative effect on women’s income: everything else being equal, taking account of all characteristics (married women, ethnicity, living quarters, make-up of the household, level of education, experience), the more a woman has young children – compared to a childless woman – the lower her income will be; if you compare two women with the same level of characteristics, the one with young children will have a lower salary.

Finally, the participants were reminded of certain points before starting the group work looking at data from Vietnamese surveys:

- Perspective: emphasis on a comparative approach, between regional analysis and the situation in Việt Nam;
- Producing economic and social analysis: the Stata software should aid reflection, and in this sense remains a tool;
- The need for assurance that the employment survey would enable them to respond to the issues raised by each group before any analytical work;
- Starting off their reflection by the construction of simple tables based on descriptive statistics, before any complex econometric work.

Bibliography

Day 5, Friday 22nd July

The group work started the previous day continues all morning. The exercise is above all centred on methodological issues based on the analysis of the employment situation and incomes, and ethnic and gender discriminations in different regions of Việt Nam, including a comparison at the national level: the mountainous Northern region, the Red River Delta, the Central region, the Highlands region, the Southeast and the Mekong Delta. The statistical results produced during the workshop, and presented below, were discussed at the end of the day. All of this material was used in the reporting-back session on the final day of the summer school - Saturday.

### Table 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic and Gender Discrimination in Different Regions of Việt Nam (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural population (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary school (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher education (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic group (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population aged 15-24 years (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity rate (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For women</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For ethnic groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Workshop Participants.
### Table 38  
**Ethnic and Gender Discrimination in Different Regions of Việt Nam (2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mountainous Northern region</th>
<th>Red River Delta</th>
<th>Central region</th>
<th>Highlands region</th>
<th>Southeast region</th>
<th>Mekong Delta</th>
<th>Việt Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate (%)</strong></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gap between sexes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(man-woman; percentage points)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic gap</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kinh-others; percentage points)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under-employment rate (%)</strong></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gap between sexes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage points)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic gap</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage points)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of hours worked</strong></td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gap between sexes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage points)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic gap</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage points)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Workshop Participants.

### Table 39  
**Ethnic and Gender Discrimination in Different Regions of Việt Nam (3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mountainous Northern region</th>
<th>Red River Delta</th>
<th>Central region</th>
<th>Highlands region</th>
<th>Southeast region</th>
<th>Mekong Delta</th>
<th>Việt Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands of ₫)</td>
<td>3,820</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>4,196</td>
<td>7,546</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>5,994</td>
<td>5,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women = % men</strong></td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
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Source: Workshop Participants.
## List of Participants

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname and first name</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Research theme</th>
<th>Email</th>
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2.2. Biographies: From the Quantitative Survey to Analysis

Philippe Antoine – CEPED-IRD and LARTES, Mody Diop – National Agency of Statistics and Demography, Senegal, Andonirina Rakotonarivo – Catholic University of Louvain

Biographical data harvesting via the framing of specific questionnaires allows us to access a complex reality. Gathering data through biographical surveys sheds light on intermediate stages between the departure point and the arrival point, which deserve to be taken into consideration. From birth to death, the individual moves through different stages due to interactive processes which mould his life trajectory. The questionnaire generally used is a modular questionnaire which retraces the main stages of life for each surveyed person. The main principle of the biographical questionnaire is to focus on the aspects of the individual's life which change over time, and which can easily be remembered and dated. This allows us to compare the life trajectories of different generations.

One of the specific characteristics of biographical approaches is to include temporal aspects within the analysis – individual time, collective time, cyclical changes and historical eras. Individual histories are in fact written into collective time: that of the family, the surrounding networks and, at a more general level, that of historical temporality. One of the challenges of the biographical approach – both qualitative and quantitative – is to manage to combine these different levels into observation, analysis and interpretation.

This workshop aims to be an introduction to longitudinal data and basic techniques of biographical analysis, to help participants to construct longitudinal indicators and to familiarize them with the more in-depth techniques of biographical analysis.

The main aim is to provide practical training in the analysis of biographies by using the statistical software *Stata* – which is particularly adapted to the management of biographical files and to their analysis on micro-computer – to look at real data, so as to suggest to participants some elements for the analysis of biographical data.

We will demonstrate the entire practical process which leads from the design of the survey and questionnaire, through to the
most in-depth analysis, via the preparation of data files.

**Theoretical and practical content**

- Conceptualization of time and events;
- Population at risk, episode and observation period;
- Idea of truncations to the left and right (influence of migrations);
- Preparation of the biographical analysis file;
- Kaplan-Meier life tables;
- Logistical regression model (the notion of reference modality and relative risks, the equation and its interpretation, the time default);
- The Cox semi-parametric model—the event as a dependent variable in a regression model, the notion of proportionality, independent variables as a function of time.

**Data used**

The training is all about learning basic techniques, using two datasets which present two distinct methods of data harvesting. The first data series comes from a sample drawn from one of the “Urban insertion” surveys undertaken in Africa (Lomé) in 2000 on a sample of 2,536 individuals. Residential, professional, matrimonial and reproductive events are collected according to the date they were experienced. The second data series comes from the MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe) project survey – collected in 2009 from Congolese migrants living in Belgium. Events concerning different trajectories, residential, migratory, matrimonial and familial, are recorded according to year. Regression models are also tested on these data.

**Statistics and computing**

The use of mathematical statistics is kept to a minimum, as the primary objective is to get to know the practical aspects of the analysis.

**(Retranscription)**

**Day 1, Monday 18th July**

**[Philippe Antoine]**

The objective of our workshop is the acquisition of biographical analysis techniques using *Stata* software. The core of the training is based on practical exercises.

*Presentation of the trainers and participants (cf. biographies of trainers, list of participants at the end of the chapter)*

**Why do we use *Stata***?

During the first biographical surveys, at the end of the 1980s, computers had a very low-capacity memory; SPSS software required big computer systems, and wasn’t really efficient yet, whereas *Stata* was working with data in RAM. Besides, this software allowed us to work in multiple lines – at the end of a classic transversal survey one obtains a file known as rectangular, that’s to say that each line represents a person. The history of an individual, however, is contained in several lines: each change in life starts a new line. Finally, *Stata* offers commands which are specific to biographical analysis. Its design is community-based: if a researcher develops new tools, he will be able to upload his new programmes and place them at the disposal of the user community.
We will start by presenting the different kinds of biographical survey, then we will check the installation of version 9 of the Stata software.

How can we quantify biographies? How can we make the shift from harvesting the events of an individual’s life such as one can gather them on an Ageven form to creating a data file?

The analysis of biographical surveys demands method and a good understanding of the make-up of the file. One must clearly conceptualize the questioning; the technical part, or the emergence of results, is not particularly complex when one has understood the logic of this kind of survey.

During the training we will draw your attention to a mistake which is often made: undertaking false biographical surveys which are a poorly executed mixture of biographical and non-biographical parts. Several of you have used the notion of life trajectory. Using the questions posed in a survey, you must try to think of everything which can change over the course of a life, and be able to mark these changes in time. In a survey one cannot ask questions about a changeable factor – say professional situation – and then link this to a factor of which one didn’t note changes over time – for example residence, if one had omitted to gather information about migration. A biographical survey must be designed all-in-one. In Africa, for example, new religions emerge and people can change religion over the course of their life. Thinking along biographical lines implies an analysis in terms of change in all the phases of an individual’s life, and this needs to be included in the design of the questionnaire. For example, the level of education also changes over the course of one’s life: someone who reaches higher education hadn’t reached that level of education at 15 years old.

Let’s focus on another sensitive point. The biographical survey, which is quantitative and uses a large sample group, needs interviewers. In order to obtain a good interface between the design concept and the field, interviewers need to be trained for a relatively long time. No matter how pertinent a questionnaire is, it cannot provide results if the interviewers are not well trained. This is indispensable for the quality of biographical surveys – professional interviewers who are used to transversal surveys are often taken aback by this longitudinal gathering of data, and have to acquire and master new methods.

These surveys depend a great deal on the dating of events in time. If the dating is well-recorded, the stage of data exploitation and constitution of files will be greatly facilitated. One must concentrate on a high-quality recording of dates in the field, rather than giving oneself the painstaking and discouraging task of entering data corrections afterwards. Data fusion in terms of timing is relatively easy if the file is clean.

A multitude of questions are asked during biographical analysis. Each question in itself corresponds to a certain conceptualization, which requires that we know which population is at risk, what risk is being studied, when this risk begins, what time is measured, etc.

Let’s take an example. If I am studying divorce, I am not going to analyze all the people in my sample, but only those who might be affected. What is the proportion of the population which is subject to the risk of divorce? Only
the population which is married and still together is at risk of divorcing. Do I need to consider the legal sense of the term (i.e., those who have followed a divorce procedure) or can I take those individuals who declare themselves separated from their spouse? It all depends on our issue and the terms on which unions, and their break-up, are based in the society under study. The event is considered according to the aims of the research: departure from the marital home, date of the start of the divorce procedure, etc. Which timescale should be measured? It’s the time that people take to divorce from the moment of their entry into marriage – not since their date of birth. Thus one measures the time that has passed between the moment when a person begins to be subject to a particular risk (i.e., since marriage) and the moment when the event under study takes place. In this way, a person who does not get divorced is informative nevertheless: we consider the length of time he/she has spent married, until the moment of observation (usually the date of the survey). This method allows us to describe a “calendar of divorce”. A final stage would allow us to see how to model the analysis of this event and understand its causes via regression analysis. In fact, during the survey we gather information on residential and professional life, the birth of the various children of the studied individual and their activities. A multitude of analyses is possible, and for each one the timeline, the population at risk and the event will be different.

If we analyze the duration of post-education unemployment, the point of departure will be the completion of studies; the duration will be the time between the obtaining of a diploma and the date of the first job – one can be more precise: day of recruitment, first day of work. This period of unemployment which follows the completion of studies should be analyzed differently from that of unemployment after the loss of a first job. The population at risk will then be all those individuals who have lost their first job. The timescale is the period between their losing their first job and finding another. Each question has its conceptualization: a population at risk, a timescale. The timescale is not the same for each analysis: we must ascertain the starting time, the finishing time and the duration.

Dang Ngoc Hà

A “false” biographical survey is a mixture between biographical and non-biographical elements. Can you illustrate this idea?

[Philippe Antoine]

Let’s look at demographic and health surveys. Certain surveys gather information on the genetic background of women but ignore their professional life. Women aged 45-50 can be in a professional situation utterly different from the one they occupied 20 years ago. In this case, one can’t make a link between the birth of a person’s first child and her current professional activity. One can’t link past events with the individual’s current characteristics.

Another example, taken from a Ph.D. thesis. The student was focusing on the sexual experience of young girls in a Central African country. In this country, sexuality starts very early, around 13 or 14 years of age. His work made a link between the level of education attained and the advent of sexuality. The difficulty with the analysis was that only the level of education attained at the moment of the survey was considered. The author
wrongly deduced that those individuals who completed higher levels of study had embarked on a sexual life later. This is a misinterpretation: a person aged 13 or 14 doesn’t know at that stage that she will get a Ph.D. at 25! One can’t deduce that someone who got a Ph.D. at 25 experienced less precocious sexuality than those who did not undertake higher education. Just because someone has a Ph.D. doesn’t mean she didn’t have sex as an adolescent! There must be temporal coherence between the gathering of data on the sex life and the educational path taken.

[Andonirina Rakotonarivo]

Data from a survey can be partly biographical and partly transversal. However, we must be prudent about our interpretation. One can’t explain an event experienced ten years ago using transversal data from today.

First point. There are two main types of quantitative data:

- Transversal or cross-sectional data: these give detailed information on the current situation of the population. We’re talking about data collected at a precise moment, at the time of the survey, which tells you about the situation of the individuals being studied at a certain time \( t \). They give the image of the survey population at time \( t \). With regard to employment, we have for example: the kind of employment, the proportion of the population in employment at the time of the survey, etc. These data give very little information about causality: causes of employment or unemployment;

- Longitudinal data, which take account of time and thus form part of biographical data: information is available about the evolution of the values and terms of the variables being studied, over the time which is the period of observation. For example, we could ask people about the activities they have undertaken over the last six years, until the moment of the survey. We would then know the different successive activities they had experienced, like school, then university, then the first job, then unemployment, followed by a second job and so on, as well as the dates of the periods during which they had done these activities. This data would allow us to construct a timeline of the situations experienced by each individual using different variables and therefore to study the causal links between the different elements of his/her trajectory. Let’s remember that one of the main principles of causal analysis is the fact that cause happens before effect.

[Mody Diop]

Let’s take the example of the survey “Vulnerability and chronic poverty in Senegal” which was undertaken in 2008-2009 by the Laboratory for Research on Economic and Social Transformation at Cheikh Ante Diop University in Dakar, in partnership with the British Chronic Poverty Research Centre and other partners such as the IRD and UNICEF.

The survey covered 1,200 households, and 2,400 biographies were collected. Two people were surveyed in each household, and the questionnaire included 9 modules.

- Module 1: socio-demographic characteristics – ethnicity, parents’ educational level, main profession of the person looking after the children, etc. The data did not change over time – these were not biographical data;
- Module 2: residential history. We followed the residential trajectory of individuals from birth to the date of the survey;
- Module 3: a series of questions on studies, apprenticeship and professional life.

The other modules concerned married life, live-born children, health, history of influential people, associative and community life.

This survey brought together sociologists, anthropologists, demographers, but also statisticians and economists. Thanks to the biographical approach, it allowed us to better focus on the dynamic of the education sector in Senegal from 1940 onwards, and to understand the dynamics of poverty – chronic poverty.

[Andonirina Rakotonarivo]

The dates collected for each statistical unit are an essential element of the data used in biographical analysis.

- Retrospective data are the most common in social sciences – the study "Vulnerability and Chronic Poverty in Senegal". Individuals are questioned only once, information is gathered from birth to the moment of the survey. With this kind of data, longitudinal information is available straightaway, as soon as the survey is finished;
- Prospective data are collected through repeated surveys – follow-up surveys, panel surveys, observatories. A sample of individuals is questioned several times at regular intervals with the same instrument for collection, the same questionnaire. This questionnaire collects information on the recent past of the individuals – the last 12 months, for example. The next visit can take place after one year. One needs to wait a certain amount of time before the information becomes longitudinal, after several visits.

The data which we're going to use in this workshop are retrospective: this is the case for data resulting from urban insertion surveys undertaken in Lomé by Philippe Antoine and his team; and it's also true for the data from the Belgian MAFE survey (Migration between Africa and Europe) presented in the last session. It consists of data collected from 279 Congolese migrants living in Belgium in 2010, within an international research project involving data collection in several African and European countries. The four main modules which we're going to use from the MAFE data are: residence – this module reports the residential history of surveyed persons from birth until the survey; economic activity; family history, that is matrimonial history and birth of children; and finally the administrative trajectory, seen in terms of the availability of a legal residence permit and work permit during periods of living abroad.

[Philippe Antoine]

We should come back to the notions of fixed variables and variables which fluctuate over time. For example, the variable “marital situation” changes over time – during one’s lifespan one moves through various states: single, partnership, marriage, divorce, etc. Some variables remain fixed: date of birth, gender – although in some countries, Thailand for example, the “third sex” is spoken of. Where can the biography go? One could very well be of male gender from this date to this date, then change gender.

What is interesting in the biography of individuals is that each person is the product of his or her parents. There is a need for information on social reproduction. So we
come to the question of the biography of another person within the biography.

In module 1 mentioned by Mody, there are questions about parents. How do we take account of the social origin of a person and his or her parents? It is almost impossible to gather the biography of an individual and that of his/her father and mother at the same time. Often it’s the custom in this kind of survey, and also in others, to reveal social origin by asking: “What was the profession of your parents when you were 15 years old? What was the educational level of your parents when you were 15 years old?” We’re surrounded by uncertainty here because the reply is problematic. Often slips occur: people have the tendency to give us their parents’ professions at the moment when their parents stopped working. One can’t translate everything into quantitative biographical data.

Two participants volunteer for the reporting-back session on Saturday. Philippe Antoine clarifies that the synthesis on Saturday will be the product of the entire workshop, and the slides used during the week will be made available for that presentation. Working groups are formed for the practical work. On the sidelines of the workshop, exercises are given out to the participants who will need to present them during the following day’s session.

Let’s look together at the Lexis diagram so as to measure three time-related dimensions: the age of the individual, a date, and the generational approach.

This diagram allows us to structure our thoughts during the preparation of the file: we’re constantly shifting from one dimension to another and these three dimensions of time are all present in the file. Here we find the transversal, cross-sectional dimension, i.e. what is happening at a given date; the longitudinal dimension, i.e. what will evolve over time; and the time of birth at a given date.
We identify a life line then we can represent all the people in the same generation. As time passes, the person ages. Demographers speak of exact age and completed years of age. The person is born at 0 years, and during the first year of life he or she is 0 completed years of age.

The Lexis diagram has this specific characteristic: it can identify a date.
It can identify an age and people who have the same age, at different moments in time.

The diagram also allows us to pinpoint the intersection between an age and a date. We will use this dynamic between date and age. We will calculate durations which are differences of date or of age.
The life line of a person runs from birth to death via birthdays. The idea of the questionnaire is to mark a certain number of events which interest us on this life line.

One can also mark an entire year…
… or a completed age, that’s to say the age at last birthday. In this example we’re looking at people aged two complete years, i.e. between 2 and 3 years old in exact age.

The notion of generation in this example concerns all individuals born in the same year; they belong to the same cohort. This notion is extendable: we could take all the individuals born in the same 5- or 10-year period. For the choice of dimension, it all depends on the
issue being studied. For the wide-ranging historical dimension, one would take 10-year generations. In contrast, if one was studying the education of annual cohorts, one would take the year – the terms of the cohort and the generation are equivalent. For example in France, increasingly universities are required to know what each annual cohort of students goes on to do. One would have a cohort of students who left university in 2006, then those who left in 2007, etc. These students all left university in one year but are not all the same age. These distinctions come out in the analysis: it is sometimes interesting to focus only on age as a marker, while for other kinds of analysis, we look at individuals who experienced the same kind of events in the same year.

Let’s concentrate now on the Ageven form which is a way of gathering dates in the field: the marking of each event or of each transition from one state to another.
The Ageven form aims to place events in relation to each other. At the outset there is no particular order. The simplest thing is to start with family life but one can focus on events which the survey is particularly interested in. The idea is to use each event as a springboard to the next. The harvesting of biographies depends on accurate recording in time of the events experienced by the surveyed individual. Few people memorize the dates of events that they experience, but on the other hand, the order in which family events happened is easily recalled. This is useful in order to situate events in relation to each other – generally, individuals remember fairly well the date of their marriage, the birth of children and so on. In addition we generally see a better quality of information from women. One can also take as a marker the date of historical events.

The BIOMAD survey above uses a system of dates and a system of duration and of time before the date of the survey. The form offers three kinds of information, covering family life, residence and professional life. For each event, the month in which the event took place is written in brackets.

Several events can take place in the same year. In this example, in 1990, we note a divorce from the first wife, a change in residence and a change in work. In March 1974, the person married a woman, Marie; in July 1976, he moved from one town to another; etc. We enumerate the events like marriage and changes in state – moving house; the shift from single status to married.
One of the objectives of this survey was the study of the various stages of marriage. The Family/status column shows the different kinds of marriage:

- The couple undertook a traditional marriage in 1974;
- In 1978, they married in civil law at the church;
- In 1988, they separated;
- Only in 1990 was the divorce formalized.

We can adapt the form to the questions asked, columns can be added to suit the questioning – if one is working on societies where a change in religion is important, one can add a column to note conversions to a new religion; if one is studying community life one can add a column to record which associations an individual is or was a member of.

One of the constraints is that events can be of short duration – alternations of short periods of work and unemployment, for example. Should one therefore note down all these events or rather synthesize them by recording, to stick with that example, a period of precarious employment? It all depends, again, on the issue. If one is studying the start of a person’s professional life, one would focus on a very short time period: week after week; if one is covering the professional career, these periods will not be taken into account – arbitrarily, one could gather information on periods of employment or unemployment which have lasted more than six months. The timescale is adapted to the objectives. Two main kinds of data gathering exist: dating by month or by year.

One criticism made of biographical surveys is that people cannot give the precise date of events. In reality, everything depends on the talent of the interviewer in positioning one event in relation to another known event.

An initial session of introduction to Stata is started by Andonirina Rakotonarivo, and the following are presented:
- The four main windows for exploitation (commands, variables, results, editing) and the memory capacity of the software;
- The different forms of characterization of the raw data;
- Treatment of data: creation of new variables, recoding, construction of cross-tabulation, etc.

In order to satisfy the participants’ demands, the training continued with a lecture from Philippe Antoine mainly about the differences in terms of functioning and memory between SPSS and Stata. The day finished with a practical exercise involving six variables and 2,048 observed histories with the aim of illustrating the preceding theoretical sessions. The objective here is to familiarize the participants with the handling of the software before coming back to the biographical survey questionnaire and its design.
Day 2, Tuesday 19th July

Mody Diop starts the session by going through, point by point, the data treatment done the previous day on Stata by the participants, so as to avoid technical hitches.

2.2.1. Ageven Form and Questionnaire

[Philippe Antoine]

We are going to look at two different models of biographical surveys.

The surveys done with colleagues from Togo are modular surveys: a new column corresponds to each change in status or event. The form includes as many lines as there are changes in the life of the individual. The periods in this form are of variable duration – if an individual experiences no event for ten years, one line will represent ten years of his life; if three events follow each other at six-month intervals, each line will have a duration of six months.

Later, Andonirina will present to you a different kind of form where each line represents a year.

The questionnaire in Togo included several modules: characteristics of the individual, professional life, changes in residence, marital life and children.

Table 41  Module 1. Socio-demographic Characteristics

| Module 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS | Identification: \_1\_ | CLUSTER | \_1\_ | HOUSEHOLD | \_1\_ | INDIVIDUAL | \_1\_ |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------------|
| 101-102 Date of birth                      | Month \_1\_ | Year \_1\_ | 101-102 | 103 Gender | Male | 1 | 104 Religion at birth |
|                                             | Traditional (Animism, Voodoo) | 1 | Catholic | 2 | Protestant (Evangelist, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal) | 3 | Muslim | 4 | Other Christian (specify) | 5 | Other (specify) | 6 |
| 108 Have you changed your religion since birth? Yes | 0 | 109 New religion |
|                                             | No religion | 0 | Traditional (Animism, Voodoo) | 1 | Catholic | 2 | Protestant (Evangelist, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal) | 3 | Muslim | 4 | Other Christian (specify) | 5 | Other (specify) | 6 |

Sources: Antoine, Beguy and Kokou.
This module is not biographical – it allows us to gather the characteristics of the individual (gender, date of birth by month and year, ethnic group, nationality). Certain information concerns a third-party, like the father of Ego, whose level of education and profession were recorded. To record the father’s profession, we arbitrarily asked for his profession at the point when Ego was 15 years old. The same thing was done for the mother.

Our Togolese colleagues wanted to record changes in religion during the individual’s life. We opted for a hybrid solution by considering only one change in religion per life – the main change in Togo is linked to the new Protestant churches of Anglo-Saxon influence.

Let’s come to the truly biographical questionnaire. You will note here that information is repeated from one column to another – because an individual changes his residence several times in his life. In our example, with three changes during the lifetime, there would be three columns, each one referring to one place of residence. This questionnaire is completed after the Ageven form is filled in. The date at which the occupation of a residence starts corresponds to the date of birth of an individual – if we take the example of the form above this is May 1952. The individual changes residence in 1966; the second column therefore starts in 1966, the third in 1976 and the fourth in 1990.

The Ageven form allows us to set out how many columns need to be filled in: four for residence, nine for profession. Family life concerns two modules: marriage and children. The Ageven form has summed up for us the life of an individual. With this form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>42</th>
<th>Module 2. Residential History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**MODULE 2: RESIDENTIAL HISTORY**

**CLUSTER**

**HOUSEHOLD**

**INDIVIDUAL**

**SURVEYOR:** In this module, you need to fill in one column for each residence inhabited by the surveyed person. If the occupational status changes (question 216) during the period of residence, open a new column.

Reference to the Ageven form to answer the questions 201 to 203

**Sources:** Antoine, Beguy and Kokou.
to hand, it will be easier for the interviewer to complete the questionnaire.

**Thomas Chaumont**

To move from the event on the Ageven form to the column, does the number of columns correspond to the number of companions or to changes in status?

**[Philippe Antoine]**

In this case, each column represents a spouse. What makes the matrimonial module difficult, in the way we’re setting about it, is the multiplicity of dates within this module.

Here I’m showing you the final tools, but as in any survey you must first reflect on the issue. There is a whole design phase which will bring together all the members of the survey, of the research team.

Each one will share his/her concerns and what data he/she will gather with the help of the questionnaire. During design, an Ageven form is established so as to facilitate dating. The biographical questionnaire is relatively complex, it can’t be designed in the context of a meeting and applied directly in the field – so small pilot surveys are done to refine it. Once the tools are tested, the surveyor starts with the form and continues with the questionnaire.

Two modules follow the same logic: the residential module and the professional one. The first column of the residential module corresponds to the start of the individual’s life and starts with his/her date of birth; the second column kicks off at the date when the individual leaves the first residence; the start date of the second residential period corresponds to the date of the end of the first period of residence. It’s the placement of different events in time which characterizes the biographical questionnaire.

**Table 43 Module 2. Residential History (2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>R 03</th>
<th>R 02</th>
<th>R 01</th>
<th>R 00</th>
<th>R 05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>208 How did you obtain or provide the main finance to buy or construct this residence?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own funding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Home savings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Family gift</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank loan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Family loan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Family gift</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan from com. enterprise</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Loan from com. enterprise</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209 Did your spouse participate in the financing or construction of this residence?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, financially with construction materials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, financially with construction materials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, financially with construction materials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, provided the land</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes, provided the land</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes, provided the land</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210 What kind of tenancy is it?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple lease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Simple lease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Simple lease</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub lease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sub lease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sub lease</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211 Who pays the rent and charges?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spouse and I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-lease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sub-lease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212 Who are you being housed by?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father / mother</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Father / mother</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other relations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213 Who are you being hosted by?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father / mother</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Father / mother</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other relations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Accommodation from barracks</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Antoine, Beguy and Kokou.
The questions change according to the issue studied by the researchers. The questionnaires presented here are only examples. In general one must be able to date events, characterize them and gather more specific information according to the points one wants to study in depth.

In this example many questions serve to characterize residence.

Several techniques can be found in this questionnaire.

The questionnaire is almost all pre-coded: for every possible response, the interviewer circles the code which corresponds to the response. If I take question 204 (Fig. 59, Module 2, P. 210) “Specify where this residence was”, different codes are possible: if within the capital, code 1 is circled; code 2 if the residence is in a rural area in the country, etc.

Question 206 identifies another concept: the skip. We ask the status of the person in the residence and depending on the response, the surveyor must skip to other questions corresponding to each possible status and leading to other questions.

Participant

Does the numbering of columns R01 to R05 refer to the number of residences occupied by this individual?

[Philippe Antoine]

A survey costs money. If a questionnaire of several tens of pages is given to around 2,000 people, that adds up to a lot of paper! We try to put up to five residences on the same page, and use extra pages if the person has more than five. The columns are numbered, not the residences, so as not to forget anything – the surveyor can see that between the residences in the first and second columns no information has been entered.

The column numbers are a means of control, but the accuracy of the dates is more important in the biographical file. The file is constructed from dates, not from numbers which are more a means of control.

Trần Thanh Hồng Lan

Does the questionnaire include open questions: what was the reason for this shift of residence? How could one add this question into the questionnaire so as to facilitate the exploitation of this data?

[Philippe Antoine]

There are two systems: either a list of pre-coded responses – up to 20 variants; or one leaves a space to write in the answer – one takes the answer down just as it is given at that moment.

[Andonirina Rakotonarivo]

In the migration survey, many open questions were recorded, notably about the reasons for migration or the reasons for the choice of destination. We then coded the responses after the event. The value of open questions is in leaving the interviewee completely free to choose his or her response and avoid any risk of influencing him/her.

[Philippe Antoine]

Our questionnaire leaves very little initiative to the interviewer: pre-coded responses and precise gathering of data on the surveyed issues.
This module combines activity and training. Entry into professional life is taken in the widest sense, including for example a period of unemployment. As in the previous module, we find the dates of each period – questions 303 and 304. Question 305 characterizes the period. Different characteristics emerge:

1. Study, 2. Illness, 3. Invalidity, 4. Retirement, 5. Domestic work, 6. Unemployment, 7. Other forms of inactivity, 8. All kinds of occupation – trainee, paid worker, apprentice, etc. We skip our way through the questionnaire depending on the nature of the reply.
As you can see, understanding the questionnaire requires a good knowledge of it and attentive reading. During training, interviewers need to go to the field in advance so as to carry out various exercises. They need to have committed to memory the logic of each column and the relationship of each one to a different period in the life of the individual.

---

### Table 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module 3. Study, Apprenticeship and Economic Activity (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM THE AGE OF SIX ONWARDS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support during unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

306 What was your main source of support during this period?
- Occupational pension and others
- Rent/properties or savings
- Scholarship
- Scholarship and/or salary
- Spouse
- Parents
- Children
- Other relations
- Social work
- Other (specify)

96 ______________________
Go to 331

308 What was your main source of support during this period?
- Occupational pension and others
- Rent/properties or savings
- Scholarship
- Scholarship and/or salary
- Spouse
- Parents
- Children
- Other relations
- Social work
- Other (specify)

96 ______________________
Go to 331

310 What was your status in this activity?
- Salaried worker
- Trainee
- Apprentice
- Family help
- Boss and self-employed

311 How many people worked for you at the start of the period?

90 and + = 90

312 How many people worked for you at the end of the period?

90 and + = 90

313 What kind of written accounts did you maintain?
- Personal
- Chart of Accounts
- No accounting

314 Are you on the commercial register?
- Yes

Sources: Antoine, Beguy and Kokou.
Module 4 attempts to grasp all the stages of marriage. I don't know if this questionnaire designed for Togo has any relevance to Vietnamese, Cambodian or Malaysian society, but it can at least provide a comparison. The questionnaire on marriage is specific to each society, very different from the one on the labour market, for example, which is easier to adapt to each context.

In the example, multiple dates are gathered to mark the start of the relationship. During analysis, we didn't go into the detail of these dates but focused on individuals' perception of when their relationship started. I draw your attention to this point because in terms of method, it's not always valuable to create the most sophisticated questionnaire in the world. The questionnaire needs above all to be simple and easy to analyze.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>U 01</th>
<th>U 02</th>
<th>U 03</th>
<th>U 04</th>
<th>U 05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First name of spouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404-405 When did you start cohabiting? (write 13 13 if never cohabited and go to 407)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406 Is this the first period of cohabitation with this person?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407-408 Date of first steps (write 13 13 if no first steps)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409-410 Date of delivery of dowry (write 13 13 if no dowry)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411-412 Date of civil marriage (write 13 13 if no civil marriage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413-414 Date of religious marriage (write 13 13 if no religious marriage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415 What was the marital situation of your spouse at the start of this period?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Antoine, Beguy and Kokou.
In Togo, the phenomenon of couples living together required specific attention and needed to be dated adequately. We’ve understood clearly that for the residence and profession modules, the date at which one column starts marks the end of the previous period. Here, it’s not the same; we must come up with a specific system for dating the end of one relationship and know how it ended.

Questions on the eventual split and its date – question 420: divorce, one spouse leaving the home, repudiation, voluntary departure, death of spouse in the case of widowhood.

When the relationship has broken up, the date is recorded in 421 and 422. It’s the same date, whatever the nature of the relationship. Then, in the computer-based work, we need to distinguish the separations from the divorces or the deaths of the spouse. The questionnaire is designed for countries where there is high mobility around marriage, and can adapt to the specific conditions of polygamy.

Helen Ming

Why is there a double coding for the question “From what date did you cease to live together?”

[Philippe Antoine]

Variable 417 corresponds to the month, and variable 418 to the year. These are two different variables. The question numbers link to the numbers of the variables. This module is the most complex because the periods overlap; in the other modules, we have the start and the end of a period. In a monogamous situation, the form is simpler; in principle, one can’t take a new wife unless one has already divorced or been widowed. With polygamy, one can have several wives at the same time.
Here, we’re not concerned with the children of the couple but with the individual, children which the individual may have had with different spouses or partners. We’re analyzing fertility and questions are asked of women as well as of men – it is possible in this way to ask men how many children they have had at a young age – question 507.

The birth of twins or triplets complicates the analysis because in Africa, in general, the level of twin births is high – question 504.

It’s entirely possible to have children outside a relationship, which justifies the code 00 – where one can declare a child without being in a relationship – the absence of a father or a mother depending on the gender of the surveyed person in module 4.

We’re dealing with societies where mortality at a young age is high – question 507.

The children can also be entrusted to other parents; sometimes, the child can be sent to live with its uncle who lives in town, so as to be educated. The mobility of children is important, which explains the questions aimed at a better understanding of the whereabouts of the child. All these aspects are translated within the questionnaire.
Some questions refer to the education of the child.

I'd like to draw your attention to two potential criticisms of this module. It's important in any research to know its weak points.

Questions 513 to 515. These questions aren't really adapted to the biographical viewpoint – implicitly we are assuming that all children start their education at the same age, which is not true.

Question 516: “At what age did the child stop going to school?” Implicitly we are asking the surveyor to alter the method of counting – there's no demand for a date – which is not coherent with the rest of the questionnaire.

Let's move on now to the construction of the sample.

All surveys need a baseline survey done in advance. The current survey covers an African capital city but we could equally well have done a biographical survey covering the whole of the country. In general, the principle is the same. Here we take as our baseline the most recent census. In France or in Francophone Africa, for example, there are census units or enumeration zones (district). Each unit of about 1,000 people is mapped. Frequently, we proceed with cluster surveys to several degrees. We select the enumeration zones: households or houses. If for example one wants to survey 2,500 households and one is surveying 100 households in each zone, one needs 25 zones. Each zone will be taken randomly from different areas so as to obtain a reliable image of the survey region.

The more households you survey in a zone, the fewer zones you have, which is more economical. The more one reduces costs, the more one loses in terms of the diversity of the sample. If budgets allowed it, one would multiply the zones and reduce the number of households in each zone. The size
of the sample would remain the same but one would have greater dispersion, so as to reduce the cluster effects.

Cluster effects are due to the principle that two people living side by side have a high chance of having the same standard of living. One must, therefore, diversify and multiply the survey points. A compromise between logistical costs and sample quality is unavoidable: it’s possible to play around with certain parameters like the size of the sample, the number of survey points and the number of people surveyed.

Once the households are selected, one goes through a kind of enumeration of all the people making up each household. According to the objectives of the survey, one moves on to a selection among the people already surveyed within households. In Lomé, for example, we wanted to survey men and women between 25 and 59 years old, and we wanted to have equal numbers of people aged between 25 and 35, between 35 and 45, and between 45 and 59. Togo is a place where the age structure pyramid has a very wide base: lots of young people, few elderly. We were therefore led to divide the sample into 6 parts, enumerating men and women in the age groups above. We wanted to select about 400 people per section, meaning more or less all elderly people, about one in two of the intermediate section, and one in three among the youngest. In reality, we did two surveys; a first one from the census so as to obtain the list of zones of enumeration, and a second stratification from our own census of households, to select the individuals who would be the subjects of our biographical questionnaire.

Why did we proceed in this way? We wanted to avoid the surveyors themselves choosing the people to survey, because then the risk would be that we would consider too many people who were based in the home, who worked close by or who were unemployed. The advantage was to achieve a more rigorous sample, and the inconvenience was doing two surveys – we came once for the household and once again for the biography.

A major source of bias in surveys comes from interviewers who just veer towards the people who are easiest to question.

The creation of files

Once the field survey is over, we need to construct the analysis file. We’ll come back to this in detail through practical exercises.
Let’s take the example of the module “Marital life”. After codification and data entry the matrimonial module will undergo a certain number of modifications so as to form an operational file for biographical purposes. In the example considered, each line represents a change – seven lines, instead of four in the questionnaire (four spouses).

Two markers of time must be distinguished: the second-last column corresponds to the start date of the period, the last column to the end date of the period. The start date of the following period begins where the preceding period terminates.

All dates are in months: 817 corresponds to 817 months after January 1900 – for someone who marries in September 1940, the marriage date will be the year 1940 (40) multiplied by 12 months (480) to which we must add 9 months of 1940 (September). For all events between 1900 and 1999, just take the year, multiply by 12 and then add the number of months. The year 2000 is translated by 100 – 100 years after 1900 – which allows us to deal with situations which overlap two centuries.

Let’s look at the life history of this individual:
- In 817 he gets married, and his matrimonial status changes. He only has one wife, he is monogamous;
- For 38 months he remains married; in 855 he gets a divorce. When he divorces, his matrimonial status is “divorced”, he has no spouse;
- In 863 he gets married, my counter marks 1 – we add a spouse. Matrimonial status is married, monogamous; the ranking of spouse becomes 2 (it’s his second wife);
- In 876 his third marriage takes place. He has an additional wife, he is not separated from the second so he has two wives. He becomes polygamous;
- In 883 he gains a divorce from relationship number 2. He becomes monogamous again;
- In 982 he divorces; he no longer has a spouse. Then, in conformity with the theory on relationships and matrimonial systems in general, 10 months later he’s married again (992);
- 1080 was the date of the survey. The individual was on his fourth marriage, had

### Table 50 Various Marital States of One Individual since his First Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking of spouse</th>
<th>Number of spouses</th>
<th>Marital event</th>
<th>Marital state</th>
<th>Start date of period</th>
<th>End date of period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construction.
only one wife and had been married for 90 months.

You can clearly see the difference between biography and cross-section. Thanks to the biographical approach, we can see that the individual has had four different wives, that at one time he was polygamous and that at another time in his life he was divorced.

The information “four marriages” requires seven lines to record his matrimonial trajectory. One line is missing: from his birth to his marriage, what was his marital status? We must add the line where he is single, from his date of birth to his first marriage in 817.

We proceed in this way for each module; all the files will end at the survey date. The process of combining the files is based on this end date.

At the end of this procedure, we end up with four biographical files, one for each of the main types of event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital State</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Date at the beginning of this period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td>1 from Spouse 1</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td>1 from Spouse 2</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polygamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td></td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td>1 from Spouse 3</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>High-level Technician</td>
<td>2 from Spouse 3</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Sicap</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Sicap</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Wholesaler</td>
<td></td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Grand Dakar</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td></td>
<td>1022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td></td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td></td>
<td>1054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construction.

Here’s an example of combining, which results in the summarized life of the individual. From his marriage, we combined this with the place of residence, profession and children. Each time there was a change, a new line was created.
Thomas Chaumont

This information can all be found on the Ageven form but the detail of the questionnaire is not written in these lines.

[Philippe Antoine]

In fact yes, everything is written, but I haven’t made it all visible because that lengthens each line. On a line, there can be 200 or 300 variables. I can’t get 300 variables onto the page. For example each time the individual moves house, we have the name of the area; we have all the characteristics of the residence that he inhabited or the characteristics of his wife each time he got married, etc. We can see it on the screen, during data combination using *Stata*.

Nguyen Ngoc Toai

If you survey 1,000 people, do you end up with the same number of combined files like this one?

[Philippe Antoine]

For every module, we have a file. The size of the file depends on the number of people and the number of events. Whether we have 100, 1,000 or 10,000 people, we will end up with only one marriage file, only one professional file, only one “residence” file, only one file on children. Only the size of the file changes. We don’t combine individual by individual but the whole file – individual 1 followed by all his dates, then individual 2 followed by all his dates, etc. *Stata* works as if it considers each individual like an autonomous file, that’s why I’m only presenting one individual; on the file individuals come one after the other, each one identified by its code.

Nguyen Ngoc Toai

How do you manage a file that’s so large?

[Philippe Antoine]

The strength of this kind of analysis is that we structure it around one person to do the programming but the results produced correspond to a group of people. You must therefore understand that the logic of the file for one person is reproduced for every person.

2.2.2. Surveys on Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE Belgium)

[Andonirina Rakotonarivo]

As in the example developed by Philippe, we have an Ageven form (age, event) and a booklet of questions:

- The form is a kind of calendar, and is used to note events which take place in the life of the surveyed person at the moment when they take place;
- The booklet containing the sequence of questions to fill in the form and the modules which detail the periods identified in the form.

The MAFE survey underlines two fundamental differences from what has been presented to you today. Firstly, the timescale used is not the same: the events are dated by nearest year and no longer by month.
The years are placed, as before, in the leftmost column. In the second column, the interviewer notes the age of the individual from date of birth up to the date of the survey.

Here, we don’t have any information on whether an event takes place in January or July of a particular year. We only know that the event took place in a given year.

Secondly, the way we register the date differs in this module.

Let’s take an example. In the case presented, the person was born in 1958. In 1981, he had a first relationship with a person called Moseka. The third column refers to activities. We can see here that the individual started his education in 1964. The ascending arrow means that this activity continued until 1976, the date he started university. In this way we know the situation of the individual, in various different aspects, each year. We can also read it horizontally. Let’s take the year 1990. The individual is in a relationship, he has a first child, born three years previously; he lives in Brussels in Belgium; he is unemployed.

The different modules help us to deepen our detailed knowledge of each period and event of the biography identified in the form. The principal modules are:

- Family history: relationships and births;
- Residential history;
- International migrations longer than one year;
- Attempts at international migration;
- Returns to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (under and over one year);
- Migrations of surrounding networks;
For the module on migrations, for example, each column represents an episode marked on the form – the column in grey identifies the first migration – see AGEVEN form.

A migration is defined as a change of country. Here we can see that he’s had two changes of country. A first move from the Congo to the UK, and a second move from the UK to Belgium. This person has experienced two episodes of migration and so I would have two columns in my migration module.

The number of periods for each variable of interest and the number of periods counted on the form will determine the number of columns in the relevant module.

Let’s take the example of activities (education and employment). We’ll determine the number of periods of activity from our form:

- Period 1: 1964-1976, school;
- Period 2: 1976-1980, university;
- Period 3: 1980-81, one year of unemployment;
- Period 4: 1981-1990, employment in a telecoms company;
- Period 5: 2 years of unemployment;
- Period 6: employment from 1992 until the moment of the survey.

We will therefore have six columns in the activity module.
The first activity is registered in the first column, with all the details about it, such as employment status, type of employer, salary, etc. The second activity is marked and detailed in the second column and so on.
This example shows that the person has had only one relationship until the moment of the survey. We have here two important pieces of information: the year of the start and finish of his marriage. The marriage is dated in 1981 and the person surveyed was still married at the moment of the survey: the end date is crossed out in the file.
The module on children tells us that the individual has five children. Each column filled in in the module corresponds to one child. We have the year of birth which is recorded, and the year of death which is crossed out, which implies that the children are all alive at the time of the survey.

**Table 56** Module on Children

Source: MAFE Project-Belgium

**Table 57** From the Questionnaire to the File (1)

Source: Author’s construction.
Each module registers successive periods which are numbered, dated and detailed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>id</th>
<th>num_mig</th>
<th>date_start</th>
<th>date_end</th>
<th>country_destination</th>
<th>country_origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B0000001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>KENYA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the computer file to be constructed from the migration module, each of the numberings marked in columns represents a line, that is to say an observation, in the file. This table takes the columns from the paper questionnaire and makes the corresponding transcription in the State file.

Let’s take the individual B0000008 as an example. He experienced three migratory episodes, of which the first began in 2000 and ended in 2003. In the columns, we have the number of the episode, of the migration period and the start and finish dates, etc. In the computer file, each migratory episode corresponds to a line, therefore to an observation, with all the detailed information which we have for each observation: here, we have the date of the start of the migratory period (the date_start variable), the destination country and the country of origin for this migration. The observations of this person are numbered chronologically.
We have two kinds of files after retranscription: “period” files or episodes where each observation represents a particular period for an individual; and an “individual” file which groups together the variables which don’t vary over time and which are not biographical. This second file gives us a view of the whole questionnaire; it gives fixed information about the surveyed person, those data which don’t vary over time, like gender, the highest qualification level reached, etc. In this file, each observation corresponds to an individual.

**Table 59 From the Questionnaire to the File (3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>id</th>
<th>nb_relationship</th>
<th>nb_children</th>
<th>nb_migrations</th>
<th>nb_returns</th>
<th>occupation</th>
<th>max_qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B0000001</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000002</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Aggregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000003</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000004</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000005</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000006</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000007</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000008</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0000010</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Licence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construction.

**Box 5 Combining the Files**

Grouping the information from the different modules which are necessary into one and the same file

Study of migration and professional integration in Belgium:
- Module on migration
- Module on returns
- Module on activities
- Module on relationships
- Module on children
- Modules on res. permit

⇒ unit of observation = year

Source: Author’s construction.
In order to make the files compatible so that they can be combined, we create a common unit of observation which is the year. The final file is a “person-years” file.

Each line of the “person-years” file will correspond to a year which has been lived through by the individual concerned.

Here’s an example. We have an individual born in 1973, in DRC. We observe in the following lines that he started his schooling in 1979 (the “q402” column gives information about his activities). In 2003 we can see a change in his residence, to Belgium.

The objective of combining the files is to create a “timeline” common to all the modules, so as to be able to determine for each year lived by the individual what his situation is for each of the modules.

Bùi Thị Huong Trâm

In this example, each line is a year. What is it if we go back to the case presented by Philippe?

[Philippe Antoine]

In the file that I presented, a line doesn’t have a fixed duration, it represents a period which finishes with a change.

[Andonirina Rakotonaivo]

Philippe’s file will be smaller because there won’t be a transition each year. In our study, the lines will be absolutely identical if the situation of the individual doesn’t change; the Ageven form is translated into a file, and each observation corresponds to a line of the file.
The end of the day is dedicated to a practical examination of data entry errors and to checking coherence with the software.

Day 3, morning of Wednesday 20th July

Led by Philippe Antoine, the workshop makes a start on the combination of files within Stata; in the example under consideration, the residential and the study/apprenticeship/economic activity modules need to be combined. The aim is to familiarize the participants with the creation of a time counter so as to be able to order events by stage (month, year).

Day 4, Thursday 21st July

The morning of the fourth day of training is structured around questions and answers on technical manipulations of data with the Stata software. Philippe Antoine also comments on a series of scientific publications linked to the practical exercises which will be done in the final sessions: the biographical approach in the analysis of marital life, research by Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud on coming of age in Africa, research by Donatien Béguy on the interrelations between women’s employment and fertility (see selective bibliography at the end of the chapter).

The afternoon is dedicated to manipulation of Stata, working on the issue of entry into relationships and employment in Lomé: real data including a group of variables on the marital status, the number of children, changes of residence, changes in employment; the notion of condition in data treatment; regression analysis – theoretical foundations from the start of a relationship; dichotomization of the variables, Cox model.
The session finishes with the preparation of the report for Saturday – the participants each give to the two reporters an individual evaluation and observation form, covering what they have learned in the workshop.

**Box 6  ** Cox Model

- We can see the Cox model as a control, by regression, of the effect of the explanatory variables in the survival analysis, or as the introduction of the temporal dimension in the regression;
- The regression is done not on a characteristic acquired by the individual at the end of his life (or at the time of the survey), but on characteristics acquired during each unit of time during his existence;
- This regression model calculates the effect of the explanatory variables on the temporal risk of experiencing the event. To each variable, a regression coefficient is assigned, which measures the average influence of this variable on the temporal risk;
- In other terms, the effect of the variables is proportional to the probability of experiencing the event (which is why these models are known as “proportional risk”).

Survival analysis (time until the event): hazard function
Regression analysis (multivariate): regression coefficients

\[ h_y(t;z_i) = h_0(t) \cdot \exp(\sum B_i z_{ij}) \]

- \( h_0(t) \) is the hazard function for the reference category
- \( B_i \) a series of coefficients associated with the variable \( z_{ij} \)

*Source: Cox, Regression Models and Life-Tables, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.*
Day 5, Friday 22nd July

Following the model of the exercise on Day 4, and led by Andonirina Rakotonarivo and Mody Diop, practical exercises were done on the identification of a population at risk, the shift from a period of unsalaried activity, or inactivity, to a paid activity defined as a salaried or independent job. The participants had principally to create Kaplan-Meier graphs by cohort and by gender, and calculate the median age at first paid job by gender for each cohort. In terms of the descriptive analysis, the participants developed their reflection further using the Cox model – usual variables, dichotomized in advance: generation, matrimonial status, level of education, gender, characteristics of the period of inactivity. The final session covered issues around confidence intervals.

2.2.3. Synthetic Report of the Workshop

Reporter (1)

The main objective of the workshop was to provide a practical training in biographical analysis by using Stata software on real-life data. We thus focused on different types of biographical file, data treatment, the definition of an event and the main techniques of univariate and multivariate analysis.

The aim of the quantitative biographical survey is to identify social changes in their entirety. It can deliver unique information about the characteristics of a society and its dynamics, differentiating its structural tendencies from cyclical variations.

Biographical surveys are the gathering of a life history: an event corresponds to each column of the questionnaire – a change in the state of life of the individual.

The principle of the retrospective gathering of data is to retrace the main events experienced by an individual from birth to the moment of the survey, concerning activity (including education), marital life, residence, etc. The originality of the approach lies in the analysis of the relationships in time between different life events. It is therefore indispensable, at the moment of collecting the data, to place events in relation to each other.

Two main types of data characterize the quantitative survey:

- Cross-sectional data: precise, wide-ranging data on the subjects of the survey at a given moment, but of poor quality from the point of view of causal analysis;
- Longitudinal data: take the time aspect into account, placing events in time with causal analysis of the relationship between two variables: the cause coming before the effect.

For each statistical unit, the essential element is dating. There are two techniques for collecting dated data:

- The retrospective approach – commonly used in social sciences: individuals are questioned only once. The interviewer gathers data from the birth of the individual; information is immediately available – longitudinal availability;
- The prospective approach: a survey of repeat visits or a panel survey: a sample is questioned several times, with the same collection instrument. The gathering of data is focused on the recent past of
the individual within a defined period. One must wait a certain time before the information becomes longitudinal.

What are the conceptual tools of biographical analysis?

- The Lexis diagram. The biographical questionnaire consists of marking on a life line for the individual – from his birth to his death – targeted information: a date, an age – marking individuals of the same age, a generation at a moment “T” – the intersection of these two variables;
- The Ageven form. This is designed to allow us to mark each event, transition or shift from one state to another in the course of an individual’s life. The problem is that events can sometimes be of very short duration – jobs associated with short periods of unemployment. This begs the question of whether one records all the information or whether one groups events together as a homogenous period of precarity. In reality, it all depends on the issue being studied and the choice of “distance”.

Two examples of biographical surveys were given:

- Biographical survey of Lomé. This was a survey extracted from the “Urban insertion” study carried out in Africa in 2000 on a sample of 2,536 individuals. Residential, professional, matrimonial and reproductive events were collected according to the date at which they were experienced. The survey was established according to different modules: with each change in state, a new stage or a new column is created. The file contains as many lines as there are changes in the individual’s life. The timetable of the file is of variable durations, the lines don’t have to, in fact rarely do, represent equal periods of time;
- The MAFE biographical survey. This was a survey on migrations between Africa and Europe done in 2009 among Congolese migrants living in Belgium. Events concerning the different residential, migratory, matrimonial and family trajectories are registered according to year. In contrast to the previous survey, the methodology used does take one line for one year.

The participants divided into working groups for practical exercises: biographical files – combining the different modules, creation of a timescale, parameterization of the biographical analysis, etc., descriptive analysis and the Cox model.

A second reporter presents a summary of the practical work done using Stata during the week.

[Philippe Antoine]

This workshop was difficult because it had two distinct and complementary objectives: the acquisition of skills in handling new software for all the participants; and the application of this software to specific and complex techniques for biographical analysis. Finally, we were very satisfied with all the work done by the participants and the speed with which they acquired the different skills.

Pierre Yves Le Meur

From a qualitative point of view, I find it extremely interesting to enter biographies into a system of models. It allows the production of a certain amount of data. Besides, in the area of qualitative surveys,
there is a lot of discussion about what biography is. Is it an illusion? Don’t we separate the individual from his context by reducing his characteristics, his trajectory, to a collection of data? Have you brought together this kind of quantitative survey with a more qualitative approach, perhaps biographical approaches more centred on the family, several generations. It’s often extremely interesting to understand the process of accumulation, of diversification, to place them within a trans-generational or family-based logic.

[Philippe Antoine]

The more we make advances in biographical analysis, the more we ask questions about the reductions we can make in quantifying biographies. Moreover, these surveys depend on the relationship between events, so we hazard a guess that an event which comes first can explain the following event. The order of events doesn’t necessarily correspond to the hierarchy which the individual gives them. There can be mis-orderings of events, which we touched on in the plenary session.

The linkage of quantitative and qualitative events has been little developed except in Senegal. Other surveys are either cyclical surveys or comparative quantitative surveys. The method for comparing different generations of the same family has been seldom applied, we make comparisons within generations – instantaneous comparisons within a sample. In addition, the principle of biographical analysis rests on a completely random sample. Qualitative analysis methods do not apply to samples which we select from the same family, from different generations. For that, we must develop new techniques.

Selective Bibliography


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname and first name</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Research theme</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Institute of the Family and Gender</td>
<td>Sociology, demography</td>
<td>Culture and Family</td>
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<td>Migration and settlement of Chinese in the Chinese Quarter of Cho Lon in Hồ Chí Minh City</td>
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2.3. Construction and Management of Ethnicities in Southeast Asia: Cultures, Policies and Development

Christian Culas – CNRS, Grégoire Schlemmer – IRD, Trần Hồng Hạnh – Institute of Anthropology, VASS

(Retranscription)

Day 1, morning of Monday 18th July

[Christian Culas]

Welcome to the workshop on ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. We will start with introductions from the participants; this workshop is structured so as to promote the methodological and pedagogic dimension, and exchanges and discussions will be a priority all week.

How will these four and a half days of group work unfold?

We will devote this first day to the ways in which ethnic groups are designated and named, and our approach will initially be theoretical and methodological: we will explain the constructivist and naturalist approaches. We will ask what an ethnic group is and how and why we make ethnic classifications. In the afternoon, we will turn towards case studies in Việt Nam and in Laos.

Tuesday will be devoted to the relationship between the law and ethnic groups. We will start with the legal situation so as to be able to observe the relationship with what is visible in the field. Sociologists and anthropologists use the law very rarely as an instrument of knowledge; we will try to establish a relationship between law and anthropology. We will conclude this second day with case studies.

Questions from applied anthropology and development anthropology will be studied on Wednesday morning, then we will together organize three working groups, one group per trainer with a specific theme. Friday morning will be devoted to presentations from each group; from these we will derive a synthesis for the public reporting session on Saturday.
Anthropology is above all a way of looking at, a way of approaching things. As well as adding to your knowledge, our objective will be to question what you believe you already know. To do this, we will start from the central question: “What is an ethnic group?” which will lead us to touch on numerous other themes.

### 2.3.1. Elements of Theory on the Construction of Ethnic Groups

[Christian Culas]

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**Box 7** *Construction of Ethnicity (1)*

To show how ethnic groups and representations of ethnic groups are constructed over time and in different countries.

A) **Question of “social construction”**

Definition: naturalism is the doctrine which maintains that social phenomena exist before being categorized and independently of any effort to categorize them. They exist in nature, or in essence.

Definition: constructivism is the doctrine according to which social phenomena do not exist *a priori* and independently of work undertaken to categorize them.

B) **The construction of ethnic groups *via* names**

Giving a name to an object is one way to give it social existence and sometimes to appropriate it for oneself.

Always think in terms of reciprocity: if the State names the ethnic groups then what name do the ethnic groups use for representatives of the State?

C) **The construction of ethnic groups *via* the passing of laws**

Passing laws can set limits on what is an ethnic group and what is possible and legal for ethnic groups within the State.

Laws are also a way of integrating ethnic groups within the State system. Has the State consulted the ethnic groups on this point?

D) **Heuristic advantages of constructivism**

If social phenomena are constructed, we can try to understand how, by whom, with what aims?

This allows us to ask questions about the process, about exchanges, about dynamics, about social change: “how does that work?”

*Source: Author’s construction.*

The constructivist approach is in opposition to the essentialist or naturalist approach. We are going to apply this theoretical approach which allows us to say “because all social facts are constructs, it is also possible to deconstruct them: to understand how they were constructed”. The objective of this first presentation is therefore to show you how ethnic groups are socially and ideologically constructed and to analyze that construction.
Axis 1. Names, labels. Giving an object a name, whatever it is, is a way to make it exist in the social context and sometimes to appropriate it, that is to take it for oneself. This is true for ethnic groups but also for any term. The second idea concerns more specifically the labels for different groups. If we try to understand how the State names ethnic groups, this means also looking at how the ethnic groups refer to the majority population – how do ethnic groups refer to the representatives of the State?

Axis 2. The construction of ethnic groups by the production and creation of laws.

Ethnic groups are subject to the law, they are written into the Vietnamese and Laotian constitutions, the State has created a legal framework around ethnic groups. What is an ethnic group? What should it and can it do? How are these groups framed in law? Were ethnic groups consulted about the laws which apply to them?

Axis 3. The angle of the constructivist approach. Questions such as how groups function, their origins and their objectives are questions derived from the constructivist theory; asking these questions prompts us to consider what we mean by a construct.

Box 8 Construction of Ethnicity (2)

The diversity of ways of designating ethnic groups over time and in different countries shows:
- The arbitrary nature of designations (chosen by the dominant groups);
- Transformation over time (not immutable designations);
- The political nature of the choice of designations.

Source: Author’s construction.

The way in which ethnic groups are named differs according to the country and its history. In some countries, ethnic groups are labeled with names which they themselves do not know. There is an arbitrary character to the choice of names given. For the anthropologist, this shows that the administrative structure doesn’t have detailed knowledge of the different ethnic groups. If the representatives of the State do not know how people refer to themselves, then they probably don’t know how they live, their standard of living, their social relationships, etc.
To widen our knowledge of ethnic groups, here we have several countries which have minorities or ethnic groups. The point of this table, which gives a very global perspective, is to show you that the issue of minority populations and their management in law is not specific to Việt Nam; many countries in the world encounter the same kind of problem.

Let’s take the example of the United States. All social groups considered as minorities are called “minorities”; they include women, Blacks, Asians, Native Americans, Hispanics, but also homosexuals, that is to say individuals who are in the minority in terms of their sexual orientation, not in terms of their social or hereditary identity. The creation of these categories of “minorities” dates from the 1960s. It stems from one of President Kennedy’s socio-political projects: to combat the inequalities between whites and blacks, but also between different dominated groups, a precise categorization was needed. The production of categories has two objectives here: a better management of populations and the avoidance of discrimination between groups. The direct consequence of this policy was the establishment of laws in the 1960s and 1970s which said, for example, that if 15% of the American population was black, then a corresponding proportion of the administration should be black. The same percentages of ethnic groups should be seen in each administration as were seen in society – a policy of quotas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TERMS</th>
<th>TYPE OF GROUPS</th>
<th>ORIGINS</th>
<th>LAWS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>Women, Blacks, Asians, Asiatics, Amerindians, Hispanics</td>
<td>The 1960s, J.F. Kennedy: combat the inequalities between Whites and Blacks</td>
<td>Affirmative action or positive action (“positive discrimination” is a misinterpretation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR, China, Vietnam</td>
<td>Nationalities, Ethnic minorities (“people of small number”)</td>
<td>Cultural groups Russia 128 nationalities, China 56, Vietnam 54</td>
<td>Communist conception of ethnic groups, origin Stalin, Marxism and the national question, 1914</td>
<td>Specific regulation with rights (number of children, aid, etc.). But also cultural constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cultural groups, cultural communities (official ban on using the term “ethnic group” in France)</td>
<td>Several dozen cultural groups in the past 5 today? (Alsatian, Basque, Breton, Catalan, Corsican) + Rom</td>
<td>1539 Edit de Villers-Cotterêts: French as the national language + royal law applied throughout; 1789 Revolution: definition of the people of France!</td>
<td>Mid-20th century: specific laws on bilingual schools, cultural productions, taxes (in Corsica).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Aboriginals</td>
<td>Over 1,000 distinct cultural groups</td>
<td>1838 first report for the protection of Aboriginals</td>
<td>1838 first Whites condemned for murders of Aboriginals; 1992 recognition of land rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construction.
Ethnic categories were produced in a similar format in the Soviet period, in China and in Việt Nam. In Việt Nam, the approach of classifying and managing ethnic minorities in around 50 groups dates from the 1950s and 1960s. The same thing can be seen in Laos. Ethnic groups are broadly seen as people who need help, and the central, national government must support their development. What is surprising is that in the constitutions of Laos and Việt Nam, the State commits itself to support the development of ethnic groups, but in contrast it does not commit itself to help poor Vietnamese – very poor Kinh are not officially referred to in the constitution. Researchers need to ask themselves why the constitution refers to aid only for ethnic groups, not for the whole of the population.

The case of France is very unusual because the use of the term “ethnic” is banned in official texts and sanctioned in research. One cannot refer to Basques, Corsicans or Bretons as French ethnic groups, as this would not be accepted in a published text. Historically, each French region was home to people who did not speak French, and who had a different culture and traditions; the French system of centralization, in a sense, eliminated this cultural diversity. In the 16th century, a royal edict imposed the French language in all the administrative districts of the kingdom. To draw a parallel with Việt Nam, an article of the Vietnamese constitution specifies that popular jurisdictions and tribunals can be held in Vietnamese or in any ethnic language. To my knowledge, however, no tribunals have really held proceedings in any language other than Vietnamese (Kinh).

The specific characteristic of Australia is that this continent was home to more than a thousand ethnic groups, and then there was colonization by people from England in a country where as yet there was no white population. Over a period of several centuries, a relationship of domination developed, with on one side the whites who possessed economic power, arms and a powerful social organization, and on the other side peaceable ethnic groups made up of small, scattered tribes which would for the most part be eradicated.

This overview thus presents a panorama of different relationships between emerging States and minority populations, whether they are ethnic minorities or, as in the US, women or homosexuals. For me, this helps to broaden my ideas and to show that many situations exist which have no connection with Việt Nam, Laos or China.

2.3.2. Identifying and Classifying Ethnic Groups

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

Do we know clearly what an ethnic group is? One methodological principle in anthropology is to reflect on the words and the terms that we use. It’s their precise definition and rigorous use which makes them no longer just words, but concepts. The notion of ethnicity is particularly complex, and at the end of this week if you have the impression that you understand less of what we’re talking about, our objective will partly have been met!

Ethnicity is a form of belonging. These forms are multiple and change depending on the person to whom you are talking – if I am talking to a woman, I can present myself as a man; if I am talking to someone who comes
from Asia, I can present myself as European; if I am talking to someone German, I can present myself as French, etc. One's sense of belonging can also be religious or linguistic. Ethnicity is only one form of belonging. In comparison notably to sexual or political forms of belonging, one distinguishing factor of ethnic origin is that it is all-encompassing: if I say that I am from this ethnic group, then people imagine that I speak this language, that I follow this custom, that I live in this region of the world, etc. At this level, ethnic origin is comparable to national origin – if you say that you are Vietnamese, people think that you speak Vietnamese, that you live in Việt Nam, that you are governed by such a political system. Ethnicity and nationality are close, in the sense that both notions refer to a common culture, perceived as a heritage from the past and which is supposed to create solidarity between its members. The problem is that one nation is often made up of several ethnic groups, as in Việt Nam. Thus there can be a hierarchy between the ethnic and national forms of belonging. This gives rise to a question which is central to our work: how a State or a government can govern a diverse range of peoples. To manage them, it must identify them; so how do we determine what an ethnic group actually is?

**Box 9 What is an Ethnic Group?**

A group with specific objective characteristics?
- Linguistic;
- Territorial;
- Cultural, etc.
A group which defines itself as such?
- By a specific name;
- By a common sense of affiliation.
Defined thus, all groups belong to one ethnic group or another.

A group which is defined as such (by others)?
- By the dominant population;
- By official classifications (the State).
Defined thus, sometimes only minority groups form ethnic groups.

A classic definition is to take objective criteria: linguistic, territorial, cultural ones. In this way belonging is often inherited – you are born in a Hmong village, you are Hmong; in a Kinh village, you are Kinh. States choose these criteria, but in reality things are not always so simple. Let’s take two examples:

- It's true that the Hmong form an ethnic group, but they are without a territory in its proper sense: they are found in Lao, in Thailand, in China, in different parts of Việt Nam, etc.
In Laos, a distinction is drawn between the Tai Dam, Tai Deng and Tai Khao, which are different groups of Tai, defined as distinct ethnic groups, but who speak the same language.

Another criterion which can seem simple is to ask people what ethnic group they are from. This criterion implies a sense of belonging. But you can be born in a village, speak the language of that village and not feel that you belong to the community where you were born because your way of life has changed – for example if you have lived in the city or abroad.

We thus have two kinds of criteria: objective criteria – a heritage from the past – and a feeling of belonging, which are not always obvious. Moreover, these two criteria are not always linked. Let’s take the example of an individual born to Vietnamese parents and who has grown up in France. Isn’t it possible that he no longer speaks Vietnamese and no longer practises the religion of his ancestors? He dresses like a French person. He wouldn’t meet a single one of the objective criteria but he could say “I am Vietnamese!” For you, is that person Vietnamese? It’s important to know, because when we make classifications, the entire population needs to be identified. Imagine this in your own country. How can we then class the entirety of the populations of Việt Nam, over 80 million people, or that of Laos or Cambodia?

Image

The Akha Groups of Phongsaly

Costumes (from top/right to bottom/left):
- Chepia
- Eupa
- Pouli
- Nyaeu
- Oma
- Pusho
- Nouheu

Source: Author’s construction.

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- Chepia
- Eupa
- Pouli
- Nyaeu
- Oma
- Pusho
- Nouheu

Source: Author’s construction.
If we look at these images, the first person at the bottom right speaks a language very close to that of the person whose photo is to his right. Their villages are only a few kilometres apart. To the external observer, their cultural practices are identical. However, they are from two distinct groups, Nouheu and Eupa. And these groups do not intermarry. When I asked why, I got the reply that it was because their traditions differed. When I asked for an example, they replied: "When we worship our ancestors, we put two glasses of alcohol on the altar and they put three", a criterion which is to us a simple detail. Here, all the objective criteria are met, but the sense of common belonging does not exist.

As defined earlier, one might think that all human beings have an ethnic affiliation because they all have a sense of belonging to a community, have a language which they share with others, live in a village which they share with others, etc.

We’re coming to the second interpretation of the “ethnic group”, where the ethnic group is always other people. In fact, there is very often an implicit association between an ethnic group and a minority group. This is a relative definition, because it depends on a point of view, that of the majority, which often means the State (the Kinh in Việt Nam, the Lao in Laos, etc.).

For many people, ethnicity has a slightly negative sense, a marked difference to the majority. Two definitions of ethnicity can be put forward: that which one gives oneself – in which case everyone should have an ethnicity, which is not always the case – and that defined by the majority, thus ethnicity is linked to the fact of belonging to a minority culture.

![Relative Nature of Labels: the Tai Viewpoint, the Akha Viewpoint](image)
For a Lao, all the groups mentioned are called Ko or Akha. In the State classification, shortcuts are needed. The State cannot classify the three hundred groups present in Lao, and because the government is from the majority population, it has lumped wide ranges of groups together, particularly those groups culturally most distant from the Lao majority, to which most members of the administration belong.

An example. In Laos there are a number of Tai: Tai Yang, Tai Lao, Tai Neuá, Tai Lue, etc. Their differences in terms of culture, dress and language are similar to those between the different Akha groups. However, these groups have not been classified together, but recognized as separate in the official classification. One might think that this is because they are culturally and socially closer to the majority group, the Lao, and therefore better known. Now imagine that Laos is governed by the Akha: the Tai groups would then perhaps all be known as Bichon in the official classification, while each Akha group would be specified. Classifications change according to the person doing the classifying.

**Box 11 How and Why We Make Ethnic Classifications?**

**Objectives:**
- Descriptive (taking stock of things as they are);
- Normative (in pursuit of some objective).

**What could be the normative objectives of classification?**

To create a stable list of groups (fixed and covering the entire population) to facilitate identification and representation of the population, notably with a view to assuring national cohesion.

**What are the potential biases of classifications?**

- Choice of name (but which? There is not always a link with the autonym, the name which the ethnic group uses for itself);
- Choice of divisions and groupings (according to State-led criteria);
- Implies a unique and fixed ethnic affiliation;
- Implies choices which reflect the point of view of the classifier.

**Source:** Author’s construction.

States need to classify. This requirement is partly a wish to describe, but also has the objective of standardization. Let’s be clear from the start that it’s not a matter of making accusations, though it’s true that the discourse of anthropology is often seen as anti-establishment. For us, being critical means that you need to reflect on the “why” to do better and to go further. Let’s take two examples linked to this second objective:

- When the French colonized northern Việt Nam, it was important to identify each ethnic group and its spokesman – a leader – so as to impose a system of taxation based on different ways of life;
In some countries, such as India, there is an official representation of each community in Parliament. It’s important to define these communities clearly so as to represent them.

This is also why anthropologists examine the logic of these classifications, to show their limits, their drawbacks, but also with the aim of making them more accurate. A name must be chosen – and sometimes there are multiple names: the name a group gives itself, the name given by such a neighbour, and so on – and criteria to establish a homogenous classification. However, these criteria overlap in an unsystematic way and it is possible to belong to several ethnic groups.

For example, in the era of trade caravans drawn by horses, the few Akha who took on this practice identified themselves with the Han Chinese, the group which operated a quasi-monoply over this trade. But when they returned to their region, their village, they became Akha again. Diachronic analysis, over time, would allow us better to measure the ever-changing character of these classifications, as shown below by the divisions in Laos:

### Box 12 Evolution of Ethnic Classifications in Laos

- **Before 1960**: a hierarchical classification on a political basis:
  - The Tai (“free men”);
  - The Kha (“subservient men”).

- **1960-1986**: an integrating classification, on a geographical basis:
  - Lao loun (Plains Lao);
  - Lao theung (Lao of the slopes);
  - Lao soung (Lao of the peaks).

- **1986-2011**: a “scientific” classification on a linguistic basis:
  - Tai-Kadai;
  - Austro-Asiatic;
  - Hmong-Iu Mien;
  - Sino-Tibetan.

Source: Author’s construction.

[Christian Culas]

The situation highlighted for the ethnic groups in Laos was also found historically in Thailand. Formerly, all the ethnic groups in the North of Thailand were known in Thai as Chao Khao, which means “Mountain people”; twenty years ago, their official name became Thai Phu Khao, the “Thai of the mountains”. Localized coastal ethnic groups, often
nomadic and all bearing different names, are called “Thai of the sea”. The generic term “Thai” is used here to signify integration within the Thai State, but from the cultural, linguistic, historical and religious points of view none of these groups is similar to the ethnic majority Thai, or Siamese.

Srey Sophorvny

In Cambodia, the ethnic groups live in the mountainous regions in the north-east of the country. However, there are also Vietnamese, Chams, Muslims and Chinese who live in the plains, but these groups are not considered as minorities.

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

They are considered as minorities, but not as ethnic minorities. Besides, you’ll note that in Cambodia the ethnic minorities historically and linguistically have the same origin as the majority. In many countries, ethnic minorities are associated with aboriginals, the original inhabitants... In Cambodia, they all arrived together. In Laos, the original inhabitants were groups which have long been known as Kha – thus the majority don’t really want to draw attention to this fact. The current classification criterion for ethnic groups in Laos is linguistic. But firstly, speaking a language which comes from the same linguistic family doesn’t actually mean speaking the same language – there can be a great diversity of languages within the same linguistic family – and nor does it mean sharing the same culture or even the same cultural base. Groups which appear linguistically similar can live in very different ways; and groups belonging to two different linguistic families can have a very comparable way of life – as can be the case in Việt Nam between the Mường and the Tai, or between the Tai Nung and some of the Dao.

All this is to illustrate that since the concept of ethnicity is complex, ethnic classifications are always a bit arbitrary, and talking of minority groups often makes no sense except in terms of the relationship toward the State and the dominant population.

Jimreivat Pattiya

Aren’t there some Austronesians on the border between Việt Nam and Laos?

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

In my view, Austronesians don’t exist; there are simply people who speak languages belonging to the Austronesian family. We’re talking here about linguistic categories, not social or cultural ones. Many people make the mistake of using them as cultural or “ethno-linguistic” categories, Moreover, these linguistic categories have been gradually constructed by researchers, they are not data. Finally, there are sometimes political biases in the constitution of these categories. In China, a rapprochement is made between the Tibeto-Burmese and the speakers of Chinese languages; some Chinese and Vietnamese linguists say that Tibeto-Burmese, Chinese, Tai-Kadai and Austro-Asiatics belong to one family. In this way, within one nation, all the populations have a common origin.

[Christian Culas]

In Việt Nam, this debate has existed for a long time, on the relationship between Mường et Kinh. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle scientific research from ideological positions.

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

Thus we must always ask ourselves which point of view we’re speaking from. Who are you when you study this group, what are your
ideas, your position? One must take a critical look at oneself.

Jimreivat Pattiya

When one is working with the people of North-Eastern Thailand, to say that they are Lao is viewed very poorly by the government. We have to speak of North-Eastern Tai populations, but linguistically they speak Lao.

[Christian Culas]

Today, there are more people of Lao ethnicity (both culture and language) in Thailand than in Laos; they are called Issan, “people of the North-East”. The reason is simple: in the 17th and 18th centuries, the objective of conflict between different States – Laos, Thailand, Cambodia – was to capture populations. When Thailand invaded Laos, millions of people were taken to Thailand and stayed there.

Day 1, afternoon of Monday 18 July

2.3.3. Names Given to Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam

[Christian Culas]

To complement what was presented this morning, I’d like to present you with an approach to the analysis of ethnic names. We’ll see that the first names used in history were generic, they were used to refer to vast social groups which rarely corresponded to the ethnic populations’ own perceptions of identity. Who produced and used these ethnic names? How were they formed, at which period in history and with what objectives?

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Box 13 From Generic Designations to Emic Designations

- **“Generic designation”** means that a term designates a group of things which we think have numerous points in common.

  Example: “Ethnic groups” is a generic term which encompasses numerous populations which are different but all “ethnic”.

- **“Emic designation”** means that the term is used by the ethnic groups themselves.
  We distinguish *emic* which designates ways of thinking and talking described by people themselves, from *etic* which refers to ways of thinking and talking described by people exterior to those studied (researchers, the State, development projects, neighbours, other ethnic groups, etc.).


Source: Author’s construction.

The “generic designation” is easy to understand, the term is used to designate a group of things which have or are supposed to have similar or close elements, and which are therefore from the same group. The widest generic term which we used this morning was “ethnic group” or “ethnic minority”. Grégoire took the example of the Akha, found in about twenty different subgroups, but whom the Lao just call Akha. You understand that the generic designation remains very vague: individuals who are
sometimes very different are lumped together in one group.

For an anthropologist, the distinction between *emic/etic* is a very useful analytical instrument. \(^{[10]}\) *Emic* refers to all the patterns of thought and behaviour described by a people themselves; on the contrary, *etic* refers to ways of thinking and describing things by people outside the group being studied.

Here’s an example. Formerly, “meo” was used in Việt Nam to designate the Hmong – an *etic* term which came from outsiders, in this case Vietnamese; the Hmong referred to themselves as Hmong – an *emic* term. The study of the history of the designation of ethnic groups, in the archives in particular, highlights the use of very general terms, and the more one approaches the present day the more precise they become. We move from very wide generic terms to *emic* terms.

Let’s apply a diachronic method. I’m going to compare the same populations in the same places but at different moments in history. My variable will be time.

The situation is particularly full of contrasts in the mountainous areas of Việt Nam, where the presence of the Kinh – or Vietnamese – is very recent. In the 19th century, there were almost no Vietnamese in the current provincial capitals in the North of the country. Only civil servants were present, for short durations; those political and administrative officials responsible for the control of the region. This explains why the Kinh know these hill-country populations so little.

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**Table 62** *Evolution of Ethnic Designations in Việt Nam*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>Exonym</th>
<th>Exonym</th>
<th>Exonym</th>
<th>Exonym</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18th-19th centuries</td>
<td>Mợ                  (Wild people, South)</td>
<td>Măn                           (Wild people, North)</td>
<td>Thơ          (Aboriginals, North)</td>
<td>Mẻ     (Cat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1950</td>
<td>Ăn, Bahnar, Jorai…</td>
<td>Măn-Yao-Dao, Mèo, Hani…</td>
<td>Tày, Nùng, Giáy…</td>
<td>Mèo-Hmong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-2010</td>
<td>Ăn, Bahnar, Jorai…</td>
<td>Măn-Yao, Hmong, Hani</td>
<td>Tày, Nùng, Giáy</td>
<td>Flower, Black, White, Red, Hmong…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future?</td>
<td>Names of ethnic sub-groups?</td>
<td>Măm                   (Lai)</td>
<td>Tày, Nùng, Giáy</td>
<td>Black Hmong Shi Hmong Peb Hmong…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s construction.*

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\(^{[10]}\) For a historical and epistemological approach to *emic/etic*, we direct the reader to the following publication: Olivier de Sardan (1998), *Emique, L’Homme*, 147: 151-166. (http://www.persee.fr)
This summary table sets out the designations of different ethnic groups that we have found in the Vietnamese archives. You will note that the series starts from the 18th century because there are very few data on these groups before that date.

In Vietnamese, Moi means “wild”, “that which is not civilized”. This designation is specific to the South of the country. It was used for almost two centuries, then at the start of the 20th century ethnic designations were amended to shift towards the emic. The same is visible for the Mán, which also means “wild”, for the Northern region of Việt Nam; it’s an ancient Chinese term taken up by the Vietnamese. Our colleague Hạnh will expand on this – see the part of the table within a border.

The Thổ are also a very composite collection – the Mường group is included under this designation in some regions. The term is interesting because it designates the inhabitants of a place, the aboriginals; it means “those who live in that place”.

The fourth column concerns the Mèo; this name comes historically from an adaptation of the Chinese term “miao”. In the French colonial period, the Mèo were referred to alongside the Hmong group; then the term gradually disappeared, even though there is still a Tà-Mèo region, and specific groups – White Hmong, Black Hmong, etc.

### 2.3.4. Definition and Classification of Ethnic Groups in Việt Nam

[Trần Hồng Hạnh]

Trần Hồng Hạnh takes three criteria for the identification of ethnic groups used officially in Việt Nam and covered above – see section 2.3.2. Criteria for the identification and classification of ethnic groups:
- A common language. The Institute of Ethnology classifies ethno-linguistic families into three distinct groups: Austro-Asiatic, Sino-Tibetan and Austronesian;
- Cultural practices – a criterion which is seen as vague and difficult to determine (see the example of ancestor-worship practices used by Grégoire Schlemmer this morning);
- Sense of belonging – reference criterion for the publication of the list of ethnic groups in Việt Nam (see decision 121TCBKTCPB dated 2nd March 1979).

Take the example of the Dao.

The Dao in Việt Nam are called “Kiềm miền (Kìm mủn), Diu miền, Yù miền, İn miền, Bièo miền” – self-naming, that is, using a name which each community gives to itself. The names “Kiềm, Kìm, Diu, Yù, İn” all mean “forest”. “Miền, Mùn” refers to the person, the man.

However, the designations Kìm miền and Kìm mủn are imprecise, because the Dao are not the only group to live in forested areas; Diu miền, Yù miền, İn miền, Bièo miền are used in Sino-Vietnamese by the Dao.

Exonyms – names given to a community by another community – are very different because they refer to the Dao group – Động, Dao, Đào, Xà, Mán, Trai, etc.
- Động: a designation widely used in the ancient region of Việt Bắc, a historic unit of territory which means village or hamlet;
- Dao or Dào are corruptions of Dao, in the same way that the Hmong are called Mèo, Mèo;
- Xá is often used in the region of Yên Bái and of Lào Cai – a designation common to many ethnic groups in the North-west of Việt Nam which expresses contempt, racial discrimination;
- Mán refers to a “barbarian” ethnic group which lives outside the residential areas of the Hán group – racial discrimination.

As for many other ethnic groups, the name of the group is closely linked to its history: a group originally from China, the timing of their arrival in Việt Nam still an open question – from the 11th or 13th century onwards, according to different authors. Different modes of migration determined the areas where they settled: the Northwestern areas of Việt Nam – via roads, in the 12th century; the North-East and some provinces of the Centre – from the 12th to the early 20th centuries, mainly via river transport.

- In the 13th century: the Dao quần trắng from Phúc Kiến migrated towards the provinces of Quảng Yên, Lạng Sơn, Cao Bằng, Thái Nguyên and Tuyên Quang; a small number of them established themselves in Vĩnh Phú or in the provinces of Yên Bái and Lào Cai and bore the name Dao họ;
- Between the 15th and the 18th century: the Dao quần chẹt and Dao tiền migrated towards the provinces of Quảng Đông, Quảng Yên, Vĩnh Phúc, Hà Tây, Hòa Bình, Yên Bái and Tuyên Quang;
- In the 17th century: the Dao thanh y from the province of Quảng Đông migrated towards Móng Cái, then crossed Lục Ngân and the river Dương to get to Tuyên Quang; some of them went to Yên Bái and Lào Cai and were known as Dao tuyển;
- In the 17th century: the Dao đỏ and Dao tiền of Quảng Đông and Quảng Tây migrated to Cao Bằng, Bắc Kạn, Hà Giang and Tuyên Quang;
- In the 18th century: the Dao đỏ migrated to Lào Cai;
- At the end of the 19th century and in the early 20th century: the Dao lô gang settled in various provinces of Việt Nam.

You’ll note from these names that the first element is self-naming and generic; the second element refers to the clothing worn. Currently, about 30 Dao groups have been identified in Việt Nam, of which the main ones are: Dao tiền, Dao đỏ, Dao quần chẹt, Dao quần trắng, Dao thanh y, Dao cóc ngáng, Dao cóc mùng and Dao lân tén. For about thirty years now, this group has also been present in the provinces of the Central Highlands and in the East and South of the country. These population movements have contributed to the cultural enrichment of the group.

Jimreivat Pattiya

The Dao are scattered over a very large area, from the Northern mountains to the Central Highlands; is this due to the political will of the government or just a spontaneous migratory movement?

[Trần Hồng Hạnh]

In contrast to the Hmong, the Dao don’t move in an organized way. The main reason for these migrations is an economic one.

In Lao, the government displaced Hmong and Dao living in national parks or national forest areas; the effects on the way of life of these populations were very damaging.
Lê Hải Đang

The Institute of Ethnology categorizes three ethno-linguistic “families” while the Museum of Ethnology identifies five; what is the reason for this?

[Trần Hồng Hạnh]

The classification into three linguistic groups is an official document of the Institute of Ethnology, but even there there are different views. It is true that the Museum of Ethnology distinguishes five different groups: Austro-Asiatic, Austronesian, Sino-Tibetan, Tai-Kadai and Hmong-Dao.

[Christian Culas]

I think that one explanation is that a division into five linguistic families in Việt Nam, in Laos and in Thailand fits the vision of all the international publications by the most eminent linguists. This classification carries weight in numerous countries: Japan, France, the US, the UK, etc. To my mind the Môn-Khmer, Tài-Kadai and Mèo-Dao families are very different – tonal languages or not. How can one group these different minorities together? The question remains open.

Nguyễn Thị Hà Nhưng

In my opinion the name Dao is a name given to this group by the Chinese.

[Trần Hồng Hạnh]

The names Kim mun, Yu mien, etc., are autonyms – emic. They all have a common meaning, “person living in the forest”; these different names are known as Dao in Sino-Vietnamese.

[Christian Culas]

Just an anecdote on the naming of the Yao in Việt Nam. In the text, “The Descriptive Geography by Emperor Đồng Khánh”, is written in Chinese characters, when the Dao or Yao are mentioned, the Chinese character Yao is used, but the symbol has changed. In Chinese, we have the symbol for a snake, and here we have the symbol for a man. The Vietnamese appropriated the Chinese character, but they pronounce it Dao not Yao, and the symbol for the character was modified. This is an external logic: we have a Chinese character which comes to Việt Nam, but there’s no link to people; all this takes place between learned Chinese and Vietnamese writers who “play” with characters. These are exonyms, a completely etic dimension.

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

Yao is a Chinese term, which is interesting for our discussion because it designated a category which was more political than ethnic, in this case meaning groups exempt from servitude – for services rendered to the Emperor. Secondly, even if it’s not an autonym, it did confer an attractive political status so there were groups who had an incentive, at particular moments, to identify themselves as Yao. In fact, in both China and Việt Nam, there are groups speaking the Tai language who have been subsumed within the overall Yao grouping.
2.3.5. The Approach of Ethnicity: The Laotian Example

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

I would like to use the Laotian province of Phongsaly, my area of study, as an example of issues of ethnicity. I will take various prejudices, often aired in the press or public opinion, associated with ethnic minorities and try to provide a criticism of them, deconstruct them, using examples from that province.

First “received wisdom”: ethnic minorities constitute a group, implying that they have points in common which link them to each other, distinguishing them all from the majority.

According to the official classification in Laos, there are thirteen ethnic groups in Phongsaly. During surveys conducted in the field, when I asked individuals to identify themselves by group, I myself counted about forty different designations. These interviews were held in about 150 out of the 600 villages in the province. It’s noteworthy that the Lao, the ethnic majority of Laos, constitute only 3% of the population of the province – a very tiny minority! From among the multiple ethnic groups identified, let’s look at the Tai Lue. The Tai Lue group is very close to the Lao in every way. To simplify, let’s say that what distinguished the two was their original political affiliation: the Tai Lue were the subjects of the ancient kingdom of Sip Song Panna (Xishuanbanna in Chinese – now integrated into the Chinese province of Yunnan, which borders Phongsaly), while a Lao was a subject of the kingdom of Lan Xang, the former name for Laos. The ethnic definition here is typically established on the basis of political factors.

Today, a Lao of Phongsaly is closer to a Tai Lue of Phongsaly than he is to a Lao from the South of the country. Dwellings, manners of dress and language are identical; they are neighbours and communicate with each other. Nevertheless, the official classification defines one of these groups, the Lao, as forming the majority, and the other as an ethnic minority…

Let’s take another example of the ambiguities of official classifications, the example of the Ho (or Haw) in Phongsaly. This group is closer to the Hoa of Việt Nam than to the Ho of Thailand, because the latter are often former caravanners from China, who were Muslim traders – in China, they were known as Hui, and formed an ethnic group of “nationality” due to their religious affiliation. What about the Ho of Phongsaly? Officially, they are an ethnic group. They accept and claim the designation “Ho”, which assures their position in Laos, notably by distinguishing them from more recent migrants from China. But among themselves and in their own language, they define themselves as Han, that is the biggest ethnic majority of China. Thus the Ho, numerically a tiny minority in Laos, see themselves as belonging to a group which represents about a third of the human race. These two examples beg the question: what are the criteria for the definition of ethnic and minority groups in Laos, when within this category are groups based on a former political origin (the Tai Lue), others stemming from recent migrations but defining themselves as part of the dominant Chinese majority group (Ho) and others grouped together through ignorance (Akha/Ko)?

Second “received wisdom”: each ethnic group itself forms a discrete grouping, and these are more or less mutually exclusive.
The interesting thing about a region like Phongsaly is that despite its small surface area, it contains a great diversity of ethnic groups. However, the study of these populations shows that these groups share many similar practices with each other as well as with the Lao, which are the majority population and therefore not classed as an ethnic minority. These similarities override ethnic affiliation. For example, all the ethnic groups in the province have the same religious traditions around territorial rites, because they all live in the same territory. Groups influence each other in many ways, as much technical as sartorial, culinary, etc. Thus we understand that monographic research is important, but must be complemented by studies of the relationships between groups.

Third “received wisdom”: ethnic groups are groups which have endured over the long term, changing and evolving little.

But in fact ethnic groups are born, live and then die. The study of this dynamic is particularly interesting at Phongsaly because almost three-quarters of the population was not yet present in the province 200 years ago: many individuals migrated as a result of the violent revolts of the Hui and the Taiping which adversely affected the whole of South China in the mid-19th century. These migrations sometimes snapped the link between people who had come from the same group but found themselves displaced in different directions, bringing about the creation of new ethnic groups. Populations from the plains, who had a fixed habitat and used irrigation to cultivate rice, found themselves isolated in a forest setting. One mustn't think that these groups had no history; it's just not a written history. Likewise one mustn't think that these groups can't change their way of life. Let's take the example of the Hmong. The majority of this group lives in China. They live in impressive sedentary villages and have tended irrigated rice-fields for many years. In Việt Nam, Thailand and Laos, they live mainly from slash-and-burn agriculture in mountain villages. To escape the troubles affecting South China, they had to adapt to a new mountain environment and to a way of life which allowed mobility and thus escape. In a few decades they made major changes to their way of life. Moreover, the idea that ethnic groups live in closed-off economic units is a tenacious one. But as far as we can go back in history, thanks to Thai and Chinese records, it is stated that mountain populations were integrated into economic networks on an international scale, through the production of cotton, opium, forest products, etc.

To conclude, let’s remember that ethnicity is a fluid notion made up of several criteria which aren’t necessarily linked. It’s both a fairly objective kind of affiliation – based on a common cultural heritage – and also a feeling of belonging, which is partly subjective; and its position is defined by, or built around, its neighbours. It is characterized by a multiple, changing reality, which is as much social and political as cultural.

What are the methodological implications in the approach of ethnic groups?

- We need to examine transformations and changes over the long term;
- We mustn’t over-emphasise ethnic groups and must be careful of generalizing;
- It’s useful to take a more inclusive regional approach, touching also on local dynamics;
- We must be careful not to isolate ethnic groups, but instead integrate their
relationships with their neighbours as a key part of their identity.

Day 2, Tuesday 19th July

2.3.6. Cartography in the Former Kingdoms of the 19th Century, and the Geographical Distribution of Linguistic Families

[Grégoire Schlemmer]

Let’s look at historical maps and the division of populations and see how these can help us frame questions about ethnic affiliation. These maps are focused on the Laotian province of Phongsaly: they represent the location of populations living in the province, and of speakers of the linguistic families to which they are linked.

Map 1 Location of the Province of Phongsaly

On the map of the province of Phongsaly, you will see to the West the province of Xishuanbanna in China – the ancient kingdom of Tai Lue – and to the East, the region of Lai Châu, called Muang Lai by the Tai – then to the South, you will find Điện Biên Phú. It’s a very mountainous area, with very few rice fields.
This map shows the former kingdoms already mentioned: Sip Song Panna (the Lue kingdom), Muang Lai and Muang Then – which were part of Sip Song Chau Tai: the twelve districts ruled by the Tai. You can see neither present-day Thailand nor Laos, but instead a grouping of kingdoms with fluid frontiers.

**[Christian Culas]**

Each shaded area represents a principality with a princely court, autonomous political entities: to the West, the principality of Chiang Mai; then that of Nan, in Burma, the principality of Chiang Kaeng; in Laos, Luang Prabang, Vientiane in the South and Champassak.

**[Grégoire Schlemmer]**

Only the political centres were important, the frontiers were fluid and could overlap. For example, the former kingdom of Tran Nhìn – or Xieng Khouang – paid tribute to Hà Nội and to Luang Prabang; Luang Prabang itself paid tribute to Hà Nội, which paid tribute to China and Siam. One can clearly imagine the difficulties during the establishment of fixed, definitive frontiers so as to determine who owned which political entities.
Boundary markers, like mapmaking, are recent in continental Southeast Asia.

The States controlled the areas close to the capitals, the rice-growing deltas, but exercised very little control over the hill and mountain areas – aside from a few missions by the official posted there. The first marked frontier between Việt Nam and China was defined in the 19th century. The frontier between Thailand and Laos dates from the same era – drawn by a commission comprising Thailand, France, Laos and Great Britain. For a very long time, the local population had thus been very weakly controlled. Then the definition of frontiers pushed these populations into Thailand, Laos, etc.

The historical approach is essential when studying ethnic groups. We must bear in mind that the present-day States are recent inventions. In the 19th century, strict control of territory and its populations mattered less than the collection of taxes. This goes some way to explain how such ethnic diversity was possible: there was no attempt to unify the population via common governance, or by putting them to work together. Moreover, the cultural and linguistic diversity between groups served to justify and maintain political and economic distinctions – the culture of the dominant population and its elite thus keeping itself separate.
This map represents the distribution of Austro-Asiatic populations; it covers Cambodia, Việt Nam, the Eastern half of Laos, part of Burma, and extends as far as India.

We can see here a continuous or block-by-block occupation, which could lead us to suppose some kind of cultural homogeneity. This map testifies to the scepticism we must maintain in relation to social and cultural interpretations of linguistic families: just because you speak a language belonging to the same linguistic group as someone else doesn't mean you have anything at all in common with him. At the social and cultural level, these populations are extremely diverse; we find people from the plains and from the mountains, founders of great kingdoms or forming small isolated groups, influenced by Chinese or Indian civilization, of different religious affiliations, etc.